Korea at a crossroads (II)

By Stephen Costello

Korea’s relationship with the United States is the key to maintaining its security and standing within Northeast Asia and the world. U.S. standing in the region is also greatly impacted by the strength, effectiveness, and particular goals of its alliance with South Korea. In context of this mutual dependence, the ROK has a great deal to say about how the relationship should evolve, how its component parts are addressed, and what timelines and goals are appropriate. However, the leaders of both countries have been pulled in different directions, and have struggled to pursue or articulate consistent goals.

Today there is great confusion about what the goals of U.S. policy are regarding Korea and across the region, beyond promoting the TPP “trade” standards, opposition to diplomacy with the DPRK regime, and balancing against Chinese overreach. For the U.S., extensive engagement on the DPRK nuclear issue during the 1990s led to the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994 and an ultra-productive period of US-ROK cooperation during 1998-2000. This strategy was repudiated in a dramatic policy reversal after the arrival of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld group in 2001. In 2009, many expected the incoming Democrats to undo some of the damage from what was arguably the second worst foreign policy blunder of the Bush years, and to remember the rationale of Clinton-era strategies. They were surprised and disappointed, because the new team doubled down on faulty analysis and counter-productive approaches. The strategic incoherence and tortured public language that has followed these extreme swings in worldviews, threat assessments, calculations of the “national interest” and resulting policies remains in the US policy community’s bloodstream today. Soon this will have gone on for 16 years.

Language and policy from the US toward Korea during the Obama presidency has suggested a preference for seeing the ROK as primarily a loyal soldier in the political/security confrontation with North Korea and the long-term balance of forces against a stronger China. In this view, the ROK is expected to continue under de facto U.S. military direction indefinitely, as well as under U.S. diplomatic direction, with very little room for independent action. The prevailing view in Washington prefers the same arrangement with Japan, as demonstrated by the treatment of the short-term Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.

A striking aspect of U.S. administration and mainstream think tank views today is the determination to resist at the political and policy level any evolution of the South Korean or Japanese systems toward bearing greater responsibility or positive independence from the United States. The rise and assertiveness of China, and the 13 year march to having nuclear weapon and missile capabilities by North Korea, have relieved most U.S. strategists of the need to consider the logic and advantages of such potential evolutions until recently. A new report from the Pacific Forum/CSIS on Trilateral Cooperation to Strengthen Deterrence in Northeast Asia begins to illuminate this point. This American insecurity stands in stark contrast to statements of pride in those allies’ democratic development, military modernization and diplomatic capacity-building.

At a fundamental level this is a failure of imagination and a confusion of interests. Neither Japan nor Korea are in danger of “going wobbly” in the face of the real threats they face. Nor are either likely to compromise democratic principles or common security interests with the U.S. when they engage and strike deals with North Korea or China. Japan has avoided suspicion for now by embracing defense upgrades in line with US tactics for the region. Korea, despite its defense expansion, is distrusted by much of the U.S. security mainstream because it does not precisely share views and language with Japanese and U.S. administrations supporting a simple view of China and North Korea as growing threats. President Obama’s public warning to President Park during their Washington summit last October reflects this.

The real fear in Washington may be of losing a degree of authority, or of receiving less obedience than expected. U.S. officials may also worry about not “leading,” or of being required to practice realistic, strategic diplomacy, which can carry some measure of political risk and which requires as a matter of course the formulation of plans and delegation of authority. There is also much of the unilateral, lecturing U.S. tone left over from the previous administration, and not enough listening, recognizing others’ interests, and compromise. Most crippling of all is the lack of interest in longer-term, strategic planning, or in the public discussion of realistic options. As experienced professionals keep pointing out, some of the current language and assumptions toward China and North Korea can create their own negative spirals and invite conflict.

The view of the U.S. position in the region as rigid and zero-sum is also deeply divisive in the politics of both Japan and South Korea, and puts the U.S. squarely on the side of those rejecting greater leadership and middle power status, and those skeptical of all diplomacy with the DPRK. For this reason the U.S. administration shares with conservative parties in Korea and Japan a perverse political interest in exaggerating the threats from North Korea and China. There is no indication that the next U.S. administration will address or change this. While there exist real threats from both countries, language from official and unofficial opinion leaders in Seoul, Tokyo and Washington has often suggested that there is no such thing as “loyal opposition” to current government approaches.

Since little change can be expected from the U.S., what could change today’s prognosis of decreasing regional security? Perhaps only Korea is in a position to force greater sophistication on the U.S. view. If the U.S. is led back to strategic engagement as a result of ROK initiatives, its long-term strategic interests could be protected and advanced. The core political issues in the region, once unlocked, can lead to movement that could in turn alter today’s dangerous trends. North-South dialogue and resumption of economic engagement can provoke Japanese-North Korean political progress. Arms reduction on the Peninsula should lead to robust regional efforts and mechanisms. Inter-Korean energy and transport links can pave the way for resumption of plans for a Japan-Korea bridge/tunnel. The Chinese role with North Korea could become more aligned with that of the ROK, Japan and the US. A key source of U.S.-PRC tension could be reduced. No other policy toward the region would gain for the U.S. such multi-dimensional advantages as from supporting a successful South Korean-led peninsular pacification. It was working from 1998 to 2001. It just might again.

Stephen Costello is a producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.