Trump risk and Koreas

By Choi Sung-jin

U.S. President Donald Trump's North Korea policy has earned higher marks here than his predecessor's, especially among liberals who want inter-Korean rapprochement, despite the numerous problems and controversies surrounding him.

Former President Barack Obama did little more than managing the North Korean nuclear crisis under his “strategic patience” policy. However, Trump has not only met Kim Jong-un three times but also exchanged “love letters” with the North Korean leader when circumstances required. Washington and Pyongyang are now about to resume working-group talks to speed up the stalled process to denuclearize the isolated country.

The self-admiring U.S. leader says had it not been for him, America might have been thrown into another war in this part of the world. He went as far recently as to make a thinly veiled demand to give him the Nobel Peace Prize for that and other diplomatic accomplishments.

As any cool-headed watchers would know, however, what the U.S. leader has done concerning the peace process on the Korean Peninsula were acts in a show rather than anything of substance. It is true the tension on this divided peninsula has been reduced notably compared with the Trump administration's first year.

It was the newly inaugurated American president, however, who ratcheted up the tension in the first place with his “fire and fury” threat, drawing similarly harsh rhetoric from the totalitarian state. In short, Trump has solved a crisis of his own making.

Looking back on the past 15 months of contact between the U.S. and North Korea, one can easily find how unprepared and improvisational Trump was in dealing with North Korea and its young leader. In Singapore in June last year, Trump made a bold, though abstract, agreement with Kim too quickly.

In Vietnam this past February, Trump refused to move forward any further, sending Kim back to his country empty-handed but winning praise from U.S. hawks for not giving a deal to an undeserving counterpart. Recently Trump sacked his national security adviser, John Bolton, who is said to have been behind the ruptured Hanoi meeting, albeit mainly for his mistakes in the Middle East.

Will the working-level meetings to be resumed in weeks proceed smoothly, then?

Unfortunately, not many experts seem to be sure. The foot-dragging in the preparatory procedure shows Washington is unprepared.

Since the fiasco in Hanoi, Pyongyang has shifted its main target from the economy ― lifting of sanctions ― to guarantees of national security in return for phased denuclearization. President Trump also responded in kind, citing the need for negotiating with a “new method.” It is anyone's guess, however, how the two sides will narrow their differences over reciprocal actions.

If the reports are accurate that the U.S. president and his foreign policy team will be content with a “small deal” ― virtually recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power by not taking issue with its existing weapons, as long as Pyongyang stops short of installing them on intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland ― the situation will hardly be worse for South Korea.

Seoul has done its best to mediate between Washington and Pyongyang but finds the nuclear threat remains almost intact after all the time and energy it has spent. North Korea's visible sidelining of the South in recent months deepens such suspicions.

So far, the so-called Trump risk for South Korean diplomats has been the whimsical and unpredictable U.S. leader himself as well as how dedicated he has been internally in solving North Korea's nuclear crisis. Now a big obstacle has been added ― an impeachment inquiry into Trump related to his attempt to force Ukraine to dig up dirt on his potential Democratic challenger, former Vice President Joe Biden.

As things stand now, chances appear slim that President Trump will be actually impeached, but his fight with political opponents will likely put foreign policy issues such as North Korea on the back burner through most of next year. This, along with Kim's self-imposed deadline of the year-end, will make the next three months crucial in resolving the nuclear issue.

What all this indicates is quite clear ― South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his foreign policy team will have to become far busier and more active than now. Seoul needs to help maintain the momentum of the denuclearization talks by, for instance, presenting a carefully thought-out, action-to-action timetable while persuading both Washington and Pyongyang to take one step back.

President Moon's initiative to turn the Demilitarized Zone into a regional peace zone is not a bad idea but will end up as another symbolic gesture rather than a substantive alternative. Instead, Seoul ought to persuade Washington to agree to resume South Koreans' tours to Mount Geumgang and to reopen the inter-Korean factory park in the North's border town of Gaeseong in return for its dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

The last and biggest Trump risk will come if he fails to win re-election. Like George W. Bush refused to take up where Bill Clinton left off, and Trump himself revoked almost all of Obama's accomplishments, Trump's successor may likely start from the ground up in the denuclearization process. And that explains why the incumbent leaders in three capitals will have to put the process on an irrevocable path within the next 15 months or so.

Foreign policy issues will not, of course, play a big part in the U.S. elections. President Trump, however, has attained precious little in diplomacy, either. One of the best places he can win points for his diplomatic legacy is the Korean Peninsula.

Likewise, Kim should realize his country's economy can ill afford to waste any more time in diplomatic brinkmanship. The best way to reduce the Trump risk is for Seoul to come up with more concrete and practicable incentives to break through the expected deadlock in the months to come.

Choi Sung-jin is a Korea Times columnist. Contact him at choisj1955@naver.com.