Absence of joint statement dampens prospects for improved ties

During his reciprocal state visit to Beijing, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung met with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Jan. 5. Afterward, the presidential spokeswoman and national security adviser praised the restoration of the bilateral relationship, but this claim seems unconvincing to most people. The summit was unable to deliver a joint statement, after Xi’s state visit to South Korea last October had a similar outcome. The presidential office has called the lack of a unified statement a “new normal” to downplay its diplomatic significance.

The joint statement is a critical measure of success for these visits. A joint news conference and statement supplement the 21-gun salute, reviewing stand and state banquet. The summit’s joint declaration underlines the leaders’ compromises on shared interests and pledges future development. Many observers are confused by the lack of a joint statement after two summits.

The joint statement holds considerable importance for future collaboration. It outlines a framework for subsequent working-level meetings and facilitates progress toward the objectives established by the two heads of state. In the absence of a document, meetings risk becoming directionless, lacking in compromise and, crucially, undermining the confidence essential for driving progress. Lee has reportedly presented numerous suggestions to Xi regarding the concerns and interests of the South Korean populace. The developments include curtailing China’s expansion of fish farming and monitoring facilities in the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) in the West Sea, the lifting of bans on Korean entertainment in the Chinese market, and issues related to China’s fine dust pollution.

After visiting Beijing, Lee held a press event in Shanghai, where his remarks revealed that he was swayed by his opponent’s defense. He was apparently sold on China’s claim that the West Sea structures were fish farms, convincingly saying China “maybe would remove” the surveillance facilities. He proposed a vice-ministerial meeting on West Sea maritime demarcation to ease anxieties and expressed optimism for its speedy resumption. Working groups on these two subjects have been meeting occasionally for some time now. China committed to co-inspecting facilities after a PMZ working meeting in April, but nothing has been done. One month ago, an inspection opportunity was given but failed. China’s military opposed Korea’s unilateral inspections in February and August. These issues seem to have escaped China’s attention, considered unsuitable for a unified statement.

Lee also informed the media that he had requested that China take on a more constructive role in enhancing inter-Korean relations, as well as creating opportunities for dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea. He expressed apparent pride in receiving a positive response from the Chinese side, although the specific details remain unknown. At this point, there is minimal expectation surrounding China’s purported commitment, as Beijing has adjusted its stance regarding North Korea’s nuclear challenge in recent years.

China appears to have lost interest in North Korea’s disarmament, a shift that stopped the summit from adopting a joint declaration on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In September 2022, North Korea passed the Law on Nuclear Forces Policy, legalizing preemptive nuclear strikes. Pyongyang has also stated that it will never give up its nuclear weapons, a stance that was confirmed by the Supreme People’s Assembly last September. In late 2023, North Korea redefined South Korea as a hostile state. In 2024, it reiterated its willingness to use nuclear weapons if attacked. Since 2023, China has taken a more distant posture on North Korea’s nuclear program, even as it constantly threatens to use nuclear weapons and insists on a divided Korean Peninsula.

The official joint statements from China-Russia summits in 2023 and 2024 removed China’s 2017 formulas of “dual suspension,” involving the suspension of both U.S.-ROK joint military exercises and North Korea’s nuclear tests, and “parallel advancement,” or the simultaneous pursuit of denuclearization and peace on the peninsula. Instead, Beijing stressed respect for North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns” and urged parties to discuss North Korea’s nuclear issue. China’s passive attitude — bordering on indifference — was again visible in the 2024 South Korea-China-Japan summit joint declaration, which included the phrase “respecting each country’s position.” Despite this, the Korean president has asked China to help promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, particularly regarding North Korea’s nuclear issue. China did not respond, indicating its disinterest.

Since South Korea and China normalized diplomatic relations in 1992, Beijing has backed inter-Korean engagement and North Korea-U.S. negotiations, stepping up when needed. It is proud to have hosted the Six-Party Talks and helped organize the 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi. After the summit, the state-run People’s Daily outlined the nation’s role.

China may voice its backing for inter-Korean dialogue or seek to enhance its relations, yet it currently does not assume a role that parallels the significance of the Six-Party Talks or the Hanoi summit. For nearly three decades following normalization, China has issued commitments that have not been fulfilled. A significant number of these promises were formally recorded and documented. In the absence of a joint statement this week, the optimistic declarations made by Lee regarding China’s responses to the issues he raised are even less likely to yield tangible results.

A fresh strategy to China is needed to account for its special connection with North Korea and its goal to preserve equidistance between Pyongyang and Seoul, which is bound by the U.S.-ROK alliance. The growing trilateral collaboration between North Korea, China and Russia makes this requirement more urgent. Thus, incentives are needed to break North Korea’s hold. History has shown that this will require improvements in U.S.-China and U.S.-North Korea ties. A coordinated plan with Washington is essential, since the U.S. is the common denominator. North Korea and China will react to U.S. decisions.

Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.