Nuclear bomb test and consequences

By Tong Kim

It is not difficult to identify multiple consequences of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6 ― aside from the question of whether it was a hydrogen bomb test, as Pyongyang claimed, or a boosted nuclear fission test as Western experts suspect.

However, it is not easy to understand North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s reasoning for conducting the test. Contrary to speculation from several analysts, the motivation does not seem to have been to get attention or gain increased leverage for negotiations or acquire the status of a nuclear weapon state.

The latest test has reinforced an argument that denuclearization efforts by Washington and its allies and partners have completely failed. It made the recent international condemnation sound hollow.

The peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue has become more distant. No resolution is in sight for the remaining time in office for President Barack Obama or President Park Geun-hye. The state of inter-Korean relations has returned to last August, when the two sides were on the brink of war following a DMZ landmine explosion that wounded two South Korean soliders.

Park‘s North Korea policy has failed miserably ― in both her policy of trust building or pursuing a “unification jackpot.” Her policy toward China is being questioned, with Beijing signaling its reluctance to join Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo to punish Pyongyang to make sure “North Korea feel pain” from harsher international sanctions.

An ongoing flurry of diplomatic activities ― including summit calls, position statements, and meetings between senior officials of the relevant countries ― South Korea, the U.S., China, and Japan ― are doomed to fail, unless these include North Korea.

Park argued that her effort to improve relations with China was to get Beijing’s cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Yet, she has not been able to talk with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, in the wake of the latest North Korean nuclear test. A hotline between Seoul and Beijing has been closed despite Seoul’s attempt to use it to discuss the issue.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said to his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, that the Chinese approach to North Korea does not work, and pressed China to work out more sanctions against the North.

The Chinese authorities responded to the effect that China was not the cause of the North Korean nuclear program, nor did China hold the key to resolving the nuclear issue.

Wang said China upheld the three principles: a denuclearized Korean peninsula, maintenance of peace and stability on the peninsula, and resolving the issue through dialogue and negotiation. These principles lay in the premise that peace and stability must prevail over the goal or the method of resolution. Now the very precept of stability is challenged by the rekindled political and military confrontation between North and South, a most serious consequence of the nuclear test.

Resumption of loudspeaker propaganda operations does not reduce tension. Flyovers by B-52s in the South or reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to South Korea do not denuclearize North Korea. Neither will any expected additional saber rattle in the coming months contribute to denuclearization.

Discussion of deploying a THAAD system in disregard of opposition from Beijing and Moscow will further complicate the security situation in Northeast Asia. Seoul’s development of its own nuclear weapons will close the door to any opportunity for North Korean denuclearization.

Sanctions have proven to have had a minimal effect on the isolated North Korean economy, which depends little on international trade, except with China. Any additional sanctions without China’s full participation that would entail a cut-off of crude oil supplies and a maritime blockade will not change North Korea.

From all perspectives, China is not ready to let North Korea collapse and allow South Korea to take over the North Korean regime, although it is very displeased with North Korea’s provocative behavior. China has repeatedly said that it opposes North Korean nuclear development.

However, China does not regard a regime change or the collapse of North Korea as in its interest, especially when a trilateral security relationship is evolving among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea seemingly against China’s interest.

Seoul also foresees a multitude of problems that can develop if North Korea collapses. Seoul is in no way ready for a North Korean collapse.

With everything having failed to rein in Pyongyang from its nuclear development, everybody wants China to use its influence to pressure Kim Jong-un. China knows that its influence is limited.

Coming back to Kim’s motivation, some think he did it because he does not have a pool of advisers who could have advised him against the test in anticipation of international condemnation and sanctions. Many say Kim is unstable, unpredictable, and “crazy,” ― he is “a lunatic,” or “a maniac.”

The fact of the matter is he is not crazy. He knows what he is doing. It was his deliberate decision to test the bomb, mainly to solidify the legitimacy of his leadership, especially with the party congress slated for May.

To get recognition of a nuclear North Korea was only a collateral objective at best. He must have anticipated negative consequences. He also must have determined that he can ride through them. He is ready for further isolation, which is not a threat to his survival.

Because of a diminishing return, the fourth nuclear test and its subsequent development did not appear as threatening to the South Korean public as previous tests did.

The North is regarded a long way from obtaining a deliverable nuclear system to attack the U.S. But, the North will get there, if nothing is done about it. There are plenty of new ideas being tossed around. What’s your take?

Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and

columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at

the Institute of Korean-American Studies.