Battle rages over Clinton Korea policy

By Stephen Costello

Arguments and analysis from supporters of pressure, isolation and collapse toward North Korea now face louder voices from supporters of negotiation, deal-making and denuclearization. Both sides have recently increased their production of papers, OpEds, conferences and announcements. The worst-case would be for a new Hillary Clinton administration to continue the current course, not least because not one of its advocates can describe a realistic or appropriate end-game. Of course, the real worst-case would happen if someone makes a mistake, and events spin out of control. The best-case scenario would be for the most experienced and well-grounded analyses and arguments to be welcomed by a new administration. Such views could help form the basis for a serious and broad review of policy, going back at least to the Clinton/Kims diplomacy of the 1990s.

The new Obama administration failed to do this in 2009, leading to its biggest foreign policy disaster after Syria. Its waste of opportunities and of human resources, and its inability to remember the regional strategic, power and human rights dimensions at stake with North Korea, are hard to fathom. One could argue that they did a review, or that they did not. It is hard to say which is worse, since their decision to double down on the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld sanctions and isolation, together with the self-defeating and ahistorical refusal to open talks with North Korea, has led inevitably to today’s brink-of-war hysteria in Washington, Pyongyang and Seoul. Beijing and Moscow have joined the clamor in recent days.

So here we are. The advocates of further sanctions and pressure, with their pretense of forcing DPRK leaders “to the table” seem to fantasize about collapse or surrender. In any case the current destabilizing trend will continue after the Obama group is gone. Advocates of resuming the dialogue ­ the fruitful, game-changing dialogue ­ that was ongoing up to2001, seem to grasp that this is a fleeting moment for them to influence the new US President. They have endured 16 years of relative policy paralysis, on the issues they often devoted careers to, and this may be the last time many of them have any input on policy going forward. It is both ironic and tragic that North Koreans have made qualitative and quantitative leaps in nuclear and missile production since these specialists were influential.

In this battle over policy in Washington it is not central, but it is important, to recognize the weaknesses of its allies in northeast Asia today. Where Bill Clinton had frustrating difficulties during the 1990s working with ROK President Kim Young Sam, he found in 1998 a partner willing to help lead diplomacy in Kim’s successor, Kim Dae Jung. He also had relative support from Japanese leaders. The Europeans played a supportive role. Today in contrast, the Japanese and Korean administrations are whitewashing textbooks and demonizing opponents. The South Korean administration is backsliding on press freedom and blacklisting artists. Its strategic diplomacy with China is an amateurish failure, its policy toward North Korea ­ arguably its second most important ­ is a Cold War relic. Officials repeatedly insist that these are the best relationships ever, as they did again at 2+2 meetings in Washington this week ,but that claim is wearing thin.

If Hillary is to emerge from this policy hole, rather than just stop digging, her team will have to clearly assess those administrations, know how to talk to them, and find ways to bring them along. That should not be hard, since a real effort to return to negotiations could benefit them even more than the US. Benefits would begin with backing away from unnecessary and expensive missile defense systems, hair-trigger military alerts, and loose and divisive talk of new nuclear weapons in both countries. They would extend to long-term and expanding infrastructure and commercial developments, among many others. Oh yes, and nuclear tests and missile production could be frozen, and then walked back with the proper agreements.

The sanctions and isolation crew has greater numbers and better access to public microphones. Their proponents include President Obama and can be found throughout the government and into the think tanks and media. The diplomacy and ambition group is small but still formidable. Although many of the lions of Asian affairs have left the scene during these 16 years, sharp and capable people remain, able to pack their bags just in case their government comes to its senses again soon.

The dean of this group may be former Defense Sectary William Perry. He has been joined in arguing for new talks and a new structure by former Secretary of State George Schultz in the most hard-hitting and brief report to emerge in years, from Stanford University. Former Senator and now head of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Sam Nunn has weighed in with a report for the Council on Foreign Relations, which also opens the door to engagement. Two of the most experienced policy professionals from the Congress, Frank Januzzi and Keith Luse, have recently given fresh presentations full of new ideas and practical suggestions. Robert Einhorn, who was intimately involved as the diplomacy of the 1990s made progress, has recently co-authored a no-nonsense report on the practical and political dangers of South Korea flirting with its own nuclear weapons. There are others. I have spoken with several in recent weeks. The list is not long but it is impressive.

The bottom line is that if President HRC wants to get back to the business of lowering tensions, increasing security and expanding business in the Korean region, personnel should not be a problem. Nor should opposition within the US Congress. All recent diplomatic initiatives have faced a wall of resistance from the usual suspects there. But few policy battles take place with as much at stake as the current one over Korea. After great efforts, people working on US policies toward Myanmar, Iran and Cuba have had break-through victories in recent years. Although those big policy changes will require tending and attention for decades, they are what the US should be doing. Certainly, many of the most capable and experienced specialists think it is time, during the next US administration,to add Korea to that list.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.