By Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman
When an anti-nuclear government came to power in New Zealand in 1984, the U.S. chose to let go of its long-standing Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) and continue bilaterally with Australia alone.
Wellington further complicated the issue by also banning nuclear-powered ships, but it was the ``neither confirm nor deny" straw that broke that camel's back. New Zealand remains outside of ANZUS to this day.
Then there is the ``no first use" issue. Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama, in praising President Obama's global disarmament initiative, went further by unilaterally suggesting that Washington also forswear the use of nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack from elsewhere.
On the face of it, this ``moral highroad" stance would likely enjoy the support of the majority of Japanese (and perhaps even American) citizens.
But let's phrase it another way: ``Should the U.S. assure North Korea that, in the event of a chemical or biological attack against its Japanese ally, it would not respond using ``all available means"?
Leaving a potential enemy wondering about the level of response to an act of hostility is aimed at making him think more than twice about starting trouble in the first place.
Please note that refusing to adopt a ``no first use" policy does not mean that the U.S. has a ``first use" policy or intends to use nuclear weapons preemptively or in response to chemical or biological attacks by North Korea or anyone else.
But, for deterrence reasons, it leaves open that possibility. Would Japanese (or American) citizens feel more or less secure if the U.S. limited its options in advance?
(Arguing for a ``no first use of weapons of mass destruction" policy might make sense, however, but this is another issue and one that should be discussed privately between allies before public pronouncements are made).
Secretary Gates, in discussing the ``secret pact" issue with Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, warned that ``We hope that care is taken not to have a negative impact on nuclear deterrence and the bilateral relationship." The same applies to ``no first use."
Gates' mention of the extended deterrent provides context for this entire discussion. Extended deterrence is the cornerstone of the U.S-Japan security treaty, which is in turn the foundation of the two countries' security strategies.
It is remarkable to us that the new government in Tokyo would risk threatening that core of the alliance at the very time when conversations in Tokyo reveal growing concern about the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense.
Several Japanese interlocutors have even suggested that Japan consider revising the three principles by dropping the one forbidding the introduction of nuclear weapons as a cure for the lack of confidence and to add an extra level of deterrence in the face of North Korea's demonstrated nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.
We are not suggesting that Japan needs to change its three principles ― that is a decision for the Japanese alone to make ― but the DPJ's demand for transparency has the potential to poison alliance discussions and raise even more doubts about the glue that binds the two alliance partners.
Before the Hatoyama government paints itself into a corner, it needs to think through where it plans to go with its ``secret pact" investigation and its support for a ``no first use" policy and make clear to the Japanese people ― and its U.S. allies ― what the desired end result will be.
Is Tokyo really prepared to open this potential Pandora's box? Or is the new government in Tokyo playing a high-stakes game of chicken, assuming the U.S. will ``blink" and continue to defend Japan despite clear indications that U.S. security requires it to maintain opacity when it comes to transporting or using its nuclear weapons? Neither move makes sense to us.
Please note that we are not accusing the Hatoyama government of deliberately trying to undermine or diminish the alliance relationship.
The prime minister has made it clear that he sees the Japan-U.S. alliance as ``the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy" and that he wants to ``deepen the alliance in a multilayered way from medium- and long-term perspectives."
While he has received a lot of criticism over his support for East Asia community building efforts that do not necessarily involve the U.S., he has also made it clear that ``priority must be given to the Japan-U.S. alliance."
But he has also thrown Washington off guard by mentioning that he wants to renegotiate the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that currently protects U.S. forces serving in Japan ― it does not place them above the law, but put limits on jurisdiction based on the offense and whether or not it was committed in the line of duty.
SOFA discussions are certainly not off limits; they seem to be perpetual (with South Korea as well as with Japan, with each watching for precedents that the other may set). But vehicles exist for such deliberations.
Publicly adding SOFA, host nation support, and other sensitive issues to the list of other contentious issues like the ``secret pact" investigation, ``no first use," and Futenma relocation before President Barack Obama's first visit to Japan this week seems aimed more at trying to persuade him not to come than at laying the groundwork for a successful summit.
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (pacforum@hawaii.rr.com), a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Brad Glosserman is executive director of the forum.