By Tong Kim
Despite Chairman Kim Jong-il's conciliatory steps toward Seoul and Washington, there is no sign of moving toward serious negotiations for denuclearization. By keeping pressure on North Korea with sanctions, both the United States and South Korea want the North to reaffirm its commitment to denuclearization and return to the six-party talks. Kim has not done it and it is not certain he will do so under the present circumstances.
Recently, Kim released two American reporters and a South Korean detainee, and returned four fishermen with their boat to the South. Kim normalized traffic and access to the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, reopening hotlines across the heavily armed Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The North and the South agreed to hold reunion meetings between separated families.
During the mourning period for the late former President Kim Dae-jung, a North Korean delegation delivered the North Korean leader's verbal message to President Lee Myung-bak that the North wants to mend relations with the South. Lee told the North Korean envoy his government is different from any of its predecessors in handling inter-Korean relations.
The Lee administration's policy is simple and clear: the South will help the North, if and when progress is made in denuclearization. The unification minister called the North's recent measures ``a tactical shift" that falls short of meeting its commitment to denuclearization.
The Seoul government wants to treat the North as another state based on the international norm of diplomatic practice. In this context, the inter-Korean relationship would no longer be considered as a ``special relationship between two divided states of the same nation." This change of thinking is a direct refutation of the North Korean insistence that the issues of inter-Koreans relations and reunification should be approached from the position of ``between us the same nation," excluding the influence of external forces.
Kim Jong-iI also conveyed his message by way of Bill Clinton to the Obama administration that he wants to have dialogue with the United States, the same message he tried to follow up through New Mexico governor Bill Richardson and other channels. Washington welcomed an easing of seriously negotiate with the North.
The format of the talks is a problem: it is a problem of face for the North. Washington wants to revive the six-party talks, which Pyongyang said it would never return to. Pyongyang wants bilateral talks, which Washington says would only be possible within the context of the multilateral talks. North Korea's return to the six-party talks should automatically renew its commitment to the Sept. 19 joint statement, in which the North promised to abandon its nuclear weapons.
There is some hope that North Korea might make a further move toward ending the deadlock of nuclear talks. It is true North Korea has a record of shifting from confrontation to engagement. The North Koreans would often drop provocative rhetoric or actions and shift to conciliatory gestures when its militant offensive reached a wall.
The real motivation behind Kim's decision to ease tensions is unknowable. But, there are several theories: Kim is seeking an exit strategy from the increasing pressure of international sanctions; the North has realized that its pressure policy has failed to change Seoul's equally confrontational policy; as revenues for foreign currency diminish, the North turns to the South for economic benefits that are not subject to U.N. sanctions; now that Pyongyang's internal needs ― to solidify Kim 's power base and to establish a succession order ― have been addressed, Kim wants to move forward on foreign policy; and, now at full health, Kim is 100 percent in control of day-to-day decisions.
There are more theories.
Many analysts suspected provocative decisions were made by the powerful military generals who were filling in for their leader, while he was physically too sick ― especially during last fall/winter ― to manage day-to-day business and while he was politically vulnerable because of the succession issue. There is no evidence to support this argument.
The evidence we have is that, since January, Kim has shown up on almost 100 occasions ― including visits to military units and economic activities for on-the-spot guidance and watching the April 5 missile launch. It is still Kim who can make big decisions that can affect the interest of the South and the international community. North Korean propaganda describes him as a political genius and infallible leader.
But he has made several grave foreign policy mistakes.
In September 2000, Kim delayed sending his envoy to Washington. If Jo Myong-rok had come to Washington six months earlier, President Clinton would have sealed a final deal on missiles and nuclear weapons.
His ``gutsy" confession to Koizumi ― that the North had kidnapped Japanese citizens ― backfired, as Japan used it as political justification to sanction the North and refuse to join in the implementation of economic aid agreed in the six-party talks.
Taking the candidate, at the time, Barack Obama's words at face value that if elected he would meet with Kim, like many others, Kim misjudged how this policy would play out.
Perhaps his most recent mistake is Pyongyang's repeated pronouncement that it would never return to the six-party talks.
Now the North finds it difficult to return to the six-party talks without losing face. At China's prodding, Kim could make another surprise decision. But China alone is not enough. Kim needs help from the United States in order to rationalize a decision to return to the six-party talks. He hoped his recent conciliatory moves would help the Obama administration open a new avenue for engagement.
At this point, the North Koreans are hoping to have bilateral talks with Washington to discuss a whole range of issues ― nuclear weapons, missiles, security assurance, a peace treaty, etc. There is still hope for Washington to achieve a complete verifiable nuclear dismantlement of North Korea. To this end, indefinite waiting is not the solution.
The United States should have nothing to fear by meeting the North Koreans bilaterally. It can coordinate a new approach with other participants in the six-party talks before it meets the North. It can limit the agenda for a bilateral meeting to a discussion on North Korea's return to the multilateral talks.
The transition of government in Japan to the Democratic Party is also an auspicious development for the North's return to the six-party talks, in which Pyongyang harshly decried Japan's negative role.
Perhaps the current conditions are most favorable to the restart of nuclear negotiations since Pyongyang's second nuclear test. We should not miss this opportunity.
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.