By Andrei Lankov
In 1910 the Korean state ceased to exist, becoming yet another part of the Japanese empire. For 35 years Koreans were deprived not just of an independent state, but of any control over their own destiny.
The colonial bureaucracy was deliberately designed in a way that excluded Koreans from having any say in the affairs of their own country.
At the very center of the colonial bureaucracy was a governor general, a prominent general of the Japanese Army or admiral of the Japanese Navy (and often an aspiring or retired prime minister of Japan).
Theoretically, the job was open to civilians, but in practice not a single civilian official ever occupied this important post. Formally, the governor general was directly responsible to the emperor, and not to the cabinet.
In fact, being one of the most powerful persons in Japan, the governor general wielded nearly unrestricted power within Korea's borders.
Being the chief executive of the colony, the governor general had legislative and judicial powers as well. He could issue ordinances on supposedly ``minor'' matters. These ordinances, known ``puryeong'' (furei in Japanese) needed no approval, even from the emperor himself.
If such an ordinance was violated, the culprit could be subject to the maximum penalty of one-year imprisonment without any formal judicial trial. Ordinances on more serious matters had to be approved by the emperor.
Despite their geographic proximity, in the period 1910-1945 Korea was not a part of Japan, but was its colony. This made a huge difference.
Japanese laws were seldom applied to Korea, which was governed by the laws and ordinances specially designed and approved by the governor general and his bureaucracy.
These regulations tended to be harsher than similar Japanese laws. For example, until 1920 Koreans could be subject to corporal punishment ― a practice that had been long outlawed in Japan proper.
A colonial official explained: ``Flogging being a form of punishment practiced in Korea for ages, it seemed likely to be more effective as a measure of punishment for trifling offences than short imprisonment or small fines.''
Probably, the worst of all was the absence of democratic representation. Until its slide into military authoritarianism in the 1930s, Japan had a fairly developed democratic system, and its voters enjoyed a modicum of political influence. But none of that rubbed off on the situation in Korea.
There were some attempts at token representation, of course. When the country was annexed in 1910, the Japanese authorities established the Advisory Council.
It was supposed to include the most prominent Koreans, but it goes without saying that its members were hand-picked by the authorities from among their trusted supporters, local collaborators of all kinds.
Technically, the members of the Advisory Council were selected by the governor general and approved by the Emperor. However, this advisory body had few if any say in the decision-making process; and its members mostly, being dependent on the colonial authorities, avoided confrontation.
They wanted to keep their land holdings and profitable contracts ― and professing their loyalty to the emperor was the best way to do so.
Most people nowadays are sure that in the colonial era Koreans had no electoral power whatsoever. This is not quite the case, since some limited elections were introduced in the 1920s.
From that time, locally elected councils began to function in Korea. Each province had its own council, with 20 to 50 members, depending on the province size and population.
One third of the councillors were appointed by the governor of the province ``from among people of high reputation,'' and others were elected by members of the lower level councils.
The similar system operated at the county level where the council members were elected by shires. Only at the shire level were the elections direct, but even there a quarter of all seats were reserved for the Japanese, even though the ethnic Japanese comprised less then 5 percent of Korea's population.
No parties and party politics were allowed, and the governor general could dissolve councils at any level when he considered it necessary. Thus, even this restricted local democracy had a very doubtful quality.
But this hardly mattered, since councils had almost no power anyway. The councils were almost exclusively restricted to discussing questions of local budgets, and the head of the respective province, county, or shire could veto any decision of the council if it was not to his liking.
He also was allowed to execute policies he deemed necessary without first gaining the council's approval.
Thus, only in 1948 did the Koreans vote for the first time in their history.
Prof. Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. He has recently published ``The Dawn of Modern Korea,'' which is now on sale at Kyobo Book Center and other major bookstores. The book is based on columns published in The Korea Times. He can be reached at anlankov@yahoo.com.