Negotiating a way out of N. Korea impasse

By Doug Bandow

Pyongyang urged the U.S. to “positively respond” to the former’s call for negotiations “without preconditions.” Washington insisted that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea first commit to denuclearization. The diplomatic impasse on the Korean peninsula continues.

No one wants war, but mistake or misjudgment is possible. Although the U.S. and the Republic of Korea would triumph in any conflict, the price would be extravagant.

The allies continue to focus on the North’s nuclear program. Last month the U.S., Japan, and South Korea released a joint statement announcing that the path “for the DPRK toward improved relations” is for Pyongyang to take “meaningful steps on denuclearization.”

No doubt that is the best outcome. However, it remains the least likely.

North Korea has made acquisition of nuclear weapons a matter of national policy for two decades. Ignoring this reality achieves nothing.

There’s nothing mysterious about the North’s program. The advantages of being a nuclear power are many. Most obviously, nuclear weapons offer an effective deterrent. And Pyongyang knows that the U.S. means it ill.

Washington should disengage from the peninsula. That requires turning security for the South over to Seoul. Normalizing relations with North Korea while handing the nuclear issue to its neighbors. And leaving the two Koreas free to decide their future relationship.

First, the U.S. should end its Cold War alliance with South Korea. Although the American garrison has diminished in size over the last six decades and the South talks of taking on increased security responsibilities, the alliance remains antiquated and one-sided.

Washington’s defense promise benefits the ROK but makes no sense for America. The Korean Peninsula no longer is tied to a global military struggle. The DPRK’s Cold War allies, Beijing and Moscow, would not support the North in a rerun of the Korean War. Finally, the prosperous South is capable of defending itself.

Washington should announce its intention to terminate the security pact and begin withdrawing U.S. military forces. The two governments could then negotiate terms for future military cooperation. The focus would not be the DPRK, which would be Seoul’s responsibility, but broader regional and global activities in both nations’ interest.

Second, American officials should set aside the nuclear issue. The North lacks any means to attack the U.S. ― other than targeting troops which should be brought home from South Korea. Anyway, confronting America would be suicidal, a quality not evident in Pyongyang.

Washington should make the one genuine threat, nuclear transfers to non-state actors, a red line. Otherwise the U.S. should turn over the issue to the countries with the most at stake: China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia.

Then the U.S. should indicate its willingness to sign a peace treaty and open diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Six decades is long enough to officially end the Korean War. Moreover, the U.S. government would benefit from regular, even if limited, contact with the DPRK.

Third, American policymakers should make clear that it is up to the two Koreas to work out the peninsula’s future. Reunification ― whether and, if so, in what form? ― would be entirely up to the Korean people.

A more relaxed American approach offers numerous advantages. Leaving the ROK responsible for its own defense would reduce U.S. troop requirements. The South would be fully accountable for the consequences of its policies.

Eliminating Washington’s military presence in South Korea and improving its relationship with the DPRK would take America out of the region’s line of fire. Moreover, if anyone can convince the North to abandon nuclear weapons, it will be its neighbors. This includes China, which would recognize that Seoul and Tokyo might develop their own nuclear weapons if America no longer maintained a “nuclear umbrella.”

Stepping back militarily and advancing diplomatically would diminish the North’s rationale for its nuclear program and advanced conventional deployments. Yonsei University’s John Delury recently suggested that “North Korea today resembles China in 1970: waiting for a security guarantee from Washington before embarking on real economic reform.”

Of course, Mao Zedong, not Richard Nixon, was the biggest obstacle to change then. Pyongyang’s complaints might be a propaganda boilerplate and the government’s belligerent policy might continue unchanged. However, the prospect of sustained peaceful engagement with America offers a small chance of turning positive possibilities into reality.

In any case, current policy is broken.

Washington should challenge Pyongyang by accepting the latter’s latest proposal for talks. It won’t be easy for the U.S. and DPRK to put aside fundamental differences, such as on human rights. But that doesn’t mean the two governments cannot have a peaceful relationship.

Both sides would benefit from reducing the possibility of conflict. That’s a good starting point for any negotiation.

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of “Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World.”