Breaking the presidential curse

When engaging with foreign audiences or colleagues about Korean politics, one question invariably arises: “Why do Korean presidents all end up in jail?” This inquiry, while initially perplexing to those of us who grew up witnessing the regular prosecution of former leaders, suggests a troubling pattern in Korean democracy — a cycle that needs urgent examination and resolution.

Since the 1987 constitutional amendment, Korea's presidential system has seen an unprecedented pattern of post-presidency prosecutions. Four former presidents — Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye — have served prison sentences, while virtually all others have faced investigations for corruption or bribery.

Even those who avoided personal prosecution have not escaped unscathed: President Kim Dae-jung's three sons were convicted of accepting corporate bribes, and most recently, allegations involving President Moon Jae-in's former son-in-law have emerged, centering on his executive position at Thai Eastar Jet, a company founded by former lawmaker Lee Sang-jik.

This pattern stands in stark contrast to other established democracies. In the United States, the prosecution of former presidents remained unprecedented for 234 years until Donald Trump's hush money case in 2023. Even during the gravest political scandals, such as Watergate, after disgraced president Richard Nixon resigned, a presidential pardon shielded him from a criminal trial and jail time.

However, this contrast does not automatically mean that one system is superior to another. Korea's approach could be interpreted as showcasing stronger institutional accountability and checks on executive power. Conversely, it might reflect the pervasive nature of corruption within the Korean political system itself. Beyond moral judgments, four distinct patterns emerge that perpetuate this vicious cycle.

First is the nature of political retribution. Prosecuting or investigating former presidents, particularly those from opposing parties, has become an almost inevitable legacy of each administration. While prosecutors maintain institutional independence, the president's authority to appoint the prosecutor-general, who oversees the prosecution service under the justice minister's supervision, creates avenues for indirect influence over investigative priorities.

This dynamic has created a predictable cycle of prosecution across administrations. During Moon Jae-in's tenure, Lee Myung-bak was sentenced to 15 years in prison for accepting bribes, while Park Geun-hye faced multiple accusations, and was ultimately sentenced to 20 years in prison. During Lee's presidency, the late Roh Moo-hyun was investigated for bribery allegations involving his family. Under the late Kim Dae-jung's administration, former presidents Roh Tae-woo and Chun Doo-hwan were imprisoned.

Beyond legal considerations, this history of political confrontation has created perverse incentives for leaders to pursue investigations as acts of revenge or political containment. With presidential terms limited to a single five-year period, presidents have often framed the prosecution of former political enemies as a defining achievement of their brief tenure in office.

The second pattern stems from the entrenched relationship between presidents and Korea's powerful conglomerates. The government-led economic development strategy initiated under Park Chung-hee, which drove exponential growth in private sectors through companies like Samsung and POSCO via government funding, naturally created strong ties between public and private sectors.

Subsequent presidents have regularly hosted conglomerate leaders not only to discuss industrial policy but also to request specific actions, such as increased employment or investment, that align with their policy objectives. This intimate relationship, while potentially beneficial for economic coordination, frequently devolves into illicit arrangements involving illegal payments, often in exchange for favorable policies or relaxed regulatory oversight.

The third pattern involves presidential family members in corruption scandals. Even when presidents themselves are not directly implicated, they cannot escape accountability for their families’ actions.

Here, the temptation to leverage presidential connections for personal gain is a recurring weakness in Korean politics. The failure of successive leaders to set clear boundaries and prevent family members from exploiting their positions suggests a fundamental problem with institutional safeguards and personal integrity at the highest levels of government.

The final pattern reveals itself in the culture of presidential pardoning, which has become a political tool, used to reinforce their political base or attract support from centrist and independent voters.

Moon's pardon of Park, his long-time political adversary, was framed as an effort to unify the nation, while Yoon's pardon of Lee Myung-bak served to strengthen his conservative base.

Such pardons not only undermine the original intent of judicial decisions but also contradict public sentiment and the presidential mandate to uphold the rule of law.

The widespread attitude that “if you dig deep enough, you'll always find something” has normalized corruption as an inevitable aspect of political life. This cynical acceptance must be replaced with a culture of integrity and transparency.

Real change requires leaders who demonstrate through their own conduct that integrity and public service, rather than personal enrichment and political revenge, define their legacy. The responsibility also extends beyond individual politicians to encompass the entire political ecosystem – from party organizations to corporate leaders to civil society.

The newly elected President Lee Jae Myung now holds the opportunity to either perpetuate or break this destructive cycle. His decisions must reflect not merely political calculations but a genuine commitment to the public will and democratic principles.

Park Jin-wan is a nonresident fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies at the University of Vienna.