Washington and Beijing's perspectives on inter-Korean summit

By Lee Seong-hyon

For the last few weeks, I have travelled to Washington and Beijing, and North Korea was a major topic. While honoring the Chatham House rule, here are a few perspectives to share, pertinent to the upcoming North Korea summits with South Korea and the United States. The primary purpose is to inform North Korean leader Kim Jong-un about how the outside world really thinks about Pyongyang's current moves and, importantly, that's why this time Kim should truly take the courage to denuclearize.

In Washington, both Democrats and Republicans remain deeply suspicious about Kim's intentions. It was difficult to maintain the argument that “North Korea is different this time.” Second, Washington predominantly judges that the reason North Korea has reached out for dialogue this time is due to the threat of a U.S. military attack and biting economic sanctions. North Korea may think otherwise; but Washington's view is introduced here as it is.

Importantly, Washington's view has ramifications of how the U.S. will react to the North if the latter decides not to denuclearize. Since Washington “believes” that sanctions and military options are effective in getting Pyongyang's attention, it will more likely act in that direction in the future ― only much tougher and stronger.

Third, observers in Washington expect that the summits, as a diplomatic “event,” will go well, but the problems will come thereafter. A summit where a North Korean leader shows up is a rare media stunt itself. Already, there are reportedly over 800 international media crews who have descended upon Seoul to cover this weekend's inter-Korean summit.

A person who works for the White House was more worried about “the day after” all the shows conclude. If North Korea cheats again, Trump can then declare he has “used up” all the diplomatic options available on the table and now it's time to switch to a military option. The American public then is also more likely to accept the logic and support a military move too.

Fourth, the summit preparations in Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington are all being undertaken by spy agencies and done under the highest-level of secrecy. Therefore, very little information is shared with think tanks in Washington. The problem is that these think tanks are opinion leaders and have close ties with media outlets. Disconnected from intelligence, these think tanks resort to their past habits in looking at North Korea. It partly explains why the predominant media predictions in the U.S. are also on the pessimistic side. It is Kim's opportunity to prove them wrong.

For China, the North Korean problem is not so much about North Korea per se, but a part of Beijing's bigger regional strategy in dealing with the U.S. In the past, all roads leading to Pyongyang had to go through Beijing first. China's hosting the six-party talks for many years, in this sense, confirmed Beijing's leading role in North Korean affairs and strengthened China's historical sense of “sphere of influence” over North Korea.

Trump, however, changed the rules. Trump “bypassed” China to directly coordinate with Pyongyang to hammer out a summit. This made Beijing antsy. The preemptive summit by Chinese leader Xi Jinping with Kim in late March was to secure China's interests ahead of Kim's summits with Seoul and Washington. China hopes Seoul and Washington will put Beijing more in the loop. China fears a “secret deal” between Washington and Pyongyang that may put Beijing at a disadvantage.

China also frowns upon Seoul's close consultations with Washington in the process. China has a strong desire for “recognition” when it comes to North Korean affairs and is ready to “remind” Seoul if it sees that is not the case ― for instance, by slowing down its easing of economic sanctions on South Korea it imposed over its anger with a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. China, however, is also supportive of South Korea in its tension-thawing outreach to the North. Importantly, China is also supportive of North Korea's denuclearization.

Taken together, the central question from both Beijing and Washington that starts from the inter-Korean summit is whether this will lead to North Korea's denuclearization. There have been past failures and dashed hopes. Observers in Washington remain deeply suspicious about North Korea's intentions. Many Chinese are also quite skeptical too. Now, Kim has the chance to prove them wrong. It is very likely that this is Kim's final “window of opportunity” to join the international community.

Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Sejong Institute.