Art of South Korea-US summit

By Lee Seong-hyon

Some argue that the biggest achievement of the recently concluded Moon-Biden summit was Washington's recognition of the spirit of the Singapore summit. Others point out that the U.S. relaxation of South Korea's missile range limit was the most tangible outcome. Yet another group sees the “restoration” of the South Korea-U.S. alliance as the most meaningful accomplishment.

These points are all valid. Yet, it also makes one curious to dig deeper to understand what the single most important goal of the Moon Jae-in administration itself was. In other words, in the summit context, the focus should be on what the Moon administration consciously wanted to achieve from the high-level meeting, besides all of the achievements that were announced.

This approach is known as "goal-setting theory," to use an academic term. The gist of this theory, initiated by Edwin Locke in his paper "Toward a Theory of Task Motivation and Incentives," places the actor's own goal as the most direct prerequisite for performance-related action and the evaluation of a performance.

One could note that Moon's itinerary was filled with symbolism that affirms and reaffirms the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

During his visit to Washington, Moon paid tribute to fallen American soldiers at Arlington National Cemetery. “The South Korea-U.S. alliance was forged in blood and has grown stronger over many years, and President Joe Biden and I will make the alliance even more powerful and comprehensive,” Moon said.

Moon also attended a ceremony in which Biden presented an American veteran of the Korean War with the Medal of Honor. It was the first time that the leader of another state had attended such a ceremony. Moon also took part in a groundbreaking ceremony for the Memorial Wall at the Korean War Veterans Memorial.

In addition, the ioint statement includes wording and phrases that show South Korea's support for U.S. strategy toward China, touching upon the Indo-Pacific strategy, South China Sea, freedom of navigation, the Quad and even Taiwan.

“I was very surprised that the joint statement was filled with wording that makes South Korea line up much closer to the U.S. than to China, even by any previous conservative South Korean government administration's standards,” observed a former foreign ministry official.

Indeed, what drew the most attention at the summit was the so-called “return of the alliance.” One newspaper's headlines read: "South Korea's strategic turnaround, Seoul's response to the U.S. check on China, South Korean diplomacy is entering a new phase."

If we follow this line of reasoning, then it could be hypothesized that Moon's paramount goal was to certify his administration's affirmation of the alliance publicly. Then, the question is why?

If we believe the maxim, “all politics is local,” then we should approach this question from the vantage point of South Korea's domestic politics. Moon's presidential term is winding down. The nation is entering a presidential election campaign season. For Moon and his political constituency, one of the most important goals is to win the next presidential election. In that way, South Korea will continue to be under a progressive wing, and that will also make it conducive for an engagement policy toward North Korea, a signature policy of the liberal camp, which includes Moon.

Many in Washington suspect that the Moon administration has been tilting toward China. In South Korea's traditional presidential election season, a political party that is not supportive of the South Korea-U.S. alliance is disfavored. This situation is especially true for moderates, who are likely to decide the winner of the election.

According to a Gallup poll in April, South Koreans who identified themselves as "moderate" constituted 33 percent of those surveyed ― outnumbering liberals and conservatives, who each constituted 26 percent.

Moon reaffirming the alliance with the United States will be looked on favorably by moderates, swaying them toward a presidential candidate from Moon's political party.

Taken together, it is a reasonable hypothesis to argue that Moon's most important goal was to utilize the summit to gain points domestically, with the presidential election specifically in mind. Showing his support for U.S. foreign policy goals against China was the clearest signal he could send publicly in this direction.

If this situation is the case, then it may be premature to pronounce, based on simply what was inked in the joint statement, that Moon's so-called “pro-China” leaning is a bygone item.

As David Maxwell, a long-time Korea watcher in Washington, said in a newsletter, “The words in these documents are excellent. They put the alliance on the right track. They provide an excellent blueprint for the future of the alliance. However, actions speak louder than words.”

Lee Seong-hyon, Ph.D. (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), is the author of the book, “The U.S.-China Competition: Who Will Rule the World?” (Books Garden, 2019). He writes about East Asian geopolitics in the context of U.S.-China relations.