By Tong Kim
Since U.S. President-elect Barack Obama's election, Korea watchers have eagerly debated what the new administration might do about the North. Obama inherits the unfinished business of North Korean denuclearization during the worst economic recession in decades and more urgent foreign policy issues in Afghanistan and the Middle East ― Iraq and the recently renewed warfare in Gaza ― will dictate his priorities.
And yet, the importance of pursuing a denuclearized Korean Peninsula does not change as long as the United States has continuing strategic interests in maintaining peace and stability in Asia and in ensuring that Pyongyang keep a lid on the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Many conservative analysts believe ― or want to believe ― that Obama will be little different from current U.S. president George W. Bush in terms of his approach to North Korea and continue with the six-party process that the Bush administration has pushed forward with noteworthy success in the last two years.
On the other hand, many progressive thinkers wishfully expect Obama to increase direct talks with the North Koreans, leading to an Obama-Kim Jong-il meeting within or outside the six-party frame to bring about a conclusive resolution to the chronic North Korean problem by dismantling Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program in return for the normalization of ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
This group thinks Obama, uncertain of quick success on other diplomatic fronts, would be interested in facilitating the denuclearization of North Korea, which appears to be more feasible. The DPRK, through its New Year's joint editorial, has signaled that it wants to negotiate with the Obama administration more seriously than it did with the Bush administration.
A third view emerging among many other observers is that the North Korean issue will be put on the backburner again, as Obama will be swarmed with more pressing domestic and foreign policy issues that will demand his focused attention. His administration's policy will be limited to the ``management" of the North Korean issue by accepting the status quo, in which the North halts nuclear production but remains a nuclear power.
The people who will soon take the job of dealing with North Korea ― some of whom supported Obama's candidacy during the campaign ― have certainly been studying the Korean issue and should have a pretty good idea of what course of action the next administration should take from day one. The Obama team is now being formed, and I have some suggestions for it:
Stay the course with the six-party talks, but with more intensified and realistic negotiation with the DPRK. The goal should be the North's complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament. A final settlement should never accept the DPRK as a nuclear power, limited or otherwise. Verification should be a continuing process that can begin during, and end after, the third phase of the Feb. 13 agreement for dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear facilities and the disposition of nuclear weapons. Don't get hung up on a written verification accord at this point.
Discard the Bush policy of ``denuclearization first." It won't work. Set timelines for ending the state of war in Korea and concluding a peace agreement to replace the armistice agreement. The timelines will have to be linked to specific progress in negotiation, but a peace regime does not have to wait until after denuclearization, nor should it be agreed upon concurrently with formal diplomatic recognition after facility dismantlement but before the final removal of Pyongyang's actual weapons. Undertake negotiations on both issues ― a peace agreement and normalization ― parallel with nuclear talks. Normalization should be part of a final quid pro quo at the end of the process.
Draw a new road map with a conceptual timetable including a clear beginning and end, although it will be subject to revision and require a constant review as it encounters new twists and turns.
Prepare for discussion of the DPRK's persistent interest in light-water reactors. Design separate strategies for missiles and other security issues. Disassociate political and humanitarian issues from security issues. Bite the bullet and forget about a package deal. The issues are too complex despite being legitimate causes of concern; tackle the security issues first.
Appoint a chief North Korea policy officer at the State Department reporting directly to the secretary of state and the president, or appoint a non-proliferation czar at the White House to focus on proliferation issues, including a focus on North Korea and Iran. The reported appointment of Wendy Sherman, former assistant to President Clinton and his North Korean policy coordinator, is an encouraging sign of Obama's commitment to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.
Dispatch Ambassador Sherman, if she lands the job, as a presidential envoy to Pyongyang early on, before the reconvening of the six-party talks. She can inform the North Koreans that the United States would be ready to resume talks. Have the envoy assure them of Washington's willingness to vindicate the basic premises laid out in the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique of October 12, 2000, ensuring that neither side harbors hostile intent toward the other and both promise respect for ``each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs."
Sherman can tell the North Korean leadership that a meeting with President Obama is possible when the United States and its allies are convinced that the North truly intends to abandon its nuclear weapons even before complete denuclearization. To prove its intentions, the North must take positive but irreversible steps.
Ambassador Sherman's initial visit to Pyongyang could be augmented by a Track II approach. Send heavyweights ― such as former secretary of state Madeline Albright, who met with Kim Jong-il in 2002, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry or Sam Nunn ― the last three of whom were recommended by James T. Laney, a former ambassador to South Korea, in a recent conference in Seoul that I attended.
These prominent Americans can visit Pyongyang individually on a well-spaced time schedule or as a group should the need arise. In either case, the message should be consistent: The United States wants to improve relations with the North and help its economy if it's willing to work with the U.S. in order to resolve issues of concern to each side.
Resume negotiations when ready, but quickly. While talks are underway in a multilateral forum in Beijing, this writer recommends that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meet bilaterally with her DPRK counterpart on the sidelines of the next ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). Even with just an exchange of views and information, this level of diplomacy authoritatively ensures that negotiations are carried out at lower levels.
Persuade Seoul and Pyongyang to resume inter-Korean dialogue, which Washington failed at during the Kim Young-sam administration. It's difficult when the two Koreas are at each other's throats but both should stop blaming each other and make more proactive attempts at restoring relations.
I also suggest that Kim Jong-il seize this opportunity to improve relations with the United States and improve his country's security and economy as he has yet to demonstrate a genuine interest in abandoning nuclear weapons. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com