We don't know Hillary

By Stephen Costello

In fact, we don’t really know what policies a President Hillary Clinton would follow.The recent book by New York Times reporter Mark Landler, Alter Egos, is a deep look into the actions of Clinton and President Obama during the past 7 years, but on future policy it raises as many questions as it answers. As Secretary of State her role was circumscribed by her boss and by the political climate. But as president she would have a much freer hand.

This is particularly true in East Asia. We don’t know who she would hire and listen to. And because we have just endured two US presidents whounder-used and miss-used the National Security Council andthe broader government cabinet system, we don’t know how, or even if, Ms. Clinton would revamp and renew the structures of US foreign policy-making and implementation.

Will she find people who really know the issues and how to negotiate, then hire and listen to them? Or will she, like Obama, surround herself with loyalists, assume she knows everything, and use knowledgeable experts as ornamental advisors while retaining authority and power in the White House?

Lastly, we don’t know if she would be tougher on her political and policy opponents in the Congress – in a way that is multi-dimensional and engaging, perhaps more like Lyndon Johnson – or instead become captive to another four- or eight-year total war between the parties. One eminent historian recently wrote that one of Ms. Clinton’s favorite historians, Sean Wilentz, believes a healthy democracy requires stark choices between parties, rather than the apparently earnest desire by Barak Obama for an “end to politics,” or by Bill Clinton for a “third way” between left and right. Let’s hope so, but we really don’t know. And these choices will directly impact the way foreign relations are managed.

None of this is to diminish President Obama’s accomplishments with the Iran and Cuba deals. Theyare both very big deals, and demonstrate the best uses of American power. Nor should we minimize the work of US diplomats. Instead, consider those who would become the next decision-makers, and their choices about who to listen to and how to structure policy formulation and implementation. Would Hillary know how to best use the US presidency?

The George W. Bush group, before and particularly after 9/11, drastically shifted bureaucratic power from the State Department to the Pentagon. As Secretary of State Ms. Clinton brought some of that institutional power back, but the balance is still way off. She is one of the best people to address this balance, given her background. But does she see it as necessary, desirable, and doable?

Similarly, the White House-State Department balance has changed drastically depending on the president’s demands. Is it time to unchain the diplomats in northeast Asia? The role of the massive intelligence bureaucracy is now a key determinant of how policy is made and how it is talked about. With ongoing military deployments in the Middle East and rising tension in the South China Sea, management of the Pentagon will also directly impact policy.

Hillary's problem is not that she's "hawkish." It may not be hawkish to propose prescribed military action in Libya or Syria. It is that she has not shown sophistication about the uses of American power in northeast Asia. She has vastly more relevant experience for the job than any of the three preceding US presidents, but we don’t know if she can use that experience to advance US interests with less hubris and more cultural and international savvy. Does she know when to engage? Does she know how to stand up to US allies, firmly but quietly? After all her experience, can she still be spooked by the macho security/intelligence brotherhood in Washington?

The next six months of campaigning are not likely to elicit nuanced and detailed answers tothese questions, no matter how much we’d like to hear them. Instead we’re more likely to hear Donald Trump being mocked for suggesting talking to Kim Jung Un, or bragging about missile defense cooperation between Korea and Japan against the “sadistic” leader of North Korea.As the campaign heats up, we may find out increasingly less about the most important questions.

That would be a shame. Nothing would contrast more with a Trump campaign of bumper-sticker slogans and shallow ideas than a description of key, actionable choices for the next president, demonstrating respect for the public with its seriousness and its language. By picking the best examples from the past 20 years, and noting what she has learned along the way, she could show a degree of intellectual self-confidence that would make her stand out from her predecessorsand Mr. Trump.We can hope. In case good questions can be asked, these might be some of them:

1. Will you make a real effort, regardless of opposition, to move the US Senate to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS)?After 34 years this can’t be ignored. Republican objections can’t continue to deprive the US of the most important tools it could have to argue for the rule of law in crucial disputes. This is a perfect point on which to discredit longstanding Republican Party dogma.

2. Will you make a real effort against the sly end-runs around the P5+1 Iran Nuclear Deal by its US congressional and other opponents? They would link the deal to issues not directly related to nuclear weapons capabilities, so that the deal fails. If you let this deal atrophy, you and we will lose far more than the Iranians. Diplomacy itself will become less possible.

3. Will you honestly review 25 years of policy, by the US and others, surrounding the Korea issues, and resolve to add North Korea to the Iran and Cuba accomplishments, so that it becomes US policy to achieve nuclear disarmament and advance regional policy agreements that benefit all players? By the way, there are commercial opportunities available in northeast Asia that would be, well, HUGE, if the DPRK begins to open.

4. Will you find a basis much more ambitious and durable than common, exaggerated threats on which to engage allies like South Korea and Japan, and partners like China, Vietnam and India? After all, engaging primarily on a “common threat” basis often short-changes democratic and political advancement and civil and human rights, not to mention arms control. There are plenty of other logical and beneficial reasons to boost ties, and you can still be tough when necessary.

But she knew all these things, right?

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a

web and broadcast-based policy roundtable

focused on security, development and politics in

Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C.

He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.