It was fine for Trump to walk away in Hanoi

By Ted Gover

Many have described the abbreviated Hanoi summit of Trump and Kim that yielded no joint agreement as a catastrophic failure for Trump, citing that his self-touted deal-making skills fell short with the North Korean leader. They claim that Trump returned to Washington looking weak, having suffered a loss after arriving in Vietnam unprepared.

Others say that the summit was a net plus for Kim, as he was feted over by the international media and enjoyed the prestige that comes with meeting a U.S. president, all while keeping his weapons programs.

Yet, Trump was entirely correct to walk away from the talks in Hanoi without burning bridges with Kim. Here's why.

Since the Singapore summit in June of last year, Pyongyang has done little to move the needle in denuclearization talks with Washington, instead resorting to delays, obfuscations and at times outright accusations against the U.S.

President Trump concluded that a crummy deal would be worse than no deal, and that sanctions relief with only partial denuclearization was too high of a price to pay.

Trump's opting to walk was a change to the dynamics of U.S.-North Korean negotiations going back over 20 years in which it has been mostly Pyongyang calling the shots.

By walking away, Trump has adroitly maneuvered the talks, putting Kim in the position of having to make the next move, likely that of approaching the U.S. with an incentive to move forward with the negotiations.

Trump is now better situated to exact concessions from Kim on various fronts such as verifiable steps and hard time tables for disarmament as well as progress on human rights.

By saying no to Kim in Hanoi, Trump now has arguably more leverage in the talks as Kim returns home empty-handed and his regime continues to feel the pressure of severe U.S. sanctions.

As always, there are risks and costs to drawn out diplomacy with the North. For decades, Pyongyang has mastered the art of watering down demands from Washington and engaging in strategic deception during negotiations.

Ultimately, if Kim and Trump are unable to come to agreeable terms for denuclearization, President Trump must be willing to acknowledge the likelihood that there may be no deal to be had relating to the complete and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

This will force Washington and its allies to negotiate for partial denuclearization and/or to maintain the framework that has proven successful in preventing a second Korean War since hostilities ended in 1953 - a sustained policy of sanctions, containment and deterrence with overwhelming capabilities, all while leaving the door open for negotiations.

Trump was right to reject Kim's excessive demands in Hanoi. By walking away, he has put himself in the driver seat of the talks and negotiates now from a position of greater strength.

Ted Gover (amberjack_shoal@yahoo.com), Ph.D, writes on U.S.-Asian relations and foreign policy. He is the director of the Tribal Administration Program at Claremont Graduate University.