Internal dynamics of N. Korea during negotiation process

By Boo Hyeong-wook

While social scientists usually do a good job at finding retrospective explanations, they are notoriously incapable of predicting the future. Their capacity for prescribing solutions for current problems is also limited because, in many cases, it is hard to obtain a full view of the ongoing situation.

As for the denuclearization negotiations process, we still experience our incapacity, all we can do is ruminate retrospectively over what happened and find out what we can learn from it.

One of the most important aspects would be the significance of the internal dynamics of North Korea during the negotiation process. What was happening then and how can we ascribe the ramifications of the dynamics to the way the negotiation process unfolded?

A few interesting points of observation include the North Korean military, as well as their civil institutions like the United Front Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Even though we can only speculate about the internal dynamics of such institutions on an extremely superficial level, it is evident that such dynamics caused much complexities and bureaucratic struggles within North Korea. The dynamics were eventually reflected in the top-level decision-making process. Here are some retrospective and speculative analyses.

The first point of analysis concerns the North Korean military. It seems that the military's relative status is declining. This is highly probable because the military had no options but to acquiesce to their leader's policies of denuclearization and arms control which are painful moves for them.

Sitting quietly throughout the negotiations did not bode well for the military. An interesting point is that much of the repercussions seemed to be placed disproportionately on the conventional part of the military, rather than the strategic part ― while conventional forces had to endure chronic resources scarcity and neglect, its strategic forces were exempt from such pain.

After the Hanoi summit, however, the military gained political support. Such a reversal of power dynamics seems to have happened around May 2019, coinciding with North Korea's military provocations including their missile tests and the recent destruction of the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office.

Nevertheless, it appears that the turnover did not affect the hard reality for the conventional part of the North Korean military. Thus, the speculation that there now exists competition between the conventional and the strategic parts becomes ever more convincing. While we don't know much about the effects of the competition, it is very plausible it would affect North Korea's policy stance in one way or another.

Dynamics among civil institutions also call for our attention. It seems that there has been, and still is, ongoing competition between the North's United Front Department and the foreign ministry for leading roles. They competed for almost every important aspect of the negotiation process, such as organizing negotiator teams and developing strategies toward U.S. negotiators.

If the dynamics between the military versus the economy and the tensions between the conventional and strategic forces formed the situational background of North Korea's behavior during the denuclearization negotiations, the dynamics between the aforementioned two civil institutions had direct influences on its outcomes.

From the beginning, Kim Yong-chol, head of the United Front Department, seemed to obtain Kim Jong-un's trust and was able to have the upper hand over the foreign ministry. After the rupture of the Hanoi summit, however, there was a brief period when his status became very unstable.

Nevertheless, he was able to survive such instability and later garnered a significant political victory when his subordinate, Ri Son-kwon, was named foreign minister ― an extremely symbolic milestone for the United Front Department.

Meanwhile, the foreign ministry was hardly visible (with the exception of Choe Son-hui), inciting commentary that the institution had been pushed to the sidelines during the negotiation process. Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho's retirement became the final signifier of the newly solidified power dynamics between the two institutions, as it led to the disintegration of the foreign ministry's negotiation teams.

In fact, this is by no means an all-exhaustive observation ― there are other internal dynamics that should be considered with just as much importance. For instance, North Korea's COVID-19 situation and the effect the overall global recession would have on North Korea, to name a few.

The bottom line is, when it comes to restarting denuclearization talks, we must persistently gather information and make thorough analyses in order to adequately prepare for the next move.

North Korea is a secretive country. Even though we have access to some information on the internal dynamics of the North, we still do not know the causality of the incidents we observe. Therefore, it is important that we gather information about the nation and promote collective speculation that might allow us to better understand the country.

Boo Hyeong-wook, Ph.D., is a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. He was deputy secretary to the President for peace and arms control at Cheong Wa Dae.