US views Moon with concern

By John Burton

Are relations between Washington and Seoul heading for a train wreck when they should be cooperating more closely than ever in dealing with the threat of the North Korean nuclear and missile program?

Things could be heading that way if Moon Jae-in is elected as the next Korean president next week while U.S. President Donald Trump has floated the idea of Seoul paying for the THAAD anti-missile system and threatening to end the KORUS trade agreement.

Until Trump made his intemperate remarks, much of Washington’s concern was focused on the election of Moon, who is generally perceived as favoring reconciliation with Pyongyang and opposing the Trump administration’s tough attitude on North Korea.

Moon is seen in the U.S. capital as ready to ease sanctions against North Korea by pursuing Sunshine Policy 2.0, including encouraging dialogue and economic cooperation with Pyongyang like his predecessors Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun did between 1998 and 2008.

This could lead to the same sort of disharmony that occurred between Roh and U.S. President George W. Bush in the mid-2000s as it is believed that Moon would like to pursue a more independent line from Washington.

Attention among U.S. policymakers has focused, for example, on Moon’s reported comments earlier this year that he would consider going to Pyongyang before going to Washington if that would help resolve the nuclear issue. Moon is generally viewed in Washington as a leftist ideologue like his former boss Roh, with whom he served as chief of staff.

But these perceptions overlook the possibility that Moon may be more of a pragmatist in the mold of Kim Dae-jung. Moon has signaled his recognition that he has limited room to maneuver in dealing with North Korea.

There are several factors that will constrain Moon.

The first is that the Trump administration’s aggressive approach toward Pyongyang will undermine any attempt by Moon in pursuing an engagement strategy, such as reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

Moon needs to win the trust of President Trump if he is to have any influence on future U.S. action, including trying to prevent a unilateral military strike. As a result, Moon recently stepped back from his firm opposition to THAAD. He also seems to be aligned with the U.S. policy of forcing China to apply increased trade sanctions against North Korea.

“To China, we must make it clear that if they fail to rein in the North, sanctions against the North will be stepped up and the deployment of THAAD will be inevitable,” Moon recently told Time Magazine. “If the North continues with its nuclear program, it’s natural that South Korea and the U.S. will impose stronger sanctions against North Korea,” he added.

The second factor that Moon must be deal with is domestic politics. Moon is a polarizing figure mistrusted by conservatives. But if he wants to govern effectively and pass legislation on such issues as corporate reforms he must take into account the views of the conservatives and the centrist People’s Party on North Korea. Moon’s Minjoo party, after all, only has a plurality of National Assembly seats and can’t push through new laws on its own.

Another limiting factor on Moon is that with the current unfavorable public mood toward the U.S., China and Japan will weaken Seoul’s diplomatic leverage if Moon should be tempted to pursue an independent course since he would lack foreign allies in such an attempt.

The biggest challenge for Moon may be to persuade his supporters to accept a North Korea policy that parallels that of the U.S. when anti-Americanism is rising because of the prevalent view that Trump is an unpredictable and destabilizing factor.

Trump’s remarks that Seoul should have to pay for THAAD (although that has since been walked back by the U.S. State Department) and that the U.S. will renegotiate or abrogate KORUS will not help matters and will likely have three results.

One is that it will assure the election of Moon as Korea’s next president since it will galvanize his support base. Second, it will increase opposition to THAAD. Third, Moon’s job as president has just become more difficult.

The most charitable explanation for Trump’s remarks is that the U.S. president may be pursuing a high-risk strategy to box Moon in and force him to accept Washington’s lead on North Korea.

By raising the KORUS issue, for example, Trump may be reminding Moon that he has to play ball if he wants to preserve KORUS. This would be typical Trump behavior as a dealmaker: set out an extreme negotiating position and withdraw the KORUS and THAAD threats if Moon agrees to Trump’s terms.

The more depressing interpretation is that Trump is emotionally reverting to his campaign rhetoric of attacking Seoul as defense freeloader and an unfair trade partner and that he has no idea that he is undermining relations with a close U.S. ally. Maybe Washington should be worrying more about Trump than Moon.

John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant. He can be reached at johnburtonft@yahoo.com.