Elections provoke policy debate

By Stephen Costello

WASHINGTON D.C. ― Korean democrats have won majority power in the National Assembly for the first time in 16 years. Most of the discussion during the campaigns was about everything except public policy. Now that many voters have abandoned the Park Guen Hye administration, what does this election mean for policy changes, either during the 18 months until the presidential election in December 2017 or possibly during the next administration from February 2018 onward?

Despite their changing names Korea has for two decades had two clear parties, conservative and progressive. This means that even if the public prefers progressive policies, they might still elect a conservative president if the progressives are divided. This is probably what happened in 2007 and 2012. Neither progressive candidates Chung Dong-young or Moon Jae-in were able to end the civil war that was recklessly and fatefully launched by Roh Moo Hyun and his group in 2003. In the wake of the recent Assembly elections, one question is: can progressives end that war? More to the point, what would it take to end it?

Most of the progressive’s policy preferences have been reversed or ignored under the two conservative administrations. Upon taking office in 2008 President Lee tried to abolish the Ministry of Unification. During this time, other countries have had to adjust their expectations for Korea, almost entirely in the direction of lowered ambition and less responsibility. If they were to begin to influence policy over the next year or to win the Blue House at the end of 2017, democrats could return to approaches to domestic economics, North Korea, China and the US alliance that were only fitfully begun in the 1990s.

Some of those changes would put them in conflict with positions that American administrations have counted on for the past decade. Although President Obama’s policies have reflected democratic preferences in other parts of the world, Korea has been a glaring exception. There he has embraced and expanded on actions and worldviews he inherited from the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld group, with predictable results. The fact that it was easier for him to do this during the conservative administrations in Seoul only partly explains the White House’s China-centric view of Korea and preference for pressure over negotiations toward the DPRK.

What might change in Korea’s foreign policy if progressives are able to use their new legislative and possible future executive power? Discussions and cooperative economic and development projects with North Korea could expand. Such actions would be welcomed by China, and open new possibilities for wider interactions between Beijing and Seoul. They would also give Seoul new power in the bilateral relationship. Korea may also reverse the recent desire to acquire and deploy various anti-missile systems. Such decisions could be taken for entirely strategic reasons having nothing to do with Chinese pressure.

Perhaps most importantly, it is likely that an attempt will be made to develop and integrate mutually-reinforcing policies for the domestic economy, military force structure and procurement, inter-Korean cooperation, and regional diplomatic leadership. While major improvements in Korea-Japan relations most likely will have to wait for a post-Abe administration there, room exists for preparation of new joint initiatives on infrastructure, naval contingencies other than conflict, and trade.

Much of the progressive agenda is not primarily ideological, but rather is based on post-authoritarian and post-1997 economic crisis requirements. This was true of the growth of civic groups, expansion of the Internet, independence of the justice system and professionalism of the intelligence agency. In short, progress toward better governance could be taken up again.

Conservatives now face their own questions. Mainly there are two. First, what do they believe in? Judging by the policies of Lee Myung Bak and President Park they believe in an out-of-date 1980s approach to both domestic economic policy and foreign policy. The emptiness of those policies for the modern Korean electorate was exposed by the fact that President Park adopted major progressive policies as her own in order to gain election four years ago. Economic Democracy at home and Trustpolitik toward North Korea were just two of them.

It now seems neither of these was serious, so what does modern conservatism mean in the Korean context? If the old authoritarian basis for forming a coalition is broken – as it may now be – then what would younger and more savvy conservatives offer in its place? Right now we have no idea. The drama and power struggle over pro- and anti-Park factions in the ruling Saenuri Party have obscured the necessary policy work. And related to this is the fact that preparedness is beginning to be a requirement for office again. Who among possible conservative candidates has real experience in diplomacy, business, or real-world affairs?

The second part of the question for conservatives is: can they learn from the Park years, and from the crippling personality fights among progressives, that party policies and practical visions matter more than personalities? Can they do the public and in-house work to craft and propose realistic solutions to Korea’s main challenges? Energy, the Chaebol, employment, the military budget, North Korea, China and US issues all need experienced experts to help form policy ideas. What would they do to enhance transparency and professionalism in the Justice system and the Intelligence Service?

It may be too early to begin measuring the capabilities of various possible presidential candidates. But it’s not too early for parties to begin developing better policy ideas and making these the basis for governing. If Korean democrats begin to reassert themselves there will be some friction with Washington’s established expectations. Nevertheless, for Korean and US interests, that may be a good thing.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politicsin Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be reached at scost55@gmail.com.