By Tong Kim
The timing of President Lee Myung-bak's recent visit to Moscow ― where he ``upgraded" South Korea's relations with Russia to the level of a ``strategic partnership" ― may not have been appropriate from the perspective of Seoul's ``strategic alliance" with Washington. His visit was carried out at a time when U.S.-Russian relations are at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War.
Their relations are seriously strained by increased tensions due to their mutually provocative behaviors, including Russia's recent military attack on Georgia and subsequent talk in Washington of expelling Russia from the G-7 and WTO, not to mention the U.S. interest in eastward expansion of NATO encircling Russia and missile defense shields in Eastern Europe formerly under the control of the old Soviet Union.
Washington was not happy to see a democratic setback in Moscow that allowed Vladimir Putin to remain in power after changing his title from president to premier. The Bush administration, as well as both American presidential candidates, John McCain and Barack Obama who promised in their first debate to take a tougher stance on Russia to curb its potential revival as an imperial power, strongly condemned the Russian attack on Georgia.
If a ``strategic alliance with the United States" truly means a global partnership to take a common stance or coordinated action on international issues ― security, political, ecological, or humanitarian ― beyond the security arrangement on the Korean peninsula, one would think Seoul should stand by Washington's position on Russia.
In 2001 when South Korea issued a joint statement with Russia, praising the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty ― which the Bush administration was intending to abrogate in order to build a national missile defense system ― Seoul was seen by Washington as standing on the wrong side of the alliance. Although this was not a direct cause of the disastrous outcome of the first Bush-Kim Dae-jung summit, it did not help President Kim's effort to persuade Bush to accept his ``sunshine policy." Bush was adamant against engaging North Korea from the outset anyway.
Upon taking office President Lee Myung-bak embarked on a ``four-power diplomatic strategy," pledging to develop a ``strategic alliance with the United States" and to strengthen relations with China, Japan and Russia. These four powers are currently participants in the six-party process and, except for Russia, are South Korea's three largest trading partners.
The recent Russo-South Korean agreement to develop a natural gas pipeline project from Sakhalin to South Korea passing through North Korea may prove a good approach to Seoul's ``energy diplomacy" if realized. But it is a long-term shot as such a project would require Pyongyang's participation. Right now the North is not even talking to the South.
This gas pipeline idea, along with a conceptual plan of linking South Korea's railroads to a Siberian network of infrastructure, is not new. In fact it was former president Kim Dae-jung who first espoused this idea as part of his economic vision for the ``sunshine policy."
Recently I had an opportunity to talk to Jung Dong-young in Washington, the failed major candidate in the last presidential election: he still talks about, along the line of Kim Dae-jung's initiative, an economic integration with the North, in which the South can take advantage of cheap labor and land in order to increase its competitiveness as a ``fourth wave of power shift." I told him that could be a vision for Korea, but far away in the distant future. The voters were not ready during the election, and they are still not today, to support such a dream.
President Lee has so far met twice with the American president, twice with the Japanese prime minister and twice with the Chinese president. Lee finally met with the Russian leaders to complete a cycle of his four-power summits. Lee has established ``a strategic partnership" with China and even with Romania. While Lee's relations with other nations all seem to have been dubbed as ``strategic partnership," his relationship with Japan is different. He calls it a ``future-oriented mature relationship," in which he said his government would not ask Japan to apologize for its past.
Despite his original intention, Korea-Japan relations are still in limbo if not in confrontation not from disagreement on the North Korean nuclear issue as in the recent past but largely from a territorial dispute over the Dokdo islets. In my view if Korea keeps occupying the island based on historical evidence, prudently and quietly ignoring the Japanese claim, there would be nothing much Japan can do about it.
In the meantime, whatever the strategic U.S.-ROK alliance means, there has been some notable progress between Seoul and Washington. Recently Congress passed a bill to treat South Korea as a favored nation along with NATO plus three other nations ― including Japan, Australia and New Zealand ― for foreign military sales (FMS). South Korea will receive benefits from a shortened approval period and reduced costs of weapons purchases.
Although the prospect of Congressional passage of the FTA is out of the question for this year, a student learning and work program as well as a visa waiver program is expected to be implemented soon. This is good news. Bad news is that Washington still wants Seoul to send some troops, police or military, to Afghanistan. And Washington wants Seoul to increase its share for the cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Korea.
In the negotiation of a next Special Measures Agreement (SMA), I have not seen a difference between Roh Moo-hyun's government and Lee's in its position to contribute as little as possible. This does not seem to jibe very well with Lee's U.S.-first policy. Again in my view, South Korea would be better off by investing money in the maintenance of U.S. forces, rather than purchasing military hardware through its upgraded FMS status, that would contribute to an arms race.
As the four powers are focused on the denuclearization of North Korea ― and denuclearization should be the most important security interest to the South, the Lee government should seek its role in the process of resolving this issue, by resuming talks with the North. Peace through dialogue and economic cooperation would be less expensive than a military buildup. Except for the nuclear threat, the balance in conventional forces on the peninsula, with a widening gap of economic capacity, tilted in favor of the South a long time ago.
The U.S. decision to keep its force level to 28,500 troops, canceling its earlier plan to cut an additional 3,000, was apparently based on a second thought of the requirements. This decision seemed to have had little to do with the pro-American attitude of the Lee government. Neither did it seem to be a precursor to the U.S. request for South Korea's re-dispatch of troops to Afghanistan or to Washington's interest in an extension of the stay of Korean troops in Iraq.
Lee Myung-bak once said, ``There would be no alliance with the United States, or a partnership with China without Korea's national interest." This was a sobering statement. Nations see the world through the lens of their national interest.
As it pursues its national interest, South Korea is already finding itself in a delicate position in the center of rivalry for influence over the region among a rising China, a Japanese economic superpower, a reasserting Russia eager to join the game, and the United States, still a sole superpower that may want to redefine its role in Northeast Asia. What's your take?
Tong Kim is a research professor with Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS. He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.