Completion of Kim Jong-un's control

By Tong Kim

The Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) ― the legislative branch of the North Korean government that rubber-stamps decisions made by the Korean Workers’ Party and the DPRK government ― elected Kim Jong-un as “chairman of the State Affairs Commission” (SAC). Kim Yong-nam, president of the presidium of the SPA, said the new title represents “the top post” of the DPRK.

The SAC replaces the National Defense Commission (NDC), which was set up by Kim Jong-il to carry out the “military-first” policy, and the younger Kim served as the NDC’s “first chairman.”

The latest titular change in the DPRK’s power structure was made in Kim Jong-un’s presence during the fourth meeting of the 13th SPA on June 29, attended by about 700 deputies. Kim did not attend two previous annual SPA meetings.

In May, the seventh party congress changed his party position from “first secretary of the party” to “chairman of the party.” Kim Jong-un did not use the same title of “general secretary of the party” that his father held. By the DPRK constitution, the party provides leadership for all activities for the state.

Like Kim Jong-il, who reserved the DPRK presidency “eternally” for his father Kim Il-sung, the incumbent leader set aside the NDC chair “permanently” for his father, observing what has become a Confucian tradition of the Kim dynasty.

The titular evolution, from “first secretary” to “party chairman” and from “first chairman of NDC” to “chairman of the State Affairs Commission,” sheds light on the completion of an elaborate process in the transition of power from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un over the past four years.

After succeeding his father in 2012, the young leader was called “supreme commander” of the Korean People’s Army, a title Kim Jong-un still holds today. In the wake of the recent SPA meeting, Kim Jong-un is coming out of the shadows of his father and his grandfather to open an era of his own rule.

Kim Jong-un is fully in control of the party, the administration, and the military ― three cornerstones of the North Korean ruling system. It is more critical than ever to deal with the North as it is, not as we wish it to be, when devising new ways forward for the resolution of Korean issues ― such as security and peace, denuclearization, human rights, inter-Korean relations, or unification.

It is ironic that only a few years ago many in the Western world questioned the viability of Kim Jong-un in power ― on the grounds of instability because of his young age, inexperience, short temper, cruelty, unpredictability and belligerence. It is also ironic that North Korea is still moving on its own political, military and economic agendas, defying the pressures from international sanctions, and still making stunning progress in its nuclear and missile programs.

North Korea’s test-firing on June 21 of the “Hwasong 10” rocket, called a Musudan missile by the U.S.-ROK alliance, may not have been a complete success. John Schilling, an aerospace engineer at the Air Force Research Laboratory, called it “a partial success,” writing for the 38 North website on June 28. Nevertheless, it was an undeniable sign of significant progress in North Korea’s missile technology.

One may discount some of Pyongyang’s claims that the intermediate-range ballistic missile, designed for a range of 3,500 km, was fired at a high angle to reach an altitude of 1,415.6 km, without affecting the safety of any neighboring countries, splashing in the targeted waters 400 km away, and probing “the reentry heat resistance capability” of the rocket.

This success, full or partial, came after five preceding failures of similar tests. It may suggest that the Musudan missiles, already deployed, are not operational today, but it does suggest that North Korea is working fast toward the perfection of technologies to develop a reliable, functional nuclear warfare capability equipped with ICBMs that can strike the continental United States.

The Korea Central News Agency quoted an elated Kim Jong-un as saying: “We have the sure capability to attack … the American bastards in the Pacific operations theater (that should include Japan, Guam, and Hawaii) … The real foe for our nuclear force is a nuclear war itself …” It also reported that Kim Jong-un kept up the morale of the rocket scientists throughout repeated failures by showing “more care and encouragement” for them.

Ironically, the media in Seoul predicted Kim’s embarrassment and anger over the earlier failures of the missile test. Pyongyang keeps silent on its failures and makes big propaganda out of its successes. Seoul relishes its detection of Pyongyang’s failures. This time Seoul seems to have been caught off guard by Pyongyang’s success in the test.

In Beijing last week, representatives of the six-party talks came together in a Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue meeting, where Choe Son-hui, deputy director of North American affairs at Pyongyang’s foreign ministry, said the “six-party talks are dead,” as her country is “not in a position to talk about denuclearization.”

The North Korean issue is likely to be turned over to the next administration of the United States. However, North Korea will be one of the top priority security concerns besides ISIS and cyber-security, as viewed by CIA director John Brennan at a recent Senate hearing, and one of the five threats along with Russia, China, ISIS and cyber-security, as described recently by Defense Secretary Ash Carter.

North Korea continues a mixed policy of provocation and dialogue towards Seoul and Washington, which respond only to Pyongyang’s provocations. Time is running out as the North is rushing to become a fully functional nuclear state. What’s your take?

Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.