Political parties must choose

By Stephen Costello

Political parties are still important in Korea. The pull between personality-based parties and program-based parties has often been misunderstood, as if all that mattered was that the boss could demand loyalty, rally support and collect funds. In fact the supporting power groups, the kind of change expected, and the view of national identity was always very different between the conservatives and the progressives in Korea. The “Three Kims” era is now over a decade old, and the requirement for clear and compelling programs has only increased. This should be good for both parties, because it will force them to attempt a more comprehensive and strategic description of where they want to take the country. It should also relieve pressure on political personalities ― who in normal times are medium-sized ― to seek any kind of “boss” status, since the program now comes first and since, well, they are really not up to it. After all, party leaders who have extensively done their homework and who have the intellectual confidence to hire big, capable ministers and deputies, and learn from mistakes, come along rarely.

Anticipating the 2016 Assembly elections and the 2017 presidential election, the two main parties each have one major decision to make. For the conservatives, it is the choice between post-democracy modernization and a principle-based approach on the one hand; and doubling down on a 30-year-old mindset and support structure, which ― necessarily ― uses the same old gimmicks to line up support and satisfy the base. Winning is very important, but winning is frustrating to almost everybody if the program is unrealistic, insincere or impossible.

As democracy moved forward in the 1990s, the wily former President Kim Young-sam eliminated politically-interested military figures and instituted real-name banking. But his original Faustian bargain with the old guard conservative group prohibited him from making real changes to the structure. Former President Lee Myung-bak tried apparently to echo George W. Bush and undo most of what his predecessor had accomplished on the peninsula, but his orthodox zero-sum view of politics was out-of-step with the expanding and developing society created by previous advances. President Park Geun-hye only won the presidency due to her embrace of decidedly liberal postures and promises ― school lunches, economic democracy, engagement with North Korea ― and has therefore torn open the choices for her party. They will now either rebuild a constructive nationalism and healthy economic/social policies or become even less relevant.

For progressives, the choice now is between an 11-year-old destructive split between social revolution and fake cleanliness versus the progressive old guard on the one hand; and broad support for democratization, social and political inclusion, and national empowerment on the other hand. As with the conservatives, these are choices. All-of-the-above will not fly. Progressives have absorbed four major body blows between 2000 and 2009. These included political and policy abandonment by their key ally, unnecessary division into two warring camps, and the deaths of Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung three months apart in 2009. There are reasons why they are squabbling.

If progressives have answers, those are based on core aspects of the pre-1998 integrated economic, institutional, peninsular and U.S.-Korea alliance posture. That year’s effort to recast the policy basis of the nation’s politics was reflected in the ruling coalition of industrialist Park Tae-joon, conservative Kim Jong-pil, and progressive Kim Dae-jung. Any future leaders must begin from there, and appeal to broad ― and hungry for practical leadership ― national audiences. For both parties, and because Korea has such a dynamic recent history, modernization is key to party rejuvenation. And modernization must include technology, governance, environment, transparency, inclusion and North-South rapprochement to be credible and to interest smart, connected voters.

In these polarized political times, the four old dilemmas have returned: a divide over the best North Korea policy, self-contradictory economic plans, confusion over relations with the U.S., and hesitation over what role to play in Northeast Asia. After the conventions, party platforms must address all four, because these issues are closely intertwined, and because only long-lasting public programs can offer a logical and realistic guide for progress. A certain amount of charisma is good ― required, in fact ― but integrated and strategic policies that lead to popular outcomes are essential.

Beyond the old dilemmas lie two fundamental questions. First, what kind of modern political/economic development should Korea follow? Beyond the basics of democracy and markets, is the European social democrat model the most appropriate, or the U.S. conservative mainstream model of less government, minimum social spending and minimum regulation? Second, what regional role is best and most appropriate for Korea? Roles are not mutually exclusive, so what should be Korea’s primary posture? Washington’s deputy in tactical policy, with limited independence and flexibility? Or, while anchored to the U.S. alliance and acting as a check on Chinese misuse of power, could Korea act as a diplomatic, economic and security middle power, convener and peace-builder? That would provoke insecurity in some. New regional responsibilities would have to be skillfully advocated and successfully borne.

Both parties have choices to make. Modernization or retrenchment. Development model and regional role. Each has major implications for domestic cohesion, social progress and national strength. Some choices can increase cooperation and compromise, and grow national strength. Others can increase division and mistrust, and drain strength. Ambitious parties will present clear choices before the next elections.

Stephen Costello is producer of AsiaEast, a Web and broadcast-based policy roundtable focused on security, development and politics in Northeast Asia. He previously directed the Korea program at the Atlantic Council of the U.S. He writes from Washington, D.C. He can be contacted at cosetllos@asiaeast.org.