Israel and US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and lessons for South Korea
Joel Petersson-Ivre
Israel and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear program show the dangers of a South Korean nuclear sprint.
On June 13, claiming that Iran was getting perilously close to developing nuclear weapons, Israel began an air campaign against facilities associated with Iran’s nuclear program and carried out targeted assassinations of leading military figures and scientists.
The Israeli targeting of Iran’s latent nuclear capabilities is likely to strengthen North Korea’s sense of justification in pursuing its own nuclear arsenal, which is estimated at around 50 warheads — about half of what Israel possesses. However, the escalating tensions in the Middle East might induce caution in those who advocate for South Korean nuclear armament or even nuclear hedging.
Nuclear hedging in Iran and South Korea
Like Iran, South Korea has been suggested as a nuclear candidate. The two countries certainly differ in many ways: one is a dictatorship and international pariah, while the other is a vibrant democracy and key player in international trade. However, they both face rivals armed with nuclear weapons, which has driven them to hedge their nuclear bets.
Iran’s efforts have progressed much further than South Korea’s. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international nuclear watchdog, Iran has accumulated 406 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent. Integrating this fissile material into a viable nuclear weapon would likely take around one year.
South Korea did pursue a nuclear program in the mid-1970s and engaged in minor enrichment efforts in the early 2000s, but is adhering to its nonproliferation commitments today. South Korea does have large supplies of uranium, but a bilateral agreement with the United States limits enrichment to below 20 percent, which is not weapons grade.
Unlike Iran, South Korea does not have facilities to enrich uranium, nor does it have facilities to reprocess plutonium (another path to the bomb). Recently, many in Seoul have pushed for renegotiation of the bilateral agreement with the United States to change this. They want to enable South Korea to “sprint” to the bomb if the security environment deteriorates further. This would constitute a “latent deterrent” to dissuade North Korean aggression.
It is worth noting that the Lee administration opposes both nuclear latency and nuclear armament. But the underlying structural drivers of South Korean proliferation have not gone away with the departure of the Yoon administration, which was far keener to pursue it.
Cautionary tales from the Middle East
Although few in Seoul would think to draw direct comparisons with Iran, Israel’s attack on the Iranian nuclear program should induce caution in South Korea’s nuclear proponents.
First, a latent deterrent is unreliable. Whether or not Iran intended to go through with the manufacturing of nuclear weapons is less relevant; the perception that it was about to do so is what triggered the Israeli attack. Any South Korean facilities implicated could be similarly targeted by North Korea.
Second, the sprint towards nuclear weapons is dangerous. To avoid triggering a North Korean preventative attack, some in Seoul have suggested that South Korea should pursue its weapons program clandestinely. The likelihood that South Korea can do this is very low. International monitoring regimes under the IAEA Additional Protocol system are extremely strict, and the international community would likely sanction South Korea as well.
Third, the damage would be greater. North Korea’s ability to strike South Korea far exceeds Israel’s ability to strike Iran. Half the South Korean population lives in the Seoul Metropolitan area, within range of North Korean artillery, as well as its tactical nuclear weapons.
Finally, just like Iranian military officials and scientists were targeted by Israeli infiltrators, South Korea must recognize the risk of North Korean “sleeper cells” filling a similar function as well.
A bad example
There remains a less obvious implication: Israel’s targeting of Iran’s nuclear program — and the Syrian and Iraqi programs before that — have cemented such attacks as a core feature of the international counterproliferation system. Even international laws that forbid attacks on nuclear facilities only cover attacks on nuclear power plants. Major nuclear powers, including the five recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty — China, France, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S. — have deliberately kept the option to attack nuclear facilities open.
The South Korean government expressed “grave concern” over Israel’s action and is highly unlikely to sprint to the bomb or even pursue nuclear hedging. But the Lee administration should work actively to curtail the ability of a future Korean government to develop a latent deterrent.
One way to do this is to “black box” South Korea’s enrichment abroad, and commission another country to handle the reprocessing of its spent fuel. This would strengthen the South Korean nuclear industry’s competitiveness and provide all the peaceful benefits of this sensitive technology, while still putting it out of reach of any future government with their eyes on nuclear armament. It would also ensure that Iran’s fate does not befall South Korea.
Joel Petersson Ivre is a policy fellow at Asia-Pacific Leadership Network.