By Dr. Jojin V. John

This month South Korea will honor Lt. Col. C. Rangarajan, who led the Indian medical mission during the 1950-53 Korean War as the Korean War hero of the month.
This gesture on the 70th anniversary of the war by the Korean government not only salutes the contribution of Lt. Col. Ragarajan and his 60th Parachute Field Ambulance Platoon (PFA), a mobile army surgical hospital (MASH), but also is an acknowledgement of India's humanitarian role during the war.
The 60th PFA had earned the name “The Maroon Angels” for their exemplary service in Korea. Numerous citations, including the Meritorious Service Citation from the ROK Army, the U.S. Army Citation, and the Meritorious Unit Citation of the United National Commander vouch for their significant work. It is estimated that the unit in their over three years of service in Korea performed 2,234 surgical operations.
While honoring the humanitarian contribution of India during the Korean War, what is often forgotten is the peacemaking role New Delhi played in diffusing the Korean crisis. There is no better moment to revisit the overlooked aspects of India's engagement as a peacemaker in the Korean crisis than the 70th anniversary of the Korean War.
Indian involvement in the Korean question began even before the outbreak of the Korean War. India was a member of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) in 1947, which was tasked to conduct a general election in Korea.
Indian diplomat KPS Menon served as the chairman of UNTCOK. It is important to note that India declined to recognize either the government of South Korea or North Korea that were formed in 1948 on the belief that the division was artificial and recognition would solidify the division further.
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Indian efforts focused on breaking the deadlock between the two superpowers in the U.N. to find a mediated solution through proactive diplomacy. Events that followed the outbreak were the first test of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's foreign policy of non-alignment and his efforts to champion the cause of peace in Asia.
Mindful of the emergence of the Cold War in Asia, four postulates drove Nehru's Korea approach ― resist North Korean aggression, prevent the escalation of the conflict beyond Korea, not tie other questions to the Korean struggle and most importantly, the future of Korea should be determined by the people of Korea.
India supported the U.N. resolution to assist South Korea to repel the North Korean aggression, however, refrained from sending a military force to Korea under the U.N. Command. Instead, India sent a medical mission to support the U.N. Command's liberation efforts.
Indian efforts to find truce through mediation, though receiving appreciation, appeared naive and frustrating to the hard-nosed apologists of Cold War politics in the West and the East, as both sides were determined to achieve a full military victory.
Despite all efforts, India could not prevent the U.N. forces from crossing the 38th parallel or the Chinese intervention in the war. However, such efforts of India proved to be useful in hindsight.
After two years into fighting when the two sides reached a stalemate, India's deft diplomacy in the U.N. offered a solution to the prisoners of war (POW) issue that was hindering the conclusion of the armistice agreement.
Continuing its efforts to the cause of peace in Korea, India assumed the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC). It also offered the service of the Custodian Force of India to oversee the repatriation of the POWs.
India's experience with the NNRC was not all that good as it had to take a beating from both sides ― proving the point Ben Franklin once made, peacemaking is a dangerous and thankless job.
Having already thrown itself into the Korean crisis, India was keen to play a mediating role in the Political Conference, mandated by the armistice agreement.
In April 1954, when the Political Conference on Korea convened in Geneva, India was not invited as a delegate, owing to the strong opposition from the Syngman Rhee administration and intensification of Cold War rivalry. Not only the Geneva Conference failed, but no political conference on Korea was to convene after that.
Seven decades is a long time to forget, but there are two other reasons for overlooking India's peacemaking role. First, the Cold War historiography, which presents the narrative of the Korean War with its domineering emphasis on the role of superpowers and bipolarity, obfuscates the role played by non-aligned countries like India for the cause of peace.
The second factor is the ideological prism through which the image of India was cast in South Korea during the early Cold War period. It was no secret that President Syngman Rhee didn't trust India and openly called Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru an agent of the communist bloc.
Of course much has changed since, so too has the nature of the problem on the Korean Peninsula. However, the shadow of war still looms large.
In a context where the international environment around the Korean Peninsula is undergoing a significant transition, the quest for peace demands new thinking, perhaps even the involvement of new actors. However, to think afresh, it is essential to reflect on past attempts at peacemaking on the Korean Peninsula, including those by India.
The author (johnjojin@gmail.com) is a research fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.