By Tong Kim
Since the middle of last January North Korea has intensified tensions on the Korean Peninsula and toughened its stance on denuclearization by delineating new, separate, offensive postures on South Korea and the United States.
Pyongyang's latest defiance reflects a joint strategic calculation among the military, the party and the cabinet administration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) ― as they were represented by the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs backed by party and cabinet organs Rodong and Minju Chosun.
By Pyongyang's new tactic on the South, the North would disregard any of its ``political or military agreements with the South that intended to end inter-Korean confrontation." Further it has ``nullified" the 1992 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South: it would not observe the NLL (Northern Limit Line). The KPA's General Staff berated the Lee Myung-bak government as ``unqualified" to participate in the denuclearization talks.
On the United States, North Korea is imposing new conditions for denuclearization: normalization before denuclearization, nuclear verification of both sides of the peninsula, and complete drop of hostile U.S. policy and verified removal of the U.S. nuclear threat. In addition, the North wants to remain as a nuclear weapons state; it wants to be treated as such by the United States.
The North has weaponized, DPRK officials said, over 30 kg of plutonium previously reported to the six-party talks and the weapons will be excluded from verification. The North will give up its weapons only when it determines that the hostile U.S. policy and U.S. threats have ended. The North Koreans suggested nuclear arms reduction talks, which would exclude South Korea and Japan, to discuss the nuclear issue of the world as a whole, not just the denuclearization of North Korea.
The North Koreans clearly want to sharpen their negotiating leverage by raising the obstacles for the Obama administration, even before it is ready to engage with them. Pyongyang is saying that it will continue on its path of independence, isolation and economic suffering, unless the United States wants to engage the North more seriously to address mutual security and political concerns. It is testing the new administration in Washington.
North Korea is still high on Obama's agenda, as suggested by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's plan to travel to Asia first. Despite Pyongyang's provocative rhetoric, the goal of a nuclear free North Korea must be achieved, and such an achievement will be in the best interests of all parties concerned.
On the other hand the North's pressure on the South is more worrisome and dangerous. A year after Lee Myung-bak's hard line policy of resistance against pressure from the North, the state of inter-Korean relations is the worst in decades beyond the point of recovery. Yet, President Lee recently said, ``Dialogue with the North will be resumed."
At this point it is hard to see how dialogue would be possible. Dialogue takes two sides, but the North would not come to the table unconditionally. Does Lee mean that his government will now accept the North's demands regarding the two previous summit agreements? In the face of Pyongyang's personal attacks on him as a ``traitor" and a ``U.S. sycophant," how can he show flexibility to depart from his ``principled stance of strict reciprocity" without losing face?
After the North Korean military said it nullified the NLL, some analysts were predicting the high possibility that the North might launch short-range missiles in the vicinity of the NLL to prove that its word is followed by action. The likelihood of the firing of another long-range missile by the North is a separate issue. The prospect of a renewed naval clash on the West Sea is looming as a clear and present danger.
There is a serious concern on which the Lee government might be basing its policy ― the possibility of a sudden change in the North, based on speculation of Kim Jong-il's health, or the possibility of a change in Pyongyang, as it would need food aid from the South. The Lee government has provided no food to the North, and some hard liners are known to believe another year of no food provision would either contribute to a North Korean collapse or compel the North to come to the table to beg for food. The North is more likely to seek food elsewhere than from the South under the current circumstances.
In the mist of such an ominous development, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) recently released a report on ``Sudden Change in North Korea," recommending that the United States should prepare for such change. The council's report developed three succession scenarios in the event of Kim Jong-il's incapacitation ― ``managed," ``contested" and ``failed" ― and provided an interesting discussion of how each scenario might develop and what the United States should do in each case.
The timing of its release, a week after Obama's inauguration, is intended to influence policy thinking in the new administration. The CFR, as a prestigious think tank, may make policy suggestions, and it had made them on Korea before. But the wisdom of this particular report is questionable.
Its problem is a lack of a factual basis for its argument. All three scenarios are based on speculation, unconfirmed reports, unsubstantiated rumors and fictional imagination. If the scenarios are fictitious and therefore not plausible, the rest of their follow-up discussions are largely immaterial, no matter how imaginatively interesting they may be. The central premise of the report is contingent on Kim Jong-il's condition ― the possibility that his health ``may actually be much worse than press reports suggest and that his capacity to govern ― if it hasn't already been seriously compromised ― may be short lived."
Five days before the report was released, Kim Jong-il demonstrated his seemingly normal physical and mental functionality when he met with Wang Jiarui, a cadre of the Chinese Communist Party. The situation in Pyongyang seemed to have returned to the ``status quo ante."
(On the issues of Kim's health and succession, I suggest that the readers see my earlier writing, ``Kim Jong-il on Spotlight" published in this column September 21, 2008.)
Regardless of Kim Jong-il's health condition, a father to son succession is most likely to be repeated, based on a best understanding of North Korean politics and a long history of Korean dynasties.
For both Washington and Seoul, it would be risky to formulate policy based on unsound imaginary theories of unproven hypotheses, absent a good analysis of ``actionable intelligence." Discreet preparation for a sudden change in the North might be a prudent thing to do. But its public discussion is not helpful to tackling the task of denuclearization or to managing the heightened state of inter-Korean tensions. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com