For stability and peace

By Tong Kim

With the outcome of the National Assembly elections on April 13, which handed a major victory to the opposition parties over the Saenuri Party of President Park Geun-hye, there appears to be a better chance for defusing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

This is because the administration’s hardened North Korea policy, supported by its conservative ruling party, which focused on security imperatives and pressuring the North Korean regime to change or collapse, has not produced its intended result.

Instead, the policy has only intensified inter-Korean confrontation to the point of a serious security concern, after cutting off all channels of communication and closing the Gaeseong Industrial Complex.

North Korea, still defiant of UN sanctions and bilateral sanctions of individual countries, of course is the first to blame for mounting tensions on the peninsula. The North relentlessly continues to test missiles and is now threatening a fifth nuclear test.

Unfortunately, the North Koreans believe that strengthening their nuclear and missile capabilities is the only way to ensure their survival ― reminded of Libya’s fall after giving up its nuclear program and what happened to Iraq because it did not have nuclear weapons.

The three-pronged U.S. policy centered on deterrence, sanctions and dialogue supported by South Korea and Japan, has not made any progress towards denuclearization or contributed to the reduction of threats. And it will continue to be ineffective as long as dialogue is contingent on the tough condition requiring the North to demonstrate a credible intent for denuclearization by actions that may include a full declaration of its nuclear programs and verification by International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

President Park’s policy to pressure Pyongyang to the point of collapse unless it gives up its nuclear programs sounds like another case of wishful thinking. Pressure from sanctions certainly makes life harder for the elites and particularly for the general populace of North Korea. However, there is no assurance that even reinforced sanctions will lead to a North Korean collapse or force the North Koreans to return to the denuclearization talks.

This allied approach has not worked and will not work during the remainder of the terms of the incumbent administrations in Seoul and Washington. Public statements to North Korea that denuclearization will provide it with more security and opportunities for a better economy are neither convincing nor persuasive to the North Koreans.

The more unlikely it is for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons, the more necessary it is to engage the country in dialogue. Only through dialogue is it possible to understand each other better. The North remains interested in dialogue with the United States, although it insists that a peace agreement, not denuclearization, be the agenda for negotiation. In this regard, the Chinese proposal of discussing a peace agreement in parallel with denuclearization talks still appears to be a way forward.

Given the current stage of North Korean nuclear development, it is not hard to think any eventual end state of nuclear negotiations will be a long haul ― perhaps taking several years, even if things somehow start and move smoothly. What is urgently needed now is to put a stop to the further development of the North Korean nuclear program and to prevent further proliferation ― especially to guard against any transfer of dangerous fissile materials into the hands of terrorists.

The North has exported missiles to some states in the Middle East, and there is no guarantee that it would not try to sell the dangerous nuclear materials to a non-state actor, especially when its economy is strapped for foreign exchange due to international sanctions.

Maintenance of an adequate deterrent is important. However, we should not forget that deterrence or sanctions alone do not prevent localized provocations or contribute to denuclearization. The purpose of deterrence is to ensure peace and stability, which is the most important immediate objective.

War should be avoided by all means possible. The election of progressive-to-neutral opposition candidates to the national parliament, most of whom are in favor of dialogue with the North Koreans, not for appeasement but for the pragmatic purpose of peace and stability on the peninsula, is a sign of encouragement. You can forget about denuclearization or unification for now. Peace is the priority.

With the ascendance of these peace forces in South Korean politics, the Park administration, badly hurt by the election outcome, will be less able to push its hard-line policy against Pyongyang, and it will be possible for the administration to opt for a renewed approach toward improved inter-Korean relations.

However, President Park is a strong-minded leader, notoriously reluctant to admit mistakes, and she may not easily change her policy.

Purely from the perspective of peace and stability, the new political landscape in the South would give some sense of easiness to the North Korean leadership. It may feel less uptight and it may even want to slow down any provocations. It must understand a new missile launch or an additional nuclear test will only make it more difficult for the peace forces, which support inter-Korean dialogue.

In the meantime, the North may decide to wait it out for the end of the Park administration, whose term runs out in less than two years, as it did for the Lee Myung-bak administration, once it had determined that it could not expect much from cooperating with President Lee.

For the South, our North Korea policy is an extension of domestic politics. The parliamentary elections are changing domestic politics, and it will influence Seoul’s North Korea policy. What is your take?

Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and

columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow

at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He

can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.