Power shift in foreign policymaking?

By Oh Young-jin

A former foreign minister once told me of an incident that I think captures the nature of power: one who has power wants to use it.

The incident concerned a meeting at Cheong Wa Dae during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. Then Foreign Minister Yoon Yong-hwan berated deputy chief of the National Security Council secretariat Lee Jong-seok. “You could hear a pin drop between bursts of Yoon's criticisms.”

A “not-so-anonymous” letter was sent, accusing some Foreign Ministry officials of calling President Roh's aides, the famous bunch from the “386 generation,” “Taliban.” Back in the early 2000s, the 386 generation represented those aged in their 30s who attended colleges in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s, the rebels who saw the downfall of the Park Chung-hee dictatorship and forced his general-turned-successor Chun Doo-hwan to hold a popular presidential election.

Yoon stepped down. Lee rose further. The letter sender is now an ambassador to Vietnam. Wi Sung-rak, a brilliant diplomat, was relieved of his post. My source told me that it was Lee's sweet revenge against Yoon. Yoon led Roh's presidential transition team responsible for foreign affairs and North Korea policy, with Lee a junior member.

My source told me that Yoon didn't understand the nature of power that is often not so much based on title as on proximity to power. A deeper peek would show a Tolkien temptation to use power just like as in “The Lord of Rings.”

Why do I bring up the old story? Because I believe there is a ring to the ongoing “leakage-gate” (still in the early stages, with the chance of being covered up without going the full distance).

It is about a diplomat caught for leaking the contents of conversations between President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump to an opposition lawmaker. The highlights include Moon's rejection of a visit by John Bolton, the U.S. national security adviser, who is at the top of North Korea's list of personae non grata, and Moon's request for the Trump visit. But these supposed nuggets look less important than the circumstances.

Cheong Wa Dae opted to take a tougher line on the incident, triggering a chain reaction ― a probe started to catch the leaker and the leaker called home for questioning, with Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha vowing to have him severely punished. This action was taken when Trump was visiting Japan, as if it was intended for him.

This represents the government's subtle change of direction toward the U.S. and Trump.

The Moon team has been “patronizing” Trump, praising the ego-driven leader because he has a decisive say in dealing with the North but with plenty of derision hidden about him.

Its handling of leakage-gate indicates Seoul has put more heart into its approach toward Washington.

If this is true, there could be a couple of explanations. One may show a higher level of desperation to get the North's denuclearization process moving again at a time when it appears stuck after the no-deal Hanoi summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

But it is hard to readily believe that those dyed-in-the-wool people behind the facade of the national security establishment ― National Intelligence Service (NIS) Director Suh Hoon, National Security Office chief Chung Eui-yong and, by extension, non-standing presidential adviser Moon Chung-in ― have changed.

One “foreign” element is Kim Hyun-chong, NSO second deputy, who was transferred from trade minister after the revision of the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA).

Kim, a U.S. lawyer from Colombia University, served in the same post when the two countries worked out the FTA during the Roh administration. President Moon served as chief of staff for Roh. Kim went on to serve as ambassador to the United Nations. Then, he led Samsung Group's legal department.

Now, Kim is known for acting like an American, “kicking a chair when he came back from negotiations with the U.S.,” according to one source who worked with him during the FTA settlement in April 2007.

He also thinks like an American ― proof of it being his leading role in the wrapping up of trade talks with the U.S. Of course, that doesn't necessarily mean he is sympathetic to causes the U.S. represents or U.S. leaders, particularly Trump. But he sat next to former U.S. President George W. Bush when he recently participated in the 10th memorial service for President Roh.

Of course, his new position is more related to economic affairs, with the first NSO deputy being a former Army general. But Kim's role could be much greater and his influence much bigger than its job description. First of all, senior presidential aides don't always abide by their given jurisdiction, because important decisions are discussed and decided by a meeting of principals. Also, Kim has proved his expertise in dealing with Americans and has a bigger network among American influencers than anybody in the Moon government ― and most importantly he knows the way Americans think.

These strengths can give Kim a leading role and make him the first among equals or over some seniors in policymaking about the Trump administration, when Moon's North Korea initiative faces headwinds from Washington. And he knows it.

Then, wouldn't he feel tempted to use the power derived from them, just like the seeker of One Ring ― Gollum ― or the bearer like Frodo?

Perhaps he is already using it, with the leak scandal being a manifestation. This is a different kind of power struggle ― one against himself. Just because he has the power, he wants to use it and he uses it to see how strong it is.

Oh Young-jin (foolsdie5@koreatimes.co.kr, foolsdie@gmail.com

) is digital managing editor of The Korea Times.