
Tuesday is election day in South Korea, with the inauguration of the new president the following day. The country has been in political turmoil for months following former President Yoon Suk Yeol's disastrous martial law declaration and subsequent impeachment and removal from office. Whoever wins the election has a chance — a responsibility — to lead South Korea back to sure democratic footing, political and governance competence, economic and demographic growth, socio-cultural progress and a strong position on defense, security and foreign affairs.
These areas are interconnected, but that is too much to address in one column, so I’ll focus on the last issue: How should we evaluate the new president’s approach to international affairs? How can we know if he is focused on the right areas? Adopting sensible policies and approaches? Balancing competing national interests?
There are at least five items that strike me as priorities over the next 150 days — the exact amount of time before South Korea has an opportunity to shape international affairs at the 2025 APEC Summit in Gyeongju. The new president’s attention to and choices regarding these items will be an early indicator of the likelihood of overall foreign policy success or failure.
First, the new president must quickly reinvigorate relations with the U.S., its most important security and defense ally and economic partner. The fact is the relationship has languished over the last six months, and arguably is in a “quiet crisis,” as Victor Cha puts it. Most top-level meetings have been on hold since martial law. Defense Secretary Hegseth has skipped Seoul twice during swings through Asia and ignored South Korea during his recent Shangri-la Dialogue speech. U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs continue to hang over Washington-Seoul relations. For good or bad, the U.S. is moving forward in numerous areas, and Korea has been hindered in its efforts to adapt and keep pace.
The silver lining until now has been that South Korea has largely been off the U.S. radar, but that will likely change, whether over economics and trade, host nation support for the U.S. military presence, the repositioning of U.S. Forces Korea for “strategic flexibility” in deterring China or Washington’s approach to Pyongyang. The new president will need to say all the right things about the U.S.-South Korea alliance, rapidly prepare to follow the U.S. lead where proper, propose improvements to relations where necessary and pragmatically assert Seoul’s interests where they differ from Washington’s.
Second, we should watch the language the new Korean president uses to address China. Obviously, Korea’s new president should avoid language that either inflames or kowtows to China. Ideally, the rhetoric should be principled — both in terms of Korean interests and those of the international rules-based order — and diplomatically phrased to avoid drawing Beijing’s ire unnecessarily or appearing to make commitments Korea can’t or shouldn’t uphold. There may well be an immediate test of this tight-rope act in how the new president responds to the ongoing build-up of Chinese structures in the South Korea-China Provisional Maritime Zone in the West Sea. Make no mistake, this is likely the beginning of a slow hybrid attack, and Korea should be prepared to respond strategically, including through smart, calibrated rhetoric and accompanying action.
Third, how will the new president utilize summits to Korea’s advantage? The G7 summit takes place in Canada in mid-June, while the NATO summit meets in The Hague at the end of June. Korea is not in the G7, but it has important relations with each member. The G7 meeting this year is likely to be tense, given the Trump administration’s misaligned positions on international trade and the Russian war against Ukraine. The new president should subtly but clearly signal to the non-U.S. G7 members that Korea supports rules-based international order in regards to international trade and security.
As for the NATO summit in late June, the new Korean president should attend as a member of the so-called Indo-Pacific Four (Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand). This is low-hanging diplomatic fruit. The president would indicate Korean commitment to combined Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security while also setting up a host of meetings with counterparts. The most important element would be an initial personal meeting with Trump. If played correctly, this would get the new president an invitation to the White House, which he could in turn use to solidify a formal invitation for Trump to attend APEC in the fall.
Fourth, how will the new president carry out relations with Japan? Korea and Japan need each other more than ever, both bilaterally and in the trilateral context with the U.S. The new president should understand that and give early indications that he will tend to this relationship productively.
Lastly, will the new president make bandwidth available to middle powers, including in Europe, Australia and the ASEAN nations, and oft-neglected regions of Africa, South and Central America? Korea should want to shape the rules of the evolving international order, advance its trade, economic and supply chain interests and support policies that incentivize better behavior by China, Russia and North Korea. Whether Seoul does this through bilateral relations, so-called minilaterals or multilateral engagement (including South Korea’s final six months on the U.N. Security Council), it will need to mobilize middle powers to work together.
Mason Richey is a professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, president of the Korea International Studies Association and editor-in-chief of the Journal of East Asian Affairs.