Steeling ourselves against Vostochny outcomes

Several years ago, I was talking with a high-ranking Russian government official. I reminded him that North Korea’s justification for developing nuclear weapons was the “security threat” it has from the U.S. I asked him if there was any chance that Russia may revive the security alliance with North Korea that expired in 1996. The official replied that Russia would not enter into such a relationship with the worst dictatorship in the whole world.

President Putin and Chairman Kim Jong-un met at the Vostochny Space Center on Sept. 13. As I followed the meeting, I recalled the conversation with the Russian official. In the intervening years, Russia and the world moved in different directions.

No agreement was signed, and no official announcement was made to publicize the purpose or the outcome of the meeting. However, the trade of North Korea’s conventional weapons for Russia’s weapons of mass destruction technology was suspected as the purpose. It is worried that this could further aggravate the carnage taking place in Ukraine. It will also lead to worsening North Korea’s nuclear provocations.

As for ammunition, shells and artillery, North Korea has already been suspected of providing sizable amounts to Russia. Putin is quite well-known for the habit of being late to meetings with foreign leaders. In Vostochny, he arrived 30 minutes earlier to receive Kim. His defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, the man in charge of the ongoing war in Ukraine, left Moscow for several days to attend the July 27 military ceremony in North Korea. Putin and his men are making unusual moves, which implies how desperately they need North Korea’s conventional weapons.

As for the transfer of Russia’s technology for weapons of mass destruction, there is an important divergence of views among experts. Some are of the view that Russia, since the days of the Soviet Union, has carefully stayed away from the transfer of technology. Russia is proud of its status as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Furthermore, Russia understands the importance of maintaining the NPT regime. Given all of these factors, Russia will take care not to share important technology with North Korea.

Others point to the fact that a defeat of Russia in Ukraine would cause unbearable political damage for Putin. Thus, Russia may go out of its way to provide sensitive technology to North Korea for as many conventional weapons as it can get.

The U.S. and other concerned countries are vowing to respond with further sanctions, if and when these suspicions turn into actual transactions. Both Russia and North Korea are already subject to a whole range of economic sanctions. Thus, finding and imposing additional economic sanctions will require consideration of existing sanctions. In the case of North Korea, it could benefit from Russia’s food and energy supply and labor demands, in violation of existing U.N. sanctions.

More effective sanctions would be to provide additional and higher-technology weapons to Ukraine. Some NATO members are already discussing that.

As for South Korea, we should seriously study the consequences of North Korea having access to Russia’s technology in missiles, satellites and nuclear-powered submarines. As stated, we do not yet know the full scope of technology Russia will share with North Korea. However, even the satellite technology, which Putin suggested Russia may provide to North Korea, would lead to significant improvement in North Korea’s missile technology and reconnaissance capability.

In this context, it was timely that Korea and the U.S. announced the Washington Declaration on the occasion of President Yoon Suk Yeol's state visit to the U.S. last April. It was also timely that the leaders of Korea, Japan and the U.S. met at Camp David in August to strengthen trilateral cooperation for security, especially against North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles. Korea must take the initiative in implementing these agreements to strengthen extended deterrence against North Korea’s provocations.

As for the Washington Declaration, it significantly increased the voice of Korea in extended deterrence; it agreed on joint planning and joint implementation on measures to be taken against North Korean nuclear weapons. An important step in implementing the declaration is to work out an operational plan between Korea and the U.S. based on conventional nuclear integration.

North Korea introduced a law in September last year to allow it to conduct a preemptive nuclear attack against the South. Since then, it formed two separate military commands dedicated to planning strategic and tactical nuclear operations respectively. Last month it further amended its constitution to bolster the stance. Now, if North Korea gets its hands on Russian technology and succeeds in significantly improving its nuclear capability, it will be further tempted to make nuclear provocations. It’s a scary scenario. For the time being, the only practical option we have is to strengthen extended deterrence.

Ahn Ho-young is chair professor at Kyungnam University. He previously served as vice foreign minister and Korean ambassador to the U.S.