Living with a nuclear N. Korea

By Tong Kim

Three weeks have elapsed since North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6, and the U.N. Security Council has yet to agree on a new resolution for another set of sanctions against Pyongyang. This delay is largely due to differences in interest and policy between the two most powerful, veto-wielding permanent members of the Council ― China and the United States.

They quickly denounced Pyongyang’s nuclear test that was conducted in flagrant violation of the UN resolution. However, after five hours of discussion between their foreign ministers ― John Kerry and Wang Yi ― last week, they simply agreed to adopt another sanction resolution, but without specifying measures to be included in it. Kerry said “an accelerated effort” would be exerted to produce a new U.N. resolution.

The next resolution will have to be stronger than one in 2013 resolution that stated it would “take significant action” in the event of a further nuclear test. All sanctions have so far failed to prevent the impoverished North from advancing its nuclear and missile programs. Wang Yi made it clear, “Sanctions are not an end in themselves.” China will not support any sanctions that may “provoke new tension” and destabilize the Korean Peninsula.

During a joint press conference with Wang, Kerry made reference to a wide spectrum of sanction areas in which China has options to punish the DPRK, including trade and services, movements of ships, aviation, banking, and exchange of resources such as crude oil and coal. Kerry noted China’s connections with the North as a means to helping resolve the North Korean issue.

China is not ready to bear economic and political costs by cutting off trade with North Korea. Nevertheless, China is likely to agree to a watered down version of a new sanction resolution that justifies Beijing’s position of peace and dialogue in support of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. They will make sure that Pyongyang pays a price, not high enough to prompt a regime collapse.

Apparently reminded of Chinese perspectives, Kerry said, “We don’t want to raise military tensions … we are not seeking additional measures.” However, “additional measures,” he mentioned does not include pursuing “what is necessary” to protect the United States and its friends and allies from a “declared” North Korean nuclear threat.

President Park’s suggestion to replace the six-party talks with a five-party format was effectively shot down by China and Russia on its announcement even before it ever reached the other members through diplomatic channels. The goal of the suggested five party talks was readily identifiable ― to unite the five to punish the North.

Kerry argued that the purpose of sanctions, that should be non-punitive to the ordinary citizens of North Korea, is to bring the regime there back to the table to negotiate an end to the nuclear issue, in resonance with Beijing’s emphasis on dialogue and consultation. Washington is not walking away from its commitment to economic and political assistance if Pyongyang chooses a different path. However, this rhetoric sounds like a broken record.

Washington’s conditional offer of dialogue was on the table for the past seven years and it did not get anywhere near a process of denuclearization. This is not taken seriously, especially by Pyongyang, which is determined to perfect its nuclear and missile technology. Understandably, the current mood is to make the North pay a high price for its latest provocation.

If the next batch of sanctions also fails, what can be done about any further provocation whether it may be a more advanced missile test or a real, full-fledged hydrogen bomb? Sanctions were effective for bringing the Iranian government to negotiations. But North Korea is no Iran. It has little incentives from the lifting of current and future sanctions, short of a total cut off in trade with China or a total naval blockade that was never seen during peacetime.

Washington used to say whenever the North embarked on provocative behavior that it would only deepen North Korea’s isolation, which this column previously argued only helps domestic politics in the North and is therefore welcomed by the elite in Pyongyang. Interestingly enough, the Obama administration removed the term isolation when denouncing the DPRK’s latest nuclear test.

Now, we must think hard about whether it is still possible to deal with the North Koreans in a rational way in order to deescalate tension, secure the safety of nuclear stockpiles in North Korea, prevent proliferation of nuclear materials and technology from North Korea, and find a long-term multi-phased approach to the eventual goal of denuclearization.

To look for any positive side to North Korea’s nuclear program, one should note that no nuclear accident has occurred during the development and tests of nuclear devices. Pyongyang officially maintains against international concerns that it will not proliferate nuclear materials to another state or any non-state actor. It makes bluffs about the potential use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. It says that its nuclear weapons are a deterrent and that it would use such weapons only if it is attacked.

There is no authentic North Korean nuclear doctrine. However, the North Korean leadership understands it would be finished upon first use of nuclear weapons. Although, Pyongyang said it would not attend any talks aiming at its denuclearization, there is a ray of hope that North Korea may give up its nuclear weapons once it is convinced its conditions are met ― no U.S. hostile policy, a peace mechanism, diplomatic normalization, and economic cooperation.

No sanctions, but an offer of unconditional talks, are likely to bring back the North Koreans to the table. After the recent nuclear test, Pyongyang renewed the validity of its offer of talks on halting nuclear tests in exchange for a suspension of joint U.S.-ROK military drills and its offer of negotiations for a peace agreement. Washington in cooperation with other relevant countries concerned with the nuclear issue can counter this offer by seeking to discuss all issues including denuclearization. What’s your take?

Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.