Vanishing national interest

Park Jung-won

The curtain has fallen on the APEC summit, but the performance of diplomacy goes on. President Lee Jae Myung held a series of meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, which his administration has trumpeted as historic breakthroughs. Television networks replayed the scenes of handshakes and smiles, creating the impression that Korea now stood at the center of global diplomacy. But after the lights fade and the applause quiets, one question remains: In concrete terms, what did Korea actually gain from all this spectacle?

The Lee administration’s proudest claim — the revised tariff deal with the United States — was portrayed as a major economic breakthrough, a bargain struck in return for lowering U.S. tariffs from 25 to 15 percent. However, the details tell a very different story. Korea agreed to invest about $350 billion in the United States, including $200 billion in cash over the next ten years.

Given Korea’s foreign reserves of roughly $420 billion — of which more than 90 percent are tied up in assets that cannot easily be liquidated — this commitment represents a serious financial strain. Committing $20 billion a year in cash for ten years could undermine both foreign-exchange stability and monetary flexibility.

An even deeper problem is that Korea does not control where this vast sum will go. Reports indicate that the committee charged with deciding the investment’s direction is effectively chaired by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. Secretary Howard Lutnick. In practice, this means Korea provides the capital while Washington decides how it will be spent. For all the talk about “commercial viability” and “mutual benefit,” such words ring hollow when one side pays and the other side decides.

Secretary Lutnick has already mentioned the Alaska Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) Project as a likely destination for Korean funds. The Alaska LNG project is primarily an energy-infrastructure venture based in the U.S., and its relevance to Korea’s long-term economic or industrial interests remains unclear. Korean participation in secondary or follow-on projects may be theoretically possible, but the reality is discouraging: Finnish shipbuilders have already secured most of the icebreaker contracts tied to the project, leaving slim prospects of meaningful gain for Korea.

The contrast with Japan is striking. Tokyo, in its own negotiations with Washington, secured joint investment rights in rare-earth and critical-mineral sectors — a strategic move directly linked to Japan’s industrial supply-chain security. Seoul, by contrast, seems to have focused on short-term political optics rather than long-term strategic value, failing to secure comparable structural benefits. Frankly, it is hard to understand what “achievement” the government sees in this outcome.

Aside from automobiles, progress in key industries such as semiconductors and steel remains elusive. The recent tariff cut to 15 percent applied only to a limited range of items; most sectors continue to face high duties or trade barriers. The situation is no different in agriculture and livestock, where Washington still demands full market liberalization and Seoul clings to the protection of sensitive industries. The government has portrayed this stalemate as if every major dispute with Washington had been resolved in a historic breakthrough. In truth, the distance between political theater and tangible results remains painfully wide.

The nuclear-powered submarine affair borders on absurdity — a striking symbol of how far diplomatic theater has drifted from strategic reality. President Trump declared that Korea would be “allowed” to possess nuclear-powered submarines, which the Lee administration quickly promoted as a milestone. In reality, Trump’s so-called approval meant only that Korea could purchase and operate submarines built by American engineers at Philly Shipyard, with no transfer of nuclear technology or fuel. Such an arrangement offers little strategic value to a country that does not possess nuclear weapons of its own.

The true significance of nuclear-powered submarines lies in their ability to secure a second-strike capability when combined with nuclear arms. Without that link, a nuclear-powered submarine is nothing more than a vessel with a nuclear engine. Moreover, the process of construction and operation requires enormous time and comes at astronomical cost, making it virtually impossible for such a submarine to become operational within Lee’s term. In practical terms, the project will yield no real enhancement of defense capability — only political utility. By presenting the idea as proof of a stronger, self-reliant defense, the Lee government is merely projecting an image of power rather than achieving it. A nuclear-powered submarine without nuclear weapons is not a shield but an expensive illusion.

This is no time for self-congratulation. What is truly exasperating about the Lee administration is its inability to focus on the real crisis, turning a blind eye to a far more dangerous development — the shifting balance created by Washington and Pyongyang. Trump’s latest remarks laid bare the deeper reality of Korea’s security dilemma. He referred to North Korea as a “sort of nuclear power” and openly expressed his desire to meet Kim Jong-un again.

That single phrase reframed the entire U.S.–North Korea dynamic. Any future summit will inevitably center on arms control, not denuclearization. If negotiations proceed on the premise that Pyongyang will keep its nuclear arsenal, Seoul will once again be left outside the room while its fate is discussed. Rather than confronting this marginalization, the Lee government speaks vaguely of a “restoration of peace,” assuring the public that stability is returning.

The essence of diplomacy is not ceremony but the precise calculation of national interest. The Lee government has chosen staging over strategy. Summits came one after another, and the media were euphoric. But behind those glamorous images, the balance of national interest tipped decisively against Korea. Security was dressed up as spectacle and statecraft turned into a show as the national interest became its casualty. The show cannot go on.

Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.