US-Iran deal - 10 lessons for Korea

By Stephen Costello

Lesson one

The essence of the deal will not be about enrichment capacity, timelines or other technical details. It will instead be about the exchange of mutually valuable elements, and about the political will for implementation. In the case of North Korea, they will have to see a clear path to development, diplomatic relations and international interaction, and performance by the other parties. South Korea and the U.S. will have to see a cap on nuclear weapons work, WMD, and missiles, a rollback of plutonium and uranium possession, and verification. A deal cannot appear or be one-sided. There can be either no winners or all winners.

Lesson two

The key actor on the non-proliferation side will be the U.S., regardless of buy-in or not from the other interested parties. This is due to the solid and practical non-proliferation community in the U.S., and the wide reach (still) of U.S. diplomacy and diplomatic capability. It is also due to the extensive and ongoing commitment of the U.S. to allies and a rules-based order in Northeast Asia.

Lesson three

Discretion and secrecy will play a major role, because that is the way governments need to operate on critical matters with questionable partners and complex domestic constituencies. The Iran talks were conducted in secrecy for years before they were acknowledged. Some parts of Nixon’s 1972 trip to China were secret for decades. So were almost all other important breakthroughs, and for solid reasons. President Park’s principle against secret meetings and preparations will have to be amended if there is to be any North-South progress.

Lesson four

Some degree of domestic consensus is necessary in Korea. At least the outlines of the deal must appeal to a clear majority of the public. Its basic premise should be sound. People are likely to accept new engagement, but they can be scared into opposing all options except a military buildup. Political leaders must therefore explain and convince.

Lesson five

The downside should be manageable. In case North Korea does not support the deal, some “snap-back” should be available to other powers. More important, “cheating” should be expected, and a range of practical, calibrated and appropriate responses should be in place if that happens.

Lesson six

Together with lesson one, the deal must be based ― both implicitly in its design and explicitly in its promotion ― on a long-term understanding and embrace of the primary interests of the two (or more) parties. It is a multi-administration initiative with extensive buy-in and advantages to multiple power centers, industries and stakeholders. The fundamental exchange of interests must drive the initiative over time.

Lesson seven

The U.S. will not lead in a deal with North Korea. South Korea will have to lead the next peninsula deal. This is unfortunate, particularly since the U.S. got so far, made so many mistakes, and learned so much from them in the 1990s. But both the quality of U.S. leadership and the increasingly polarized structure of U.S. government mean that Washington must be coaxed into support for any future Korea deal. In any case, this may be the best environment for the U.S. At least in the initial stages South Korea is in a far better position to judge what would constitute a win-win deal than Washington. The U.S. will join when political costs are low. Bumbling over the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a good example of why this is so.

Lesson eight

Barack Obama and his successor will determine if the Iran deal succeeds or not, and whether it is even given a chance to sprout roots in coming months and years. For the U.S. role in a future Korean deal, the same dynamic applies. If the Iran deal holds, that will be primarily because both Obama and his successor devote the time, people and strategically-grounded promotion that a region-changing peace initiative deserves. If it does not, that devotion will have been lacking. This is equally true of the new U.S.-Cuba initiatives. Since they are region-wide and involve great investments from multiple stake-holders, and because they provoke large coalitions to push back against them, they can only succeed with consistent, smart presidential leadership.

Lesson nine

The U.S. Congress will be largely opposed to any Korea deal, regardless of the details. We can see from the Iran experience how the opposition to diplomacy and support for mythical victories and even new military commitments have spread from the Republican right of the 1990s to the mainstream today, and how those instincts have now infected the Democratic Party. The reasons for this may be complicated, but the intellectual climate is clear. In the Congress, ideological polarization has combined with a dumbing-down of experience to produce an isolated and insular mood, untethered to the realities, trade-offs and opportunities in Northeast Asia.

Lesson 10

For Korea, this means three things. One, it will have to conduct its own strategic, regional re-assessment, to appreciate its role and opportunities. That means settling ― or at least setting aside ― ideological, political and personal debates about Korea’s responsibilities ― or lack thereof ― in order to act like the middle power it clearly is.

Two, the U.S. will have to be part of any denuclearization, development and securitization of the Korean Peninsula, just as it has been for the past half-century. But it will not lead, it will not even necessarily help, but will do everything else domestic politics require. There is no indication Hillary would escape this climate, and even less that others would.

Three, of course these lessons were all learned and integrated in various ways into the 1992 North-South Agreement, the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, and the 1998 South Korean Engagement Initiative. They did not fail because the agreements were lacking; they failed because political leaders failed, and they may fail again in the future. In coming years, however, these lessons could be learned thoroughly enough and advocated by figures capable enough, that they succeed.

Stephen Costello is producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He previously directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council of the U.S. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.