Is North Korea a paper tiger?

By John Burton

After North Korea conducted its third nuclear test this week following the recent launch of a long-range ballistic missile, it is perhaps appropriate to ask whether these provocative acts are signs of military weakness rather than strength. Is their purpose to cover up the vulnerabilities of the North Korean People’s Army instead of Pyongyang posing an aggressive threat to its neighbors?

On paper, North Korean maintains its image as the Sparta of Asia with an army of one million troops and 5,000 tanks, about twice the size of the South Korean army. But numbers alone are not a good indication of an army’s combat effectiveness.

Most of the North’s military equipment is aging. Its Soviet-era tanks are based on obsolescent technology from the 1950s and 1970s after Moscow cut off military aid because of the end of the Cold War. The same could be said for the North’s air force, which has nearly 50 percent more combat aircraft than those operated by the South. But 80 percent of the North’s air power is antiquated, based on Chinese and Soviet aircraft developed in the 1950s and 1960s. The North Korean navy’s main surface fleet consists of only three frigates.

The overall quality of weaponry is likely to continue to deteriorate unless China is willing to share more advanced technology, which is not foreseeable in current circumstances.

The North’s armed forces have not been battle tested since the end of the Korean War in 1950. Military training has been hampered by fuel shortages, particularly for the air force. Moreover, even some frontline troops appeared to be malnourished based on the examination of the bodies of soldiers who have drowned in floods and then been swept across the DMZ in the raging waters.

There is little doubt that the balance of military power has tipped now in favor of South Korea because of its qualitative superiority. Half of the South’s combat aircraft incorporates technology less than 40 years old, while the South’s mainstay K1 tank is based on technology from the 1980s and 1990s.

North Korea is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively strong enough to prevail over South Korea based on the military rule of thumb that a three to one numerical superiority is needed for a successful offensive. The involvement of the U.S. military would further tip the odds against North Korea.

Consequently, the North’s military posture has become defensive in character, with the capability to lash out if attacked but unable to mount a serious invasion to occupy South Korea. Its principal threat would be to flatten Seoul using artillery behind the DMZ and firing short and medium-range rockets. The North’s adoption of asymmetric warfare techniques, including special operations and cyber warfare, is meant to blunt the high-tech advantages of the South Korean and U.S. military, but alone would not be sufficient to win a war.

Seen in this context, North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program is meant to overcome the deficiencies of its conventional forces and serve as the ultimate guarantor of survival. But even in this regard, Pyongyang may be falling short. Its first nuclear test in 2006 was seen as a partial failure and the second in 2009 tested a nuclear device with a yield as low as 2.4 kilotons. Many nuclear experts viewed the tests as “laughable flops,” The New York Times recently stated.

In contrast, nuclear bombs produced by other emerging countries have been much bigger. India’s first nuclear test in 1974 produced a yield of at least 8 kilotons, while South Africa’s first nuclear bomb in the 1970s had an estimated yield of 5 to 9 kilotons. Another yardstick is the size of the U.S. atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, which had a yield of 12 to 18 kilotons.

The first two North Korean tests might indicate that the warhead designs are faulty and its inventory of between six and 18 nuclear devices could carry less destructive power than feared. In addition, there is little evidence that North Korea has managed to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to fit on top of its ballistic missiles, which are now only able to carry a minuscule payload of 100 kilos, too small for a nuclear warhead anyway. The test of the North’s ballistic missile in December has not removed doubts about its ability to deliver a warhead accurately against an assigned target. Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal could be unusable.

But North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may be welcoming the attention that the ballistic missile launch and the third nuclear test bring for they make North Korea appear stronger militarily than it is in reality.

Unfortunately, that also means that North Korea is unlikely to give up the nuclear card until it can be successfully played to gain concessions, such as diplomatic recognition and a security guarantee from the U.S. Consequently, the demand by Washington and Seoul that Pyongyang must first denuclearize before concessions are made is a non-starter and could drive North Korea to undertake more desperate measures.

John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Seoul-based independent journalist and media consultant. He can be reached at johnburtonft@yahoo.com.