Korean local autonomy

Korea has evolved in its government structure to include local autonomy. Since 1995, there have been provisions for local governments in major cities, other cities, their districts, and neighborhoods, as well as for local governments in rural counties, towns and on Jeju Island.

Most global nations have systems of government with some form of local administration. While the unitary system of government in Korea hasn’t spawned significant local power, there is renewed attention to it these days.

The Lee Jae Myung administration is promising to reach the 30 percent local funding threshold that some viewed as a barrier to further strengthening Korea’s local governments. Currently, the national government retains the great majority of tax funds. Local units have significant responsibilities, but complain they lack sufficient funding.

This isn’t surprising. One of the characteristics of many governmental systems is the dependence or codependence of local units on their national governments. Unless the tax base of local units is independent, resilient and capable of growth like that of the national government, it’s almost inevitable. Intergovernmental funding imbalances also spawn the unfunded mandates problem, making laws that lack a basis in funding to (fully) implement.

A second issue for the development of Korean local autonomy concerns party elections. At present, local elections are mostly a foregone conclusion. Local party elites predominate in the nominations stage, and there is little competition for local elections, either within or between rival parties. The Lee government proposes direct election of local representatives to enhance competitiveness and create greater autonomy.

In my experience, Korean conservative governments aren’t as given to developing local autonomy as are those of the liberal flag. That’s somewhat surprising, since many of the typical elements of local administration, or of governmental mechanisms that can coexist with local autonomy, are attuned to the idea that less government is more.

This is where students of European versus non-European governments divide. In Europe, conservative or right governments prefer less government power for public matters, outside of security and defense. The conservative view in many Asian countries prefers more government, both inside and outside of security and defense issues.

The federalist technology (dividing government power between national and local governments), in one sense, is that power should be limited and controlled so that there is less threat from corruption. Centralizing more power in one agent or kind of government makes it easier to identify, but perhaps harder to control or react to.

Similarly, dividing the government may contain corruption and make excesses easier to control, but it also makes aggregating power for national or shared purposes more difficult. If there are too many local units in a city or province of Korea, it is a lot of work to gather consensus around a particular course of action.

Dividing power or having more local autonomy allows for different passions, opinions and interests to form and to coalesce around courses of action according to the needs and preferences of diverse areas.

I remember that former President Moon Jae-in wanted to create a secondary council for leaders of local governments. I don’t know if it occurred. Much as with the current interest in local autonomy, it isn’t seemingly a high priority among the present administration. More importantly, it doesn’t appear to be among the Korean people, either. Lee also is proposing to create a number of regional “hubs” for development and administrative autonomy. That idea may carry more traction. As with China, too much local development is arguably concentrated in urban areas.

Each democracy has the chance to mold government structures that suit its popular preferences, however they’re expressed. Once a constitution is set, it’s somewhat difficult to alter the government structure. I don’t personally expect to see much change in the basic contours of Korean local autonomy.

At the same time, I do think increasing funding streams for Korean local units would address the problem of unfunded mandates. These tendencies plague legislatures, in particular those of a reforming zeal, which want to see many good things occur but lack the resources to pay for them. Resorting to making laws or statutes that lack the fiscal mechanisms for implementation is not unheard of, but it isn’t good government at all.

Here’s hoping that the Lee administration will see through this particular change for the good of Korean local autonomy and for its future.

Bernard Rowan (browan10@yahoo.com) is associate provost for contract administration and academic services and professor of political science at Chicago State University. He is a past fellow of the Korea Foundation and a former visiting professor at Hanyang University.