Relax, Korean pundits: It's not happening

Since Donald Trump returned to the White House in January, there have been several theories about Korean affairs. Some of the most notable stories are the threat of reciprocal tariffs on Korean imports, the evacuation of a sizable portion (about 4,500 soldiers) of the 28,500-strong U.S. forces here and the possibility of resuming summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

They simply will not occur, and will stay “a story being a story” at best. Pessimism stems from the potential harm that these policies will do to U.S. strategic interests if they are executed. Without a viable alternative, the U.S. will suffer a significant and long-term strategic loss.

On April 2, Trump personally announced that 25 percent reciprocal tariffs will be levied on all Korean imports to the U.S. Trump felt the step necessary for political reasons. While he claims it is about reducing America’s trade imbalances, it is actually about his commitment to limiting China’s efforts to divert and relocate its export outlets to U.S.-friendly countries or allies. Trump wants to prohibit China and its enterprises from abusing the World Trade Organization’s rules of origin. Since the implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), Chinese enterprises have effectively shifted their manufacturing sites overseas. That is why all of America’s partner countries face tariffs.

However, history shows that politically motivated tariff policies have not been particularly effective. The Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 contributed to the Great Depression. Tariff policy is overly politicized and securitized to the point where it is meant to run against the currents of the market economy, completely ignoring market principles and mechanisms. Such actions frequently result in either a probation period (delay in implementation) or the addition of an appendix to allow for exceptions.

Trump, for example, decided to grant a 90-day grace period for his reciprocal tariffs, dreading the backlash from their actual application to 50 some trade partners. The Joe Biden administration had little choice but to ask for appendices to both the IRA and the Semiconductor Act half a year after their introduction to avoid otherwise unnecessary discriminatory treatment of allies and friends and resulting price hikes. As a result, reciprocal tariffs will be lifted as long as the United States engages in tariff and trade negotiations with China.

Many observers of Korean politics in the United States appear to be getting a vibe from Pentagon personnel about the possibility of reforming USFK. One of the rumors they’ve heard is that up to 4,500 U.S. troops will be relocated to Guam. These stories are unfeasible and impossible, in large part due to the long-standing goals of the U.S.' strategy to deter China’s military growth. With the introduction of the Indo-Pacific strategy in 2017, Washington has made relentless attempts to restructure its alliances and modify the tasks and roles of American forces stationed in friendly nations.

The partnership between South Korea and the United States is no exception. This alliance was originally formed to defend South Korea against the North. Defending the Pacific was left to the so-called “First Island Chain” drawn by the United States in the 1950s. The same defense parameter refers to China’s final line of defense against foreign invaders in order to keep them from reaching the Asian continent.

With China’s growing military power, particularly its naval forces and missile capabilities, the chain is no longer an effective defense line. Korea’s geographic location makes it ideal for U.S. military assets to block China’s encroachment into the Pacific, making it a key ally. The Korea-U.S. alliance is a force with preemptive defensive capabilities against Chinese naval forces en route to the Pacific, particularly from the northern and eastern theatres. The incumbent USFK commander, Xavier Brunson, expressed his appreciation for Korea’s strategic worth by comparing it to an aircraft carrier.

For the foreseeable future, looming tensions in all aspects of the U.S. and China’s bilateral ties prevent a U.S.-North Korea summit. As long as Washington and Beijing fail to reconcile or change their relationship, the North's Kim is unlikely to accept any talks proposed by Trump.

Nor will Kim be able to approach Trump. When Beijing had favorable relations with Washington, such as in 2017 and 2018, Pyongyang felt similarly at ease when it came to diplomatic engagement. The logic behind this trilateral relationship is straightforward: my friend’s friend is also my friend, and my friend’s enemy is also my enemy. The alliance binds the other two parties.

Trump is unpredictable, but the political reality serves as an effective limitation. Whatever political motivation Trump has for using tariffs to combat China’s unjust and unfair trade practices, it will backfire on the U.S. economy. Regardless of how much he wants military partners to boost their cost-sharing by blackmailing them with reductions in stationed U.S. forces, the strategic worth of the alliance-building will never decline as long as American strategic objectives are upheld.

Regardless of how much Trump boasts about his fond feelings for Kim, the relationship remains strained. In this situation, one of the greatest strategic options for Korea is to not be rattled or swayed by Trump’s statements. Instead, Korea must focus on its own interests and develop its own strategy and agenda to deal with him. Korea's next president, following the June 3 presidential election, must recognize this reality and remain firm and unfazed by Trump while prioritizing his country’s own interests.

Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.