What Pyongyang should do

By Tong Kim

North Korea no longer needs to do something provocative to get attention. It is constantly being watched because of its nuclear and missile development programs, which are discussed in capitals in Asia, the United States, and Europe. Rex Tillerson, nominee for secretary of state, expressed the conventional hardline view of the DPRK at his Senate confirmation hearing last Tuesday.

Pointing to North Korea as “a grave threat to the world because of its refusal to conform to international norms,” and denounced China’s “empty promises” to comply with U.N. sanctions. Tillerson said, “If China is not going to comply with sanctions, it is appropriate for us to pressure them to comply.”

The nominee’s approach to ending the North Korean nuclear issue will be “a long term plan” by “closing gaps” in sanction implementation and “visiting other areas and ways of closing off access of North Korea to materials that enable them to develop the capability and the delivery system.” Tillerson also said he would consider secondary sanctions on Chinese companies trading with the North if found violating existing sanctions.

The next would-be secretary of state did not specify how and what new pressure he would impose on China to control Pyongyang’s weapons programs. At the first press conference since his election in November, Donald Trump did not discuss the DPRK at all. The transition team does not seem to have any policy specifics.

At this point, it is still not clear what kind of an overall North Korea policy would be in place for the new administration to be sworn in on Friday. It is likely that Trump’ security team, once settled at the White House, and the relevant departments including state, defense, and treasury, would take an overall review of North Korea policy, while maintaining or even tightening the existing sanction regime. George W. Bush’s initial team took 6 months to complete this process in 2001.

The Trump administration would have to choose one of the three options: (1) application of pressure through sanctions and deterrence by enhancing and deploying more capable war assets, including a THAAD battery, in and around South Korea, (2) taking military action _ either preventive or preemptive _ which is considered too dangerous in view of the likelihood of starting war and incurring unbearable damage to lives and properties, and (3) engagement and negotiation _ which does not guarantee success given its past failures.

The hardliners in Washington and Seoul do not support the option of engagement. They prefer to see continuation of increasing pressure on the North Korean regime to a point of capitulation and denuclearization, if not collapse. Sanctions and military pressure have not succeeded to change the North. There is no dispute that sanctions would take time to be effective.

Relying on China has not worked so far and it will not work even with new pressure from the United States, unless China compromises on its own core interests in Korea and in the South China Sea. If Rex Tillerson’s position on China, as expressed at his Senate hearing, were to be fully carried out, it would signal a collision course between China and the United States. Under strained Sino-U.S. relations, it would be more difficult to expect China’s cooperation on the North Korean issue.

A recent exchange of statements between Pyongyang and Washington was not constructive. It started with DPRK leader Kim Jong-un’s new year’s message, in which he said that his country was in the final phase of preparations for an ICBM test, to which the president-elect tweeted, “It won’t happen.” A spokesman of the DPRK’s foreign ministry responded, “An ICBM will be test-fired at a time and a place designated at the order of our supreme leader.”

Trump never said how he would make sure “it won’t happen”. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are believed by the North Korean leadership to be two pillars of survival and protection of their sovereignty. However, they have to remember that they have already developed enough nuclear bombs and missiles to protect themselves or to threaten their neighbors. More than enough for negotiating leverage as well. They do not need to increase or sharpen their nuclear weapons arsenal.

Perhaps, Pyongyang should and can send a positive signal to the U.S. and its allies in South Korea and Japan, by proposing talks with Washington first. The North has proposed the discussion of a peace agreement and the exchange of a moratorium on its nuclear and missile programs in return for suspension of joint allied military exercises with South Korea.

Pyongyang should understand that in the U.S., most experts on North Korea and most Americans in general have a negative attitude to them. The regime is viewed as an authoritarian system that suppresses freedom and abuses human rights, failing to take care of the minimum standard of living, while using scarce resources for the WMD programs. Pyongyang needs to reform, enhance the people’s livelihood, and improve its image.

Most of the known key members to join Trump’s security team seem to hold hardline views on the North, not much different from those who served in the previous administrations. Increased application of sanctions will no doubt make it more difficult for the DPRK leadership to revive the economy and to feed and clothe the people. They should not forget that the purpose of sanctions is to bring the DPRK back to the table. Gradual easing of the sanctions is quite possible if talks make progress.

This column recommends, as it has long supported the peaceful resolution of the security issue on the Korean peninsula, that the leadership of the DPRK take a new initiative for peace talks with the Trump administration. He has nothing to lose by extending an olive branch before the inauguration. It is better for Pyongyang to act now than to wait for the Trump team to come up with a policy decision.

Nobody can expect Pyongyang to dismantle all of their nukes and missiles overnight. It will be a long process. But it is a good time to start. What’s your take?

Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.