By Tong Kim
Domestic factors are one of the important sources of a state’s foreign policy according to Neoclassic Realism. Applied to South Korea's North Korea policy, the realist theory explains why the South has not been able to achieve the undisputed goal of improving relations with the North towards unification.
Politically, South Korea is a full-fledged democracy, where diverse views flourish and the people vote largely based on their views. The South’s decision on North Korea cannot ignore its impact on domestic politics, while the people are still divided on approach, not the goal, between realist conservatism and progressive liberalism.
In contrast, the authoritarian North Korean system is much freer from domestic pressure to make a decision regarding the South. Although the North has an internal process of decision-making, its leader Kim Jong-il makes the final decision for the people to follow. Somehow, this system is still working in the North.
President Lee has nominated Ryu Woo-ik, former ambassador to China and Lee’s confidant, as new unification minister to go through a confirmation hearing soon at the National Assembly. The nominee said he would maintain the basic principles of his predecessor’s policy, but he would be flexible in some areas, if necessary, without specifying what those areas would be.
North Korea’s news agency called the change of the unification minister ``another hoax by the South to continue its hard-line policy of confrontation,” while former Minister Hyun In-taek became special assistant to the President for unification affairs. The North called Hyun ``a national traitor, who destroyed inter-Korean relations,”
Lee changed the unification minister after the opposition’s call for his resignation through the National Assembly and ``a strong request” from the governing Grand National Party (GNP) Chairman, Hong Jun-pyo, who had complained, ``The unification ministry was doing nothing.”
Lee’s decision also came after former GNP Chairwoman Park Geun-hye, the leading candidate for the next presidency, published an article on North Korea policy in The Foreign Affairs. In the article, she did not differ much from the President’s policy nor did she offered any new ideas, but argued vaguely that more should be done to improve inter-Korean relations
How the new alignment of the two highest officials for unification affairs will work remains to be seen. However, since the new and the old ministers and the President do not seem to have the political will to make progress in inter-Korean relations, it is doubtful that they would be able to move closer to the resolution of the North Korea issue.
Given domestic politics looming large with a special election for the vacated mayorship of Seoul next month, and the general elections and the presidential election next year, President Lee will have to consider the impact of his North Korea policy on the elections.
If the GNP loses the mayoral election, it would undermine the GNP’s chance to win in the general elections next April. If the GNP loses in the general elections, President Lee would become a lame duck unable to exercise his leadership on major programs. In this context, he has only about seven months to make any significant change to his North Korean policy.
If the sitting President wants, as he is supported by the opposition and the governing parties, he can still seek a summit with Kim Jong-il to discuss a whole list of pending issues including denuclearization, tension reduction, the aftermath of the sinking of the warship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, Mt. Geumgang tourism, separated families, and the improvement of relations.
A summit would not be the only means to approach these important issues. Except for a North Korean condolence visit to Seoul, during the mourning period for the late former President Kim Dae-jung, there has been no high-level contact between the authorities of the North and the South since the Lee government was inaugurated.
Twenty years ago, the Roh Tae-woo government produced the landmark documents _ the Basic South-North Agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization _ without holding a summit. Of course, 2011 is not 1991. The year 1999 was a presidential year that unraveled the dramatic agreement between the North and the South ``because of South Korean domestic politics,” according to Lim Dong-won, a former unification minister and the author of ``Peace Maker.”
The engagement policy as pursued by the liberal governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun could not be sustained due to the opposition of conservative forces at home. The same forces supported the election of President Lee. They have imposed effective hurdles to invent and implement a positive long-term North Korea policy.
The strategic environment surrounding the peninsula ― with North Korea’s increasing economic ties with China and Russia, and South Korea’s deepening security reliance on the United States ― offers few incentives for either side of Korea to pursue a genuine initiative to improve their relations. Both China and the United States support stability and the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Although their common interest for the short term helps prevent war, the perpetuation of the status quo is not in the interest of the Korean people.
In the meantime, the status quo should not call for ``offensive realism” for both Koreas to beef up their military capabilities in an arms race. The press reported that Russia declined the North’s request for new-generation aircraft fighters during Kim’s visit to Siberia last week, as did China before. This may reflect the right roles of ``responsible stakeholders.”
In cold reality, the only mechanism we have to maintain peace is the realist balance of power in Korea. There is no economic interdependence between the North and the South, nor the influence of an international institution that inhibit hostile provocations. If Neo-liberalism could work for peace in Korea, there should be more trade and economic cooperation between the two sides, like the Mt. Geumgang tourism and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex.
It would take presidential leadership to overcome domestic politics and to restore inter-Korean relations to a level of peaceful cooperation toward eventual unification. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a visiting research professor at Korea University and at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also adjunct professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.