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US-North Korea talks and Beijing

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By Ted Gover

Although the June 12 Singapore summit is unlikely to lead to North Korea's denuclearization, U.S. President Donald Trump's outreach to Pyongyang may set in motion a seismic shift in Northeast Asia's geopolitical order that could work to Washington's advantage.

Trump has stated on different occasions his intention of developing a productive relationship with Kim. Such an arrangement may help set the stage for luring Pyongyang away from Beijing, the North's sponsor and sole military partner.

Undoubtedly, this scenario seems ludicrous to many in the U.S. Yet, such a development has long been a source of apprehension for Chinese policymakers. For decades, Beijing has worried that Washington and Pyongyang would develop a partnership ― even an alliance ― that would leave Beijing on the outside, devoid of influence on the Korean Peninsula.

Trump's unpredictable ways that place a premium on developing relationships have kept Beijing up at night. This was indicated by Xi's scrambling to host Kim in Beijing shortly after Trump agreed to a summit.

The U.S. would be well served to play to these Chinese fears. Developing a new relationship with Pyongyang would serve as a blow to China's stature in the region. It would also force Beijing to grapple with the strategic challenges associated with yet another nuclear-armed state on its border that pursues a foreign policy divergent from Chinese interests.

While it is unrealistic to expect that Washington and Pyongyang will become allies, it is possible for both countries to develop a working relationship based on transactional exchanges, possibly even cooperation in some areas.

What would Kim want out of such a relationship? For starters, sanctions relief and assurances of his personal security while not giving up any political control. This would involve a game of balancing larger powers against one another, thereby developing a relationship with Washington in order to shield the North from Chinese coercion.

Some initial areas of cooperation may be 1) a U.S. security guarantee for Kim in exchange for pledges not to attack the U.S. or its allies, 2) a peace treaty and normalization of relations, 3) an agreement that leaves partially intact the North's nuclear program and keeps U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, and 4) economic investment commitments by the U.S. on the condition that the North cease its proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and take specified steps to improve its human rights record.

A scenario of this nature would possibly open the doors to collaboration on food security and economic development. It may also become a wedge between Pyongyang and Beijing, degrading Beijing's ability to determine facts on the ground in North Korea while strengthening Washington's influence.

Moving U.S.-North Korean relations from a state of impending war to one of basic, working ties could lend itself to geopolitical cooperation, yielding strategic benefits in Washington's decades-long rivalry with Beijing.

Ted Gover (amberjack_shoal@yahoo.com), Ph.D. is associate director of the Tribal Administration Program at Claremont Graduate University.