Diminishing prospect of denuclearization

By Tong Kim

After watching the implementation of the Park government’s North Korea policy for the last one year and a half, many people express growing concern that the policy has failed to improve inter-Korean relations, and make progress for denuclearization or to lay “a foundation for unification.” Now the question is whether and how the policy should be transformed.

At a public forum last week, Unification Minister Ryoo Gil-jae defended the current policy to pursue a “genuine dialogue,” not a repeat of previous dialogue that leads to empty promises.” He makes it clear that the South is prepared to discuss all matters of concern to both sides, once the North side comes to the table, accepting Seoul’s still valid proposal for high-level exchanges.

North Korea has rejected an offer from South Korea for support on humanitarian, social, cultural, environmental, and infrastructure-building projects detailed in the Dresden Statement and the last August 15 address made by President Park. The North describes this is a ploy to defeat its political system. Ryoo says Seoul is sincerely interested in helping the North through these proposals and that Seoul will listen to North Korean views on them.

According to Minister Ryoo, a successful policy requires a “three-wheel framework” ― the first wheel dealing with inter-Korean relations, the second with a rapidly changing international environment surrounding the peninsula, and the third, with building policy support by a domestic consensus. None of these areas is easy.

For the failure in inter-Korean relations, there is plenty of blame to go around. To form an objective view on inter-Korean issues, one should consider their origins and their history. Certainly, North Korean provocation, belligerent behavior and vituperative rhetoric are some of the very causes for the current problems. On the other hand, distrust of the North, a wish for a collapse of North Korea, policy inconsistency, and self-contradictory statements on the part of the Seoul government should also be responsible for the current state of deterioration in inter-Korean relations.

Conservative proponents of Park’s policy ― for undertaking the “trust building process,” and seeking denuclearization ― are quick to point out that the trust building process could not take off sooner because of North Korean provocations including the closure of the Gaeseong industrial park and internal instability in Pyongyang following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, the former No. 2 man in the North. They believe that it will take time for the policy to start producing results, and that it is too soon to give up on the policy. The North has not responded favorably to this.

Critics say that as long as the government conditions dialogue and cooperation on the improbable denuclearization of North Korea ― which appears almost impossible for South Korea to resolve without international support ― there will not be improvement in North-South relations. Some watchers including Hong Seok-hyun, chairman of the Joongang Ilbo, one of the three major conservative dailies in Seoul, started calling for a delinking of the intractable nuclear issue from the North-South relations.

Hong and other realists recommend lifting the May 24 restrictions that banned all economic cooperation with the North, except the continued operation of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, after the 2010 sinking of the ROK naval ship “Cheonan.”

These observers also insist that since the United States or even China is not doing anything for denuclearization, South Korea should make efforts to influence and press the two big powers to get back on track by making efforts toward denuclearization.

Clearly, the North Korean issue has been pushed on to the backburner again by the U.S. administration, for some time now and especially since the emergence of threats from ISIS in the Middle East. Understandably, Washington’s top priority is on conducting air strikes on ISIS targets located in Syria and Iraq and forming an international coalition to “degrade and defeat” the heinous terrorist organization. In a major speech to the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 24, President Obama made no mention of North Korea’s nuclear issues, while passing comment on the Iran nuclear program.

In contrast, President Park’s U.N. speech calling for North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and improve human rights sounded hollow, because Pyongyang immediately denounced her speech in contemptuous, vulgar language. Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se’s proposal for an inter-Korean meeting to discuss human rights and other humanitarian issues was rejected outright by the North. In the meantime, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry held an international gathering to denounce human rights abuses in the North, calling for its “evil system” of prison camps to be shut down.

Also during a conference in Seoul last week, Kurt Campbell, former assistant secretary of state for East Asia, acknowledged there is no ongoing serious coordination with China on North Korea. Yet, he said that the U.S. should be prepared for different scenarios and that the North should be pressured on its dismal human rights record. For future North Korean provocations, he mentioned harsher sanctions that will make it harder for the North. However, he seemed more concerned that the “rebalancing” of Asia, of which he was the architect, would also be downgraded in Washington’s priority.

Regarding domestic support for North Korea policy, the Park government is hoping that the recently launched Unification Preparation Committee will contribute to reviving the people’s dwindling interest in unification and gain support for its policy.

Many indications point towards an opportunity to think of a new pragmatic approach to establish peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. What’s your take?

The author is a visiting scholar at the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University, a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies and an ICAS fellow in the United States.