Why Russia-North Korea ties will survive Ukraine war
Troy Stangarone
The Trump administration is pushing to end the war in Ukraine. If successful, the conclusion of the more than three-year-old conflict will have implications for security in Europe, but also the future of what has become an increasingly close relationship between Russia and North Korea. While some have long seen the ties between Moscow and Pyongyang as primarily a transactional relationship, there are good reasons to believe that it is a partnership that will persist beyond the Ukraine war.
Growing ties between Russia and North Korea were perhaps inevitable. Once it was clear that Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” would not be a short endeavor, Russia needed to find a means to acquire increasingly large amounts of military hardware to maintain an advantage over Ukraine. With Russia and North Korea already facing international sanctions, there was little downside for either country. Cooperation allowed Russia to gain access to artillery and other weapons to conduct its invasion, while North Korea was given a path to breaking out of the sanctions regime that constrained it.
Russia also had limited options outside of North Korea. While India was willing to buy Russian oil at a discount, it is dependent on Russia for its own weapons. Iran has been an important supplier of drones, but it also faced limits on what it could provide Russia.
Despite their “no-limits partnership,” China was not able to directly help Russia either. Beijing’s economic ties with the United States and Europe provided too much risk for it to overtly support Moscow’s war. Instead, China has supplied Russia with microelectronics, machine tools and other equipment necessary to expand weapons production in Russia’s own defense industrial complex.
North Korea’s limited international economic ties, high degree of international and bilateral sanctions and ability to supply a substantial amount of artillery and other military equipment made it an ideal partner for Russia. Estimates suggest that North Korea has provided 9 million artillery shells, 200 long-range artillery systems, approximately 150 KN-23 ballistic missiles and other military equipment. It has also provided 11,000 troops with additional troops expected to be deployed to the frontlines in Russia. These troops have in recent days played an important role in helping Russian forces retake territory in the Russian region of Kursk.
What are these weapons and troops worth? The artillery shells and ballistic missiles North Korea has supplied Russia are likely valued at around $4.5 billion. While the regime likely does not capture all of the funds from the troop deployments, the troops probably add roughly $20 million per month to North Korea’s revenue streams.
In return, North Korea has received significant benefits from Russia in the form of political support, economic aid and military technology. In addition to reviving their mutual defense treaty, Russia vetoed the renewal of the U.N. Panel of Experts mandate to monitor U.N. sanctions violations and has begun providing public rhetorical support for expanding North Korea’s military capabilities.
Economic aid to North Korea is believed to include fuel, fertilizer and food. Russia’s willingness to violate U.N. sanctions may be the most significant economic benefit, particularly as the New York Times has reported on Russian assistance in helping North Korea evade financial sanctions.
That willingness to violate sanctions has also provided substantial military benefits for North Korea. South Korean intelligence reported early on that Russia provided technical assistance to North Korea, which enabled it to put its first reconnaissance satellite in orbit in 2023. Subsequent reports have suggested that Russia has provided anti-air missiles and may have provided technical assistance for North Korea’s efforts to develop a nuclear submarine.
If the Trump administration is successful in ending the war in Ukraine, Russia would have less need for North Korea as a supplier of military hardware. This will necessitate a change in the relationship. However, we should not expect it to go back to a pre-COVID period when Russia openly worked with the U.S. and China to enforce sanctions and provide pressure on the regime to return to nuclear dismantlement talks.
Instead, common national interests will likely hold the relationship together in a new form, as will the limits of the U.S. to shape outcomes in the relationship. Both countries share an interest in seeing U.S. influence in the world diminished. They share an interest in the development of an alternative financial system similar to the one being considered by the BRICS countries to limit the ability of the U.S. to impose financial sanctions. Moscow and Pyongyang have also seen the benefits of their partnership, one which the U.S. has little leverage to change in peace talks over Ukraine.
With geopolitics shifting and U.S. power declining, there are strong reasons for Russia and North Korea to maintain ties. We shouldn’t expect Russia to return to enforcing U.N. sanctions or as an active partner in denuclearization. Instead, we should expect Russia and North Korea to continue to build their relationship in both economic and military dimensions.
Troy Stangarone is the director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy and the deputy director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.