Brexit - wake-up call for Korea's future

By Stephen Costello

There are many important dimensions to the tragic vote of the UK electorate to exit the EU on 23 June. Ramifications of the vote will be profound and negative. Both political parties descended into crises as the two main factions within each one ― always in tension ― went to war with one another. The Scottish may leave Britain to rejoin the EU. Moves are underway to delay or cancel the Brexit public referendum. As the UK begins to grapple with its biggest political and identity crisis in a generation, are there lessons for Korea?

Let’s see. A middle power in a key region leaves its leadership position and retreats into a go-it-alone nationalism. The arguments made ― that the previous efforts at regional integration were too hard, that their neighborhood partners will surrender to them, that it will be better alone ― aremostly unworkable fantasies. Many of its friends regret that it will not carry the weight it did before. The US is its main ally. This sure sounds familiar… Oh yes, now I remember. Something similar happened to South Korea over ten years ago. There are differences, of course, but the similarities should provoke some thinking.

In several ways the UK vote should give Koreans ― both political leaders and everyone else ― a wake-up call about what is important for them and what direction would preserve stability, progress and peace. It should also remind Koreans of the dangers from certain myths and illusions that have become regular talking points among many leaders and much of the media.

The United Kingdom, like South Korea, is a modern middle power. The two share a unique set of attributes: wealth, stability democracy, luck. But among the most valuable is their alliance with the US, which expands both their hard and soft power. The UK has occupied a critical space in its region, wielding far more influence due to its soft power, geography and alliances than it could ever have if standing alone. The Brexit vote is now about to destroy much of that.

Korea has the potential to play a similar role in northeast Asia, much as itdid once before. It’s ability to “punch above its weight” is based on the same set of attributes. When Korea last played this role, spearheading a strategic North-South détente that would change regional power in Korea’s and the US’s interests, prevent nuclear weapons in North Korea, lower tension and increase security, its US ally first provided crucial support and complimentary diplomacy.

Then the Bush administration publically withdrew its support in 2001,after only three years of successful work from 1998 through 2000.Korean administrations under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun struggled to keep the project going, but failed to overcome US determination to destroy it. Koreans have been living with the result for the past 15 years. Conservative administrations under Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye have since forcefully refused to resume middle power responsibilities.

This is what the UK has to look forward to if it goes ahead with its divorce from the EU. As statesmen, specialists, ordinary British and friends of the UK have observed since the vote, the place will be smaller, weaker, and more inward-looking.Korea, since abandoning its middle power and regional roles under pressure from the US, has been seeing itself and acting as a small power, at the mercy of other forces with other priorities. In Korea’s case, a more responsible role was taken from it. In the UK Brexit vote, they harmed themselves. In both cases, they lost the ability to impact the region in ways urgently needed by the region and their US ally.

A stable, peaceful, nonnuclear Korean Peninsula would, like the UK-EU partnership, strengthen the region. A slowly integrating Peninsula would transform power politics in the interests of all countries, but mainly in the interest of South Korea. Appallingly, the fact that this prospect was on the table, and was one of the best reasons for the US to support North-South engagement in the 1990s, was lost on US leaders from 2001 forward and on ROK leaders from 2008 forward. Today’s arms race, increasing tensions and nuclearizing North Korea are all consequences of such mistakes.

Fact-free visions have been peddled by those opposed to a larger role in their regions by both the Brexit and the “no diplomacy” groups in the UK and Korea respectively. The attraction of a super-nationalist and super-capitalist Britain, divorced from the EU, was deceptively sold by the UK “Leave” campaign and was transparently false and unworkable. “Singapore on the Thames,” indeed.Although the cases are in many ways different, the attraction of South Korea as a victim, rejecting its inevitable partnership with North Korea, rejecting its complicated but closer relationship with China, and joining an ill-thought-out military and pressure campaign in search of a fantasy of North Korean capitulation, is equally doomed.

The reckless unilateralism of the Bush government is gone. Current US governments are more likely to be strategically confused and politically timid toward the big issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula. This is true even if the new US president doesn’t adopt the “sanctions and capitulation” approach of the Bush/Obama years. As a result, they will probably not lead any new denuclearization efforts. They could, however, be brought along by a responsible middle power ally with a plan.

In this way, the requirement for Korean leaders to regain their full weight and influence in the region is exactly what now faces the fractured UK political class. That’s a lot to ask from candidates and parties as they gear up for the presidential contest in 18 months. But maybe few presidential candidates are prepared enough and capable enough to take on the job.

It will be grimly fascinating to see the two main political parties in the UK wrestle with leadership and policy questions as they try to recover from their self-inflicted wound. But it could also be instructive to Koreans as their parties go through their own upheavals, and with similar issues at stake.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.