Moon plays old power game anew

By Oh Young-jin

For those who feel uneasy about hiccups in the deployment of a U.S. missile interceptor, or Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, here is the lowdown.

The late President Roh Moo-hyun settled for a theoretical level on his diplomacy of equidistance ― getting away from the orbit of U.S. influence and bringing it closer to China to gain mediating power.

But his protege and friend, President Moon Jae-in, is now putting the so-called “balancer” theory into practice.

Now, the supposed gallery ― Moon’s conservative foes, government and pundits in the U.S. , and the media on both sides of the Pacific ― may feel bewildered but the chance is that Moon knows what he is doing when he kicked up the dust over THAAD. Of course, the success is not guaranteed.

Now, two launchers are deployed plus the radar system. But the remaining four launchers are in storage and will be there for the coming months.

Full deployment this year is out of question, considering a full-range environmental impact assessment survey, ordered by Moon, which some say may take two years to complete, is underway. Now Moon backed down with his aides indicating that the survey may be scaled down.

When he goes to Washington for his first summit with his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump, Moon will likely hold the trump card against the politically embattled U.S. leader whose impeachment appears to be a strong possibility.

Moon’s advantage comes from two factors.

First, Moon has driven Washington into a corner by making the ally look as if it was an accomplice in a crime. How? All the THAAD brouhaha started when the presidential office raised an issue over the omission of the four launchers in the Defense Ministry’s report and Moon subsequently called it “shocking.”

The ministry argued that it didn’t hoodwink the new government, saying that the launchers were brought in as part of the agreement with the U.S. In other words, this could have been considered as part of the routine following the agreement made in the previous administration, but there appears to be grounds for reasonable suspicion that Chong Wa Dae intentionally blew it out of all proportion.

Then, Moon made it a double whammy for the U.S. by finding fault with the ministry for cutting corners to make the speedy deployment possible with Washington’s nod.

The fuss over the omitted report and environmental survey could make more sense, if they had been plotted in advance. Why would Moon have gone that far?

The results can explain Moon’s moves.

Above all, the U.S. has found itself on the defensive. The U.S. government had first claimed there was nothing wrong with the process. Now, it hopes with a sense of concern that there would be no going back on the THAAD deployment. Trump and the top U.S. brass joined the call.

It is worth noting the shift in the U.S. tone from surprise to concern. If the system is pulled out, it could give a black eye to the U.S. reputation as well as give strategic constraints to the theater missile defense for South Korea.

True, it would get Korea behind the eight ball as well but Koreans feel less threatened by the North’s missile attacks because their country is already with the target of thousands of rockets and guns.

Moon’s move can have other repercussions as well.

First Moon can strengthen his support base. Roh got alienated from his core supporters on two issues ― the signing of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S. and the dispatch of soldiers to Iraq as part of a U.S.-led coalition. Now, Moon apparently has learned from Roh’s example, not deviating from his ideological line at the risk of angering his backers. His approval ratings belong in the stratospheric levels.

His THAAD decision is also strengthening Moon’s hand with China.

It is said that Xi Jinping had been upset with the disgraced former President Park Geun-hye for pressing ahead with the THAAD deployment without advance notice. Although the Chinese government calls for the complete THAAD withdrawal, China may come to its senses and settle for the half in the deployment. China sees THAAD as a piece in its board game of hegemony with the U.S. In this zero-sum game, China will see a half victory better than a complete loss.

It would be no surprise that some China hands in the Moon camp are speaking to Beijing to find ways of moving on from the THAAD standoff.

Conservatives and right-of-center media appear puzzled about Moon’s moves, sounding the alarm.

To their conventional eyes Moon looks to be recklessly departing from the ROK-U.S. alliance, which has long served as Korea’s diplomatic and security anchor. They fear a repetition of what had transpired during the Roh presidency ― alienation from Washington, and still worse, U.S. disengagement from the Korean Peninsula.

Ahead of his important summit with Trump, the media say that Moon has revealed his hand and putting Korea between a rock ― the United States ― and a hard place ―China.

Not necessarily. On the flip side of this old defeatist thinking is a Korea that plays the role of go-between for the two big powers.

This is a dream that his friend, Roh, came short of realizing. Moon has trodden the path before, knowing pitfalls and shortcuts.

As with Roh, Moon is seeing it as an inevitable choice. Would the second time turn out to be a charm?

Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times’ chief editorial writer. Contact foolsdie5@ktimes.com and foolsdie@gmail.com.