Korean Peninsula in 2018

By Tong Kim

The year 2017 was a year of turbulence and tension on the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps, the biggest blessing for all was that somehow war was avoided.

There were close escapes from risks of war caused by North Korea’s provocations, scary shows of force in reaction by the U.S., and from a bombastic exchange of bellicose rhetoric between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

In the South, conservative President Park Geun-hye was impeached and fired. She is still going through a criminal trial. Moon Jae-In, a liberal, was elected president in a special election. Many agree these extraordinary events could not have happened without the power of the people’s “candlelight vigil.”

Many things, including Seoul’s policy on the North, have changed during the last six months, except for the constitutional continuity that highlighted the maturity of democracy in the country.

Moon’s government has been struggling with a strategic approach, proven ineffective thus far, to improve relations with the North toward a goal of reducing tensions and curbing or at least slowing down Pyongyang’s weapons development.

Domestically, President Moon, while popular with a 70 percent approval rating, is confronting a formidable challenge from the conservative opposition parties on a range of foreign policy issues from North Korea to the U.S., China, and Japan.

In the North, throughout the last year as in many previous years, the regime kept on its obsessive nuclear ambition, advancing its nuclear and missile programs toward completing an operational nuclear force, conducting a large underground hydrogen bomb detonation and test-launching at least 17 ballistic missiles.

North Korea, claiming its nuclear arsenal is to deter U.S. threats of invasion, has actually become a threat to the United States, beyond South Korea and Japan.

In November, Kim Jong-un declared that the DPRK has “realized” its nuclear force and can now strike the continental United States. He believes the deaths of Saddam Hussein and Moammar Gadhafi were because they did not have nuclear weapons. He believes that only nuclear weapons can guarantee his survival.

The U.N. has imposed the toughest sanctions ever, cutting off roughly 90 percent of Pyongyang’s export revenue, including exports such as coal, iron, seafood, and textiles, and phasing out North Korean workers who earn foreign currency from abroad. Countries are severing diplomatic ties from the DPRK. Yet, North Korea is sustaining itself by tightening the belts of its already hungry people.

It remains to be seen whether the pressure campaign led by Washington and its allies with broad participation by the international community will succeed to force the North to come to the table of denuclearization talks.

As any military option becomes more dangerous or even impossible in view of the North’s rapidly advancing nuclear capability that can strike back in retaliation, coercive policy is inevitably restricted to economic and diplomatic sanctions. And this is where U.S. policy is today.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson published an op-ed in the New York Times on Dec. 27, offering no alternative to the current U.S. policy. He pointed out some progress in U.S. diplomacy on North Korea, which President Trump identified as the greatest U.S. security threat after he took office. American diplomacy has successfully galvanized support and participation of the international community to pressure and isolate North Korea to see if its behavior might change.

The top U.S. diplomat hopes international pressure will bring North Korea to “serious negotiations on the abandonment of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.” The U.S. keeps saying China “could and should do more” for the realization of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

However, China is sticking to its strategy to keep the North Korean regime afloat, refusing to cut off crude oil to the North by 100 percent. North Korea still has a geo-strategic value to China’s core interests.

In December, Tillerson revealed that Washington told Beijing that in case U.S. troops must advance to the North, it would only be for the purpose of securing North Korea’s nuclear weapons for safe disposition and the U.S. troops would retreat to south of the 38th parallel once their mission would be accomplished.

Tillerson has publically stated “four no’s” on North Korea: No pursuit of regime change, no collapse of the regime, no accelerated unification, and no excuse to advance American troops north of the 38th parallel. In addition, he always said the U.S. keeps the door open to talks for a peaceful resolution, which should be the task of diplomacy.

However, there have been instances in which diplomacy is constrained by the president of the United States. Trump does not give full support for efforts at a diplomatic resolution beyond the pressure campaign. He speaks of or tweets explicit and implicit threats of “fire and fury” on and “total destruction” of North Korea.

Trump’s “America first” national security strategy revealed Dec. 18 did not contain what exactly he would do to North Korea, other than “It will be taken care of. We have no choice.” He says he is committed to “achieve the denuclearization of North Korea,” although “there is more to do.” He says he would not allow North Korea to threaten the United States and the world with its weapons of mass destruction.

Knowing Trump’s North Korea policy, nothing that can help a peaceful resolution is expected from Washington. The same is true from Beijing or Moscow. However, there is some hope in Seoul’s efforts to make something positive out of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics that South Korea will host in February. Encouraged by the spirit and tradition of a ceasefire between warring parties during the Olympic Games, Seoul is proposing a deferment of the annual South Korea-U.S. military drills to a later period after the Winter Olympics.

Seoul is not seeking for a start of the so-called double freeze that has been proposed by China and Russia. Postponement of the exercises could contribute to Seoul’s effort to lure North Korean athletes to PyeongChang and to the safety of all participating Olympians. The Trump administration’s belated confirmation of U.S. participation was seen as an unwelcome attitude to South Korea’s hosting of the 2018 Winter Olympics.

A real turning point may come surprisingly from Pyongyang through a New Year’s message by its leader Kim Jong-un. His message will probably carry self-praise for its alleged accomplishments, including a series of nuclear and missile tests “for defense,” political consolidation, and progress in the continuing struggle for economic development in isolation and sanctions. He may say again that Pyongyang’s decision to pursue nuclear armament was the right one, as the nation is constantly threatened by “the U.S. warmongers and their stooges”.

Kim’s New Year’s message will say the North will continue to pursue the Byongjin policy _ for parallel development of a nuclear force and a self-sufficient economy.

On the other hand, the North is a de facto nuclear state and now it may feel that it has enough leverage to engage in negotiations with Washington and Seoul. Recently, Tillerson said that the North has to earn talks, by showing a period of restraint from provocation and seriousness in eventual denuclearization.

All know that North Korea wants to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state. But, it is doubtful if the North Koreans really believe they can expel U.S. troops from the South and take it over under their own terms, for this is something that will never happen.

South Koreans are too strong, too affluent, and too free to let that happen. They are determined to defend their free, prosperous system against any attempt by the North to take it away from them. What’s your take?

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.