'ABP' in diplomacy

By Choi Sung-jin

Has Donald Trump decided to ally with Russia to keep China, America’s new archrival, in check?

Maybe, or maybe not. To know the answer, diplomacy watchers around the world will have to read lots of chicken entrails and tea leaves until months after Trump removes the label of “-elect” from his title.

What the U.S. president-to-be has done over the past few weeks more than warrants such a question, however. And, if the reply proves “yes,” few countries will feel the impact more keenly than South Korea, from the biggest U.S. diplomatic shift since the early 1970s when Richard Nixon visited Beijing to reconcile with China and jointly contain the then Soviet Union.

Worse yet, the hypothetical rebalance of power among the three giant nations is coming at almost the worst moment for Koreans now undergoing one of the biggest political turbulences in the nation’s modern history because of the leader they chose — wrongly — four years ago.

For Korea, allied with the most powerful country in the world and located next to the second most powerful, the biggest diplomatic fiasco is being forced to choose one between the two. Just as national security and economic stability are the two basic requirements for a country’s survival, South Korea needs both the U.S. as its security provider and China as its economic lifeline. Seoul cannot simply abandon Beijing for Washington and the reversal is also true.

What the scandal-ridden President Park Geun-hye and her administration have done in diplomacy gave the impression of moving from one extreme to another. When Park stood beside her Chinese and Russian counterparts watching China’s military parade in Tiananmen Square on Sept. 2, 2015, she justified her move saying it was necessary to win Beijing’s cooperation in sanctioning North Korea and punish the latter’s nuclear ambition. As many experts had expected, though, Park’s diplomatic gamble did little to that effect, ending up only irritating Washington.

This past July, it was Beijing’s turn to feel annoyed by the Seoul government, which announced the deployment of the U.S. missile shield dubbed the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system. The U.S. and South Korean officials say the THAAD is to protect South Koreans and American troops from the North’s possible attacks with nuclear-tipped missiles but China and Russia have long opposed its deployment in the South, maintaining it is like a double-edged sword that can also neutralize the two countries’ missile systems, a reason many objective observers agree is technologically plausible.

President Park was right to criticize the foreign policy of her predecessor Lee Myung-bak, who moved too close toward Washington and too far from Beijing. But her slogan of “balanced diplomacy” between the G2 has proved to be far easier said than done. Park and her diplomatic team have wavered from the U.S. to China, or the other way round, alienating one for the sake of the other in turns. The two conservative leaders here made one mistake in common _ trying to solve the Korean problems not through the initiatives of the two Koreas but by depending on surrounding giants. They mistook that sufficient pressure would force the North to denuclearize or implode.

Few can defend the reckless military adventurists in the northern half of this divided peninsula. It is also true, however, the United States could have solved the North’s nuclear crisis had it not blown up such opportunities at least twice _ in 2000 when newly-elected U.S. President George W. Bush turned “ABC” (anything-but-Clinton) and discarded the 1994 Agreed Framework and had some U.S. neocons not scuttled the implementation of the September 2005 accord reached by their own administration. Pyongyang made its first nuclear test in the following year as Washington stepped up its financial sanctions that had begun before the ink on their bilateral accord dried up. Outlooks appear even dimmer under the incoming U.S. administration, though.

President-elect Trump has argued that Beijing is not doing all it can to dissuade its troublesome neighbor from its nuclear blackmailing. He is overrating China’s influence on North Korea and/or underrating Beijing’s strategic interests in this part of the world. Trump is using even the Taiwan card for his diplomatic purposes by appearing to drop Washington’s decades-long “One China” policy.

The North Korean nuclear crisis has gone from bad to worse under the two previous U.S. administrations and will continue to do so under the new one. The two conservative governments in Seoul have also contributed to its aggravation. The policy failures of the past 16 years in Washington and of nine years in Seoul have made Pyongyang a de facto member of the nuclear club. Given the makeup of Trump’s national security team, filled with hawks and generals, the next U.S. administration would be the return of the neocons, more ready than ever to turn their words into action.

North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear programs until it normalizes its relationships with the U.S. and Japan — as the South did with China and Russia about 25 years ago — receives some economic aid in its course and gets a guarantee of non-aggression from America by turning the armistice into a peace treaty. Rewarding bad behavior may leave a bitter taste but is better than another military conflict on this peninsula, even a limited one.

Some liberal politicians who vow to revisit the Park administration’s diplomatic accords, including the missile interceptor installation and the Korea-Japan intelligence sharing pact, if they take power next year is worthy of serious consideration in this regard.

People say international agreements should be kept for the sake of trust.

If George W. Bush adopted the ABC policy and Donald Trump maintains an “ABO” (anything but Obama) stance, however, why can’t the next South Korean leader turn “ABP” (anything but Park) in diplomacy? One might think only leaders of large powerful nations can afford to discard accords made by their predecessors. At stake for South Korea, however, is not just strategic interest but national survival.

This is also why political parties should waste no time activating emergency bodies handling not just urgent economic issues but diplomatic tasks as well.

Choi Sung-jin is a contributing writer to The Korea Times and an adjunct professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Contact him at choisj1955@naver.com.