'Xiaomi diplomacy': its implications for Sino-Korea relations

Cho Byung-jae

Two scenes. The first: On Nov. 1, 2025, at the bilateral summit between President Lee Jae Myung and President Xi Jinping held on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum summit in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, there was an exchange of gifts. It was a scene of ordinary diplomatic protocol, and the atmosphere was restrained. However, the Xiaomi smartphone that President Xi presented as a gift changed the atmosphere subtly but clearly. Short jokes were exchanged around “communications security” and “backdoors,” and relaxed laughter followed.

The second scene: Two months later, Lee visited China. On Monday, after coming out of the state banquet together with Xi, he took out a smartphone — the very smartphone he had received from Xi in Gyeongju. Lee took a selfie of the two presidents and their spouses. Then, together with the words, “I got the shot of a lifetime,” he uploaded it to social media.

Both scenes could have passed without much notice. However, given the gift of a smartphone departed from the customary practice, the meaning of this gift provided room to be newly interpreted.

Summit gifts are not decided through negotiation. They are a unilateral choice by the side that gives. If there is an intention, it is only the giver’s thinking. Since the normalization of Korea-China relations in 1992, the gifts exchanged by the leaders of the two countries have been traditional craftworks or cultural items. A smartphone departed from this practice. But precisely that fact turned a routine protocol act into a meaningful diplomatic signal. Technology, supply chains and, in the era of techno-politics, the boundaries of Korea-China cooperation came to the foreground.

The Xiaomi 15 Ultra smartphone is not China’s most advanced technology, nor is it the most high-end model that Xiaomi produces. It is merely a common product on the market. Therefore, this cannot be something China put forward to impress Korea. Second, this device includes display components of Korean companies that are produced in China, which means that it is an example of interdependence where Korea’s midstream manufacturing capabilities are intertwined with China’s consumer-goods production technology. Yet since it is a mass consumer good, it has no strategic sensitivity. That is, interdependence is clear, but it is not a sensitive domain.

Would it not be acceptable to interpret that, in China’s selecting Xiaomi, there was a meaning of presenting a new definition of the bilateral relationship?

The theme of the Xiaomi smartphone is technology, and the signal is limited interdependence. Here, the word “backdoor,” which Xi threw out by chance, reconfirmed the meaning of the signal. Rather than denying or concealing a trust deficit, the remark accepted it as a premise.

China, in effect, proposed a redefinition of the bilateral relationship. China appears to have judged that maintaining relations with Korea, even within a limited scope, accords with its national interest. Korea is an important midstream and manufacturing hub in global supply chains. If the relationship with Korea were to be blocked, it could strengthen the cohesion of a U.S.-Japan-centered technology and security bloc in Northeast Asia.

At the same time, China does not seem to view its relationship with Korea as a strategic asset whose expandability is freely open as in the past. It seems to redefine it as a “managed variable,” that is, the relationship should be maintained, but its scope must remain at a level that does not amplify China’s strategic vulnerability.

The Xiaomi 15 Ultra smartphone can be interpreted as a symbol that condenses this Chinese calculation. It is a choice that takes technology as the theme but sets a ceiling of civilian, consumer and nonstrategic domains.

Of course, it is impossible to determine from the outside, in a definitive way, the exact intention contained in gift exchanges between leaders. Nevertheless, if one looks at the context in which the symbol appeared, the Xiaomi smartphone can become a clue that runs through the two summit meetings.

In Beijing, Lee called this symbolic object back again in an informal and personal space. This scene was neither to declare full technology cooperation nor to conceal conflict. Rather, it shows a will to continue trust even within constrained circumstances.

Xiaomi functions as the minimum common denominator that both sides can share. In this respect, the Xiaomi smartphone shows that the Korea-China relationship is moving beyond a stage of one-sided expectations or declaratory goals. It shows that it is entering a more realistic and mature stage of distinguishing what is desirable and what is possible, namely, the accumulation of trust premised on constraints.

The Beijing summit was closer to a process of checking the possibilities and limits of cooperation under real-world conditions. Rather than focusing on solving pending issues right away, it has ushered the bilateral relationship into a recalibrated phase of building trust within that range.

The Xiaomi smartphone is a symbol that fixes the ceiling of a new Korea-China relationship, and at the same time a symbol that contains the will to make the relationship actually operate within that ceiling.

Diplomacy in the techno-politics era no longer advances through big promises or flashy declarations. It is formed slowly through small objects, short scenes and repeated interactions. The Xiaomi smartphone gift and the selfie shooting were two scenes that captured that process in compressed form.

Cho Byung-jae (bjcho81@gmail.com) is a visiting professor emeritus at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of the Kyungnam University. Cho was a career diplomat and his last position at the foreign ministry was the chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy.