One year of 'Trust Politik'

By Sandip Kumar Mishra

President Park Geun-hye completes her first year in office this month. It is an appropriate time to look at one of her important declarations ― “Trust Politik” ― and evaluate the progress.

The policy was considered to be a balanced approach different from both, unconditional support to North Korea represented by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations and the tough posture adopted by the Lee Myung-bak administration.

The policy essentially was directed to rebuild trust between Seoul and Pyongyang. However, President Park emphasized that it would not mean unprincipled compromise in dealing with North Korea and its provocative behavior.

The last one year has been a testing time for the policy. Even before formal inauguration of the new government, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test and later on, also tested the Unha rocket, which was alleged to be part of its missile development plan.

Soon, the tension between North and South Korea escalated to an alarming extent. In March and April 2013, during the joint military exercise between South Korea and the U.S., the hostility reached its zenith and the North cut off telecommunication lines with the South along with withdrawing workers from the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC) giving Seoul no option but to close down the GIC.

Although, after difficult negotiations, the GIC became again operational in August, most of the communication channels and more importantly quest for trust between North and South Korea remains elusive. It seems that so far Trust Politik has not even been ignited, forget about any take-off.

The blame for the failure must be attributed to North Korea and its provocative behavior. However, any evaluation of Trust Politik should also look at the role of South Korea. In making policy toward North Korea, Pyongyang’s non-cooperative behavior is a constant. A creative and constructive policy must accept the reality and devise strategy to move out of this vicious cycle.

The reason for the non-success of Trust Politik is that its basic assumptions as well as South Korean behavior have been either incorrect or not enough proactive. The first problem with the policy is that it is posited on the belief that North Korea must trust South Korea before expecting any help from it.

It is the absolutely wrong sequence of the process. You cannot force your rival to trust you and behave nicely before you start trusting it. North Korea has been apprehensive about political approaches from the ruling conservative Saenuri Party in South Korea.

Any process of trust building must begin from South Korea’s generosity and tolerance and it must be done at least a few times to create trust in the mind of North Korea. Even though, there have been few small positive gestures by Unification Minister Ryoo Kihl-jae, the overall posture of South Korea has been uncompromising.

The second problem with the policy has been its confusion about what constitutes a positive gesture by North Korea. In the last one year, North Korea has given several signals that it may like to change the course of confrontation with South Korea but in all the cases, it has been considered less than satisfactory by the Park administration.

At the height of tension between North and South Korea in February and March, North Korea avoided directly attacking Park and directed most of its rhetoric toward the U.S. Probably they were expecting a conciliatory approach from South Korea in accordance to the announced policy of Trust Politik.

The distinction was overlooked by the South. In the mid-2013, when talks were proposed for the reopening of the GIC, Seoul’s approach was again narrow and instrumental. There were disagreements about the venue of talks and official ranks of negotiators and there was not enough effort to make it a launching pad for a more comprehensive interaction with North Korea on trust building.

In January 2014, when the North proposed discontinuing cross-border slandering, it was again rejected by the South and considered as Pyongyang’s attempt to stop a joint military exercise.

The third lacuna in the policy has been that it understands any concession to North Korea as a compromise on principle. The initial thrust, which is essential for building trust between North and South Korea, cannot come without decisive and unconditional concessions by South Korea. It is very much required for the trust process to start off and later on, conditions might be attached.

The fourth problem in the policy is related to the conduct of President Park in domestic politics. She has been perceived to be communicating less with the opposition parties and this further creates doubt in the mind of North Korea about the sincerity of her Trust Politik.

In brief, the operation of Trust Politik makes it clearly evident that although the policy may have attractive nomenclature, it does not have any fundamental difference with Lee Myung-bak administration’s tough posture toward North Korea.

The last one-year has been disappointing for it and with the passing of time it will become increasingly difficult to achieve any breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. It is advisable to make a course correction sooner rather than later and bring creative intervention in the inter-Korean hostility.

Sandip Kumar Mishra teaches at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi, India. Contact sandipmishra10@gmail.com.