Deciphering Japan's posture on Taiwan

By Sandip Kumar Mishra

In the last one-and-a-half months, there were at least three occasions when Japan's top officials, including Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, indicated a change in the country's approach toward Taiwan.

On July 5, Japan's Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said that a major problem in Taiwan, caused by China's forced intervention, would be “an existential threat” for Japan. He added that “in such a case, Japan and the United States will have to work together to defend Taiwan” because “Okinawa could be the next target” of China.

Earlier June 28, the Japanese Deputy Defense Minister Yasuhide Nakyama, while speaking to the U.S.-based Hudson Institute, also said that China was “trying to surround all the Taiwan islands” and it was high time for Japan “to wake up.”

In early June, Suga also listed Taiwan next to New Zealand and Australia as three “countries” that had taken stricter measures to combat the spread of COVID-19.

These statements by high-ranking officials indicate Japan's intent to defend Taiwan from Chinese aggression even though it means Japan getting involved in a military conflict beyond its own territory.

China sharply reacted to the Japanese officials' statements on Taiwan. Responding to the Aso statement, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said July 6 that unlike 1895, when imperial Japan captured Taiwan, China is not weak.

China would “never allow anyone to meddle in the Taiwan question in any way.” On the Nakayama statement, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said that “this is highly sinister, dangerous and irresponsible” to openly call “Taiwan a country.”

Earlier, China retorted to Prime Minister Suga's statement by saying that Japan has broken a “long-standing promise not to regard Taiwan as a country.” Basically, China takes these statements as a dilution of Japan's commitment to a “one China policy.”

Japan is also deliberately trying to show that its commitment to the “one China policy” might be reviewed if China does not show restraint. Actually, during his remarks at the Hudson Institute, Nakayama went as far as questioning the acceptance of the “one China policy” by Japan as a condition to establish relations with China in 1972 and abandoning Taiwan by reducing bilateral ties to a non-governmental level.

The simmering change in Japan's approach toward Taiwan may have various reasons. First, Japan thinks that the way China has been tightening its control in Hong Kong and having more frequent military aircraft sorties near Taiwan, China would soon try to have full control over Taiwan even if it may require military means.

If that occurred, Matt Pottinger, the White House national security adviser under the Trump administration, said, “basically China would be able to dominate the region and render Japan irrelevant.” Japan is concerned about such a scenario.

Second, even though Japan played a key role in the articulation of the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as Quad, to deal with any threat (from China) to free and open regions, in the last few years, it has diluted its stance.

Japan's official documents now prefer to use the expression Indo-Pacific vision rather Indo-Pacific strategy. When the U.S., India and Australia ― the three other countries of the quadrilateral network, have increasingly gotten more overt in contests with China, Japan's softening toward China appears as a mismatch.

Thus, through a tough posturing on Taiwan, Japan might be trying to coordinate its policy with the other Quad countries because all of them have been quite engaged with the Taiwan issue in the recent past.

Third, Japan's changing posture on Taiwan may also be related to Prime Minister Suga's desire to look strong and appear as a worthy heir of Shinzo Abe. In the last 10 months of the Suga government, Abe's charisma is clearly missing.

His popularity rating has also declined which is considered to be one of the important reasons for the loss of all the three seats by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the April 2021 by-elections.

It is a bad sign for both Suga as well as the LDP as elections for the lower house are due in the latter part of this year. Through the change in Japan's posture toward Taiwan, Suga might be looking to build an image of a tough leader imitating Abe.

Notwithstanding the reasons of the changing posture of Japan, it must be underscored that China looks resolute to go ahead with its regional strategy. Xi on the centenary celebration of the Communist Party of China said July 1 that China is determined to “crush to death” if “any foreign force” tries to “bully” it.

It means that China is not going to be deterred by statements alone and it would test the resolution of Japan or for that matter any other country. Japan, thus, must be aware of the possible endgame of these statements.

The author (sadnipmishra10@gmail.com) is associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.