Korea-China relations fully restored? Not yet

Choo Jae-woo

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, has concluded successfully, prompting a wide-ranging evaluation of the current Korean government’s pragmatic, national-interest-based diplomatic approach across various sectors.

It is often remarked that “it is easier to criticize than to act.” Evaluations are prone to result in criticism, potentially undermining the remarkable efforts of those who organized an event attended by heads of state from 21 APEC member economies from around the world. Nonetheless, critical evaluations are hard to circumvent, given that some of the results of President Lee Jae Myung’s series of bilateral summits remain unverified.

Lee's bilateral discussions included a notable meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, which captured significant attention from the Korean public. The importance of the trip was underscored by the fact that it was Xi's first visit to the country in over a decade, with the last state visit occurring eleven years prior.

On the evening of Oct. 24, Koreans received the news of the visit from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than from their own government. The event came as a notable surprise, with many questioning the feasibility of a full-fledged state visit, given the time constraints.

During his three day visit, Xi was set to attend the full two-day APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, leaving less than 24 hours for bilateral meetings. It appeared that the schedule did not allow for a joint communiqué or news conference, which is usually considered essential protocol for a state visit.

The summit marked the first official meeting between South Korean and Chinese leadership since 2017. Before that, the two heads of state had only engaged in pull-aside meetings at multilateral venues. The Korean public was captivated by the event, fostering high expectations among attendees. The outcomes of the summit were communicated solely through statements from the presidential office, much to the disappointment of observers.

The phrase “state courtesy,” as used by various media outlets, may have been more accurate, given the absence of essential ceremonial elements that typically characterize a state visit. The presidential office announced that Seoul and Beijing achieved a “full restoration” of bilateral relations, but no evidence was presented to substantiate this claim.

The lack of visible outcomes can be attributed to the failure to issue a joint communiqué, which serves as a representation of mutual agreement. The lack of such a declaration suggests that no substantial agreements were reached in the end. Reports indicate that the South Korean delegation raised issues pertinent to its national interests, including North Korea’s denuclearization and maritime matters in the West Sea. This suggests that China not only rejected the establishment of any agreements regarding these matters but also declined to acknowledge a shared understanding. Crafting a mutually accepted joint statement presents a significant challenge.

Following the summit with Lee, Trump announced his “conditional approval” of Korea’s development of nuclear-powered submarines on his social media. Seoul expressed enthusiasm, viewing the situation as a potential opportunity to secure nuclear fuel and a catalyst for revising the United States-Republic of Korea Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This action could potentially open the door for conversations regarding the reprocessing of spent fuel.

The euphoria was swiftly tempered the next day, as China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement urging both Washington and Seoul to uphold their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The warning issued by Beijing is driven by some key concerns: A potential domino effect may unfold if Korea decides to acquire nuclear submarines, prompting Japan and Taiwan to consider similar actions. The acquisition of nuclear submarines by Korea also signals a significant move towards greater integration within the United States' naval framework.

China has concerns that it could accelerate the formation of a trilateral military alliance involving the United States, Japan and Korea. The issue is related to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Ongoing penalties linked to THAAD enacted by the Chinese government, including a ban on Korean cultural contents in China, remain in effect. Seoul has placed itself in a precarious position by treating Trump’s social media post as a de facto written guarantee, a move that could ultimately undermine its own interests.

Throughout history, the United States has engaged in nuclear submarine construction exclusively with the United Kingdom, having not collaborated with any other nation or issued licenses for the development of such vessels. The latest trilateral AUKUS arrangement with Australia does not involve any cooperative building; instead, it focuses solely on sales. Collaboration with Korea may prove advantageous, particularly in light of the shortcomings in the U.S. shipbuilding sector. The current situation reveals a lack of U.S. capability to meet its own commitments to Australia.

It would have been prudent for Seoul to first engage in negotiations regarding the nuclear cooperation agreement and then achieve advancements in spent fuel reprocessing. Finally, after securing a reliable fuel supply, it could pursue the development of nuclear submarines. The appropriate strategic sequence should have been followed in this instance. It is now crucial for South Korea to dispel the misconception that it has nuclear submarines, making it feasible to navigate around additional penalties imposed by China, while, paradoxically, implementing measures aimed at ultimately achieving such a capability.

Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.