'Reform without openness'

By Chang Se-moon

Andrei Lankov is director of the Korea Risk Group and a professor at Kookmin University in Korea. Professor Lankov is one of only a few scholars who know more about issues in North Korea than I do. When I was invited to his presentation in Washington, D.C., July 24, I immediately accepted the invitation.

His presentation was titled “Kim Jong-un's Survival Strategy, Why It Might Work,” sponsored by two well-known organizations: the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEIA).

According to Lankov, Kim has two objectives. One is to “die in old age” while still in power, and the other is to develop the North Korean economy. However, he faces threats to his objectives from three sources:

The first threat is the possibility of being overthrown by the elite leaders in North Korea or through a military coup. To minimize such possibilities, Kim is replacing high-level military leaders rather frequently to keep them from building a power base that can revolt against him. Clearly, the danger of such a revolt has been rising lately owing to negotiations for denuclearization currently in progress.

The second threat comes from the possibility of a “popular uprising.” To develop the North Korean economy while keeping its people from rising against him, Kim is forced to pursue “reform without openness.” To reform the North Korean economy, Kim wants to follow the Chinese experience that may be characterized as “You are free so long as you do not criticize the government.”

What Kim has to understand is that China has a system that has allowed changes in the top leadership, at least until now. Kim, on the other hand, wants to continue his family control of North Korea and not allow changes in leadership.

Lankov predicts Kim's plans of reforming the economy without openness will fail, since any meaningful reform requires cross-border open communication. If he allows openness, he is likely to be overthrown.

The third threat lies in invasion from another country, notably the United States. To ease Kim's fear, the U.S. negotiators floated the idea of securing the preservation of Kim's power in North Korea.

Lankov raises two issues that are likely to make regime security guarantees ineffective, if not irrelevant.

One is the possibility that the policy of regime security for Kim to hold onto power could be nullified by a U.S. future president. A regime security guarantee is not a law, and the next president will have the option to reverse it.

The other is the possibility of an internal uprising in North Korea. The promise of securing Kim's power means little, if anything, if Kim is overthrown through an internal uprising. If Kim were pursuing family security, instead of regime safety, either the U.S. or South Korea may be able to honor that. Any mention of family security, however, may lead to the end of Kim's life.

What does the future hold in negotiations with North Korea?

Lankov's assessment is rather pessimistic. He states the opportunity to obtain any meaningful concession from North Korea is likely lost. This loss may well be caused by lack of preparation by South Korean and U.S. leaders who had such opportunities when they met Kim for summits.

Any progress has become even more difficult because of the trade dispute between China and the United States, which makes Chinese cooperation even less likely in future negotiations.

Lankov's assessment on denuclearization is again pessimistic. He states North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons.

When I asked whether there would be changes in negotiation strategies if Kim were somehow replaced by other leaders in North Korea, Lankov's answer remained the same in that North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons.

If his views turn out to be the reality, the new arrangement of the two Koreas would be a temporary peace while North Korea is allowed to keep its current stock of nuclear weapons. This is the situation many experts on North Korea have feared to be the end product of current negotiations among South Korea, the United States and North Korea.

My personal suggestion is for South Korea and the U.S. to develop massive economic assistance programs that can create hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of jobs in North Korea. As I proposed to President Moon Jae-in in my May 16, 2017, column and again in June 26, 2017, everything has a price.

If Seoul can prepare a massive economic assistance program for North Korea in exchange for dismantling its nuclear weapons, Pyongyang may still reject it, but will have to reject it at its own great peril of mass revolt.

Chang Se-moon (changsemoon@yahoo.com) is the director of the Gulf Coast Center for Impact Studies.