USFK's role in Korea

By Shin Sung-won

In the Sept.-Oct. 2016 edition of Foreign Affairs magazine, Mac Thornberry, the Republican chair of the House Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, published an article titled “Preserving Primacy,” in which he argued that “South Korea has twice the population of the North and over ten times its GDP. Over time therefore, it should be possible for Seoul to assume a greater share of the U.S.-South Korean alliance’s ground force requirement.” During the presidential primaries in 2016, Republican nominee Donald Trump questioned the need for so many overseas bases. At the same time, North Korea’s flaunting of its nuclear weapons and missiles could necessitate even strengthening America’s military presence in Korea in many ways.

Currently, the U.S. has more overseas military bases than any other nation: nearly 800 spread throughout more than 70 countries. Of the roughly 150,000 troops stationed abroad, 49,000 are in Japan, 28,500 in Korea and 38,000 in Germany; the total cost to the U.S. government, with war zones excluded, is up to $100 billion per year. The American Eighth Army and the 2nd Infantry Division constitute 17,000 combat troops in Korea. The 2nd Infantry Division is composed of a brigade of armored troops, an air force brigade and an artillery brigade.

Since the Korean War (1950-53), the number of U.S. troops in Korea has been decreasing. When we look back on the Nixon administration in the early 1970s, every element of the strategy reflected the new downsizing. Between 1969 and 1972, total U.S. military personnel dropped from 3.4 million to 2.3 million, the lowest level since before the Korean War. The U.S. troop presence in Japan and South Korea was cut by a third, in the Philippines by half. From its peak in 1969, the Pentagon budget began almost a decade of steady cuts. Announcing a new doctrine, President Nixon said that American allies would have to provide the manpower for their own defense. The U.S. would offer weapons and, when needed, its nuclear umbrella, but it should not be expected to do the fighting. A more cost-conscious foreign policy was inevitable. Nixon and Kissinger tried to preserve America’s global standing while reducing its cost.

In 2013, the U.S. government and legislative body agreed to reduce the national budget annually, and automatically for a decade. It pushes the government to take more care of its defense costs. It is inevitable in some measures that Korea should share more of the burden of its defense. It is needed to strike a balance of interests between trade and burden-sharing for national defense.

U.S. troops stationed in Korea have played a pivotal role in maintaining and strengthening peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has played a key role in deterring North Korea’s aggression against the South. Taking into consideration the dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula, America’s defensive military presence here should be strengthened, while at the same time Korea must do the same in defending its territory from the North. Korea should beef up its military’s defensive posture as soon as possible but it is also inevitable that the USFK deploy THAAD for their own troops’ protection as well as for the people of Korea. Without this deployment the US-ROK security alliance could unravel.

It could be summed it up this way: “At the end of the day, it is all about military force and naval presence ― it is not about passionate and well-meaning talk.” Soft power is only relevant after you have developed hard power.

We must learn from the case of Germany which during the Reagan administration decided to deploy nuclear weapons in West German territory against the Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles targeted towards Western European countries. The West German government respected American decisions to protect the West German people and U.S. military bases in West Germany.

Shin Sung-won is director-general, at the Department of International Economy and Trade Studies, Korea National Diplomatic Academy.