What Japan-China tensions mean for Korea

Just one month after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, promised renewed cooperation in the region, familiar tensions have returned with troubling intensity.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks about Japan's potential exercise of collective self-defense in a Taiwan contingency have sparked a diplomatic crisis with China that shows no signs of abating.
What began as diplomatic tit-for-tat between foreign ministries has quickly escalated into travel warnings, China’s renewed Japanese seafood import bans and viral social media confrontations that have deteriorated public sentiment on both sides.
The current crisis is not merely another cyclical spat destined to fade with ministerial meetings and face-saving compromises, but reflects a fundamental and perhaps structurally inevitable collision between the core strategic imperatives of both governments that was destined to come in the near future.
For Chinese President Xi Jinping, Taiwan reunification represents far more than territorial consolidation. It is the centerpiece of his vision for national rejuvenation and a defining element of his political legitimacy. For Takaichi, who rode to power on promises of a stronger Japan capable of defending its interests in the region, collective self-defense represents a cornerstone of her national security doctrine and her commitment to standing alongside democratic partners in an increasingly contested regional order.
Neither leader confronts compelling political incentives to retreat. Takaichi continues to enjoy approval ratings exceeding 70 percent. She has proven her credentials as a leader through a successful summit with President Donald Trump and her diplomatic debut in multilateral gatherings such as the APEC and the G20. Japanese public sentiment toward China remains deeply antagonistic, with an 86 percent disapproval rating, according to Pew Research, providing substantial political cover for Takaichi's firm stance while making accommodation politically hazardous.
Meanwhile, Xi cannot appear irresolute on the Taiwan issue without undermining the Chinese Communist Party’s historical narrative and inviting domestic criticism that he lacks the resolve to achieve China’s most sacred territorial objective. Failure to respond forcefully could also weaken Beijing’s long-held doctrine prohibiting foreign interference in cross-strait relations.
Historical precedents suggest such standoffs prove remarkably durable. The 2012 Japan-China clash over the Senkaku Islands and various Korea-Japan controversies over historical grievances required years to de-escalate — and those conflicts lacked the profound ideological intensity and existential stakes that characterize the Taiwan question.
For Korea, this incident highlights two critical implications that demand careful attention.
First is the question of how China calibrates its response to a neighbor’s implicit and explicit declaration of military involvement in a Taiwan contingency. While previous Japanese leaders, including the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, have signaled potential Japanese participation through carefully coded language, Takaichi represents a new threshold of a sitting head of government making unambiguous public commitments during her tenure. Beijing’s reaction to this shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity will be noteworthy.
Yet Japan’s stance is merely one data point in a broader recalibration of regional security architecture. Washington has increasingly solicited Seoul's position on a Taiwan contingency, or at minimum, sought to reorient the mission of United States Forces Korea (USFK) toward strategic competition with China. This pressure has manifested in various forms, including past remarks from Undersecretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby, USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson’s presentation featuring an inverted map of East Asia and Adm. Daryl Caudle’s comment that Seoul’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines advances collective efforts to counter China.
As discussions surrounding strategic flexibility and U.S-Korea alliance modernization continue, Beijing’s treatment of Tokyo’s declaration becomes a noteworthy precedent for Seoul. How China distinguishes, or fails to distinguish, between declaratory policy and operational capability, between contingency planning and commitment to action, will inform Korea’s own navigation of an increasingly binary strategic environment that resists the nuanced positioning Seoul has traditionally preferred.
The second implication concerns the suspension of the Korea-China-Japan trilateral framework. After languishing for five years, the trilateral mechanisms resumed last year, offering hope for institutionalized cooperation on transnational challenges. Yet Beijing's official withdrawal from this month's planned culture ministerial meeting signals that this architecture will remain once again dormant absent a dramatic thaw in China-Japan relations.
The resulting vacuum eliminates channels for working-level coordination, crisis communication protocols and the dense web of business, cultural and educational exchanges that, while often dismissed as peripheral, constitute the connective tissue of regional stability.
The collapse of trilateralism redirects Korea’s diplomatic engagement toward exclusively bilateral channels. President Lee Jae Myung has demonstrated considerable skill in this arena, conducting substantive meetings with both the Japanese and Chinese leaders during the APEC summit that prioritized common interests over differences. Indeed, the bilateral format may offer advantages that multilateral frameworks obscure, allowing Korea to customize its engagement with each capital according to the distinct rhythms and priorities of each relationship.
What emerges here is a necessity for sophisticated parallel diplomacy: deepening security cooperation with Tokyo while preserving economic interdependence and diplomatic dialogue with Beijing. The viability of this approach depends on whether the regional environment permits such balanced engagement, or whether deepening great power competition reshapes the parameters within which Korea can operate in East Asia.
Park Jin-wan is a nonresident fellow for the European Centre for North Korean Studies at the University of Vienna and co-founder of the U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Next-Gen Study Group.